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Abstract
According to the European financial crises database from July 31, 2017, there are
18 European countries that still have not got their systems back to normal. Despite
crisis management being implemented in very few countries, formally the financial
crises are still in existence.
A common accelerator of economic crises is excessive credit growth. This cause
is not totally new, and it has been repeated with continuity over the last century.
Under certain economic conditions, financial intermediaries start to lose ground
together with their lending standards, resulting in them expanding their lending,
which leads to one of two major economic outcomes: growth or meltdown. How
does a bank decide whether to follow the herd or not? What are the institutional
arrangements that might potentially improve the banks’ choice in line with the
socially desirable arrangements expected by regulators and supervisors?
This thesis examines excessive funding supply as a potential source of market
imperfection, fueled by digitization and financial innovations in the banking in-
dustry, leading to excessive lending on residential property. The central research
question of this thesis can be formulated as follows: What are the implications of
the banking regulatory amendments (i.e., Basel III) for the funding strategies
of financial intermediaries in Europe? The delay of regulators in designing a
system for proper supervision and framing of that activity has led to imbalances in
markets and regulatory arbitrage. Changes in the locations of banks headquarters
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show that there is insufficient communication between the regulatory authority and
the industry, which is potentially caused by the underlying conflict between differ-
ent visions of the future of banking. The related research questions investigated in
this thesis and addressed in the form of appended essays are the following:
Q1: Does Basel III favor financial intermediaries that issue covered bonds? (Essay
A)
Q2: How does asset encumbrance affect banks’ asset allocations in terms of bal-
ance sheet growth and future encumbrance levels? (Essay B)
Q3: What is the effect of distance for competitor banks in the securitization deci-
sions of Swedish savings banks? (Essay C)
Q4: How do the characteristics of bank employees affect banking reform support
in Sweden? (Essay D)
The thesis consists of two parts: Part I is the kappa of the thesis and Chapter 1
in the kappa provides an institutional background for the thesis and introduces the
concepts used in the essays. Chapter 2 introduces the motivations for the research
questions addressed by the essays. The main theoretical concepts are presented in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the theoretical framework and research process of
the thesis. Chapter 5 summarizes the essays and provides a discussion of results and
future research. The essays, presented in Part II, aim to facilitate our understanding
of the financial intermediation process under regulatory changes.
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Part I
Introduction
Jane Fuller:
Banks face an onslaught of new regulation, but it is debatable whether much, or any, of
it will tackle fundamental weaknesses in the industrys structure. Perhaps the greatest of
these weaknesses is the too big to fail blanket that has wrapped itself around large and/or
complex financial institutions. This is despite the taxpayers anger at being bounced into
underwriting the risk-taking activities of overmighty and overpaid bankers.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission
on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2010, p.
xvii):
The crisis1 was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer
models gone haywire. The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial
system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving risks
within a system essential to the well-being of the American public. Theirs was a big miss,
not a stumble. While the business cycle cannot be repealed, a crisis of this magnitude need
not have occurred. To paraphrase Shakespeare, the fault lies not in the stars, but in us.
1 The Global Financial Crises of 2007
Chapter 1
Background
1.1 Introduction
The focus of this thesis is the persistent regulatory changes that have followed the
global financial crisis. The crisis came at significant costs to society by hampering
banks’ funding sources, leading to public funds being used to supplement the sud-
denly depleted markets of unsecured and even secured funding. Vast governmental
funds have been invested in order to renovate the financial system, which almost
collapsed during the years from 2007 to 2009 (Bernanke, 2010).
After the global financial crisis, public demand has also increased for additional
disclosure and supervisory comments on the policy interventions (see the discus-
sion in Costello et al. (2016) and Schoenmaker et al. (2016)). In line with Bouvard
et al. (2015), the wide media coverage put significant pressure on governments to
make the rationale for their actions more transparent. The publicly available disclo-
sures and thousands of interviews, published soon after the financial crisis, provide
invaluable material for academic studies on financial regulations and, in particular,
the stability of the banking system.
The global financial crisis is still relevant to study due both to the concern that,
as Thakor (2018) argues, there has been an irrelevant regulatory response (i.e.,
the implementation of Basel III) and because there are ongoing academic debates
about the reasons for the crisis. This thesis aims to characterize the shift of the
3
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regulatory framework in European banking, with a particular focus on Sweden, and
to evaluate the effect of the regulatory amendments of the last ten years on banks’
funding strategies. The design of the study is presented to get a first insight (i.e.,
in relation to the research question) how the changes in regulations have affected
banking behavior.
It is widely acknowledged that every banking crisis has come after a credit ex-
pansion, but, as stated by Mendoza and Terrones (2014), only one third of all credit
booms end up with a banking crisis. Mendoza and Terrones (2014) analyze the ma-
jor causes of credit booms, which are surges in capital inflows, gains in total factor
productivity (TFP), and policy reforms in the financial system. No matter the cause
of favorable economic conditions, it is more or less a fact that banks expand during
”good times” by providing more credit than they would do in other conditions.
The ”good times” may result from a TFP shock, during which a bank faces
structural changes in the economy and increased demand for credit due to a larger
amount of projects that formally comply with the bank’s lending standard. The
credit demand shock either goes along a credit rationing path (or credit crunch), in
which the bank rations some good projects and loses investment opportunities due
to its inability to get enough funding, or it simply meets the demand and funds all
profitable projects in the economy. The latter action results in economic growth.
A bank is expected not to increase the price of credit following increased demand
due to an adverse selection problem and ”lemon premiums” (Bernanke and Gertler,
1995).
Economic conditions, such as excessive money supply or favorable financial
liberalization, may incentivize a bank to engage in excessive lending and loosen its
lending policy by funding riskier borrowers than it usually does (for a discussion of
lending standards relaxation, see Ciccarelli et al. (2015)). Excessive credit supply
potentially leads to over-borrowing and spurs demand for residential properties,
which then starts price bubbles (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012).
Each over-borrowing spiral, during which the banking industry starts to accu-
mulate assets, is a concern because it builds the risk of a potential economic melt-
down. One out of three cases of banks starting to extend lending supply lead to
a crisis. The lending standards that constitute the basis for loan applications re-
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main mostly hidden from scholars. This opaqueness contributes to the difficulty of
distinguishing economic growth from risk accumulation based on a credit boom.
In its Basel III framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aims
to address the excessive lending supply by building up buffers in good times (eco-
nomic growth), while preventing extensive risk growth through capital charges in
bad times (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). According to the regulatory opinion, the last
few years have been an opportunity to build up buffers, and up till now there is no
convincing evidence of any banking crisis ahead. Most of the concerns regarding
banks are still echoes of the last global financial crisis. Whether the existing buffers
are enough to sustain the next downturn is an open question.
Essays A and B study the question of whether the exposures to risk are already
increasing in the banking industry through the use of covered bonds (CBs) as a way
to fund mortgages. The eased funding constraints lead to more mortgages issued
by banks, which in turn leads to price growth of residential properties. Essay A
studies whether the banks that exploit CBs as a source of funding grow faster than
other banks. Essay B looks at the persistence of the reliance on CBs as a funding
instrument.
The empirical focus of the thesis is situated in a European context, with a par-
ticular focus on Sweden. The main rationale behind the specific focus on Sweden
is that the country is one of the earliest adopters of the Basel III standards. The
study design, formalized in Essay C, examines the sharp decline in branch network
size of the four major Swedish banks due to digitization of banking services (e.g.,
moving bank loan applications to online forms, bank account management via a
telephone service). This is explored as an exogenous shock for the small Swedish
savings banks, which operate traditional banking. The main focus is on the loan
growth and securitization decisions of these banks when a competing commercial
bank closes down a nearby branch.
Even if the regulations were to perfectly address the issues within the banking
industry, there might still be a problem when it comes to regulatory enforcement;
that is, it is important to ensure that regulations are correctly implemented. Banks’
compliance with the current regulatory framework depends on managerial readi-
ness to enforce the standards properly. The managerial readiness to exert efforts
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to comply is a function of the agreement with regulatory enforcement. The banks’
accumulation of risky assets on their balance sheets is ambiguous given the banks’
characteristics, including unobservable managerial personal justifications of super-
vision discipline. One of the first attempts to approach that problem is made in
Essay D.
The fiercest debate remains about the nature of the crisis: whether it was liquid-
ity risk-based or credit risk-based, and more importantly, whether the new regula-
tory regime correctly addresses the fundamental causes of the banks’ failure. Un-
fortunately, the European Union provides significantly fewer comments on their
actions than does the US Federal Reserve system. The European Central Bank
(ECB) does not disclose the auditory reports and investigation results on European
financial institutions’ failures. The materials explicitly disclosed by the ECB, the
European Banking Authority (EBA), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
or other European Central Banks are not sufficient for gaining a satisfactory picture
of the recent crisis.
In contrast, US financial markets are widely covered by mass media, with in-
terviews, reports, and statements available for any date. Specifically, the Fraud En-
forcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-21) created the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission to examine those major financial institutions that failed
or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government (Fi-
nancial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Once this investigation had been made
in response to the US banks’ failure operated globally, in this thesis I elaborate
on problems revealed for banks’ US divisions that, I imply, persist for the global
banking industry, including the EU financial system.
The narrative of Section 1.1 familiarizes the reader with the thesis topic and
discusses why the topic is relevant. In Section 1.2, I first discuss how academics
are currently addressing the puzzle of the global financial crisis and I elaborate
on some of the potential limitations of existing empirical work. Second, I outline
the steps that this thesis takes to address (although by no means perfectly) such
empirical discrepancies. Section 1.3 describes the specific institutional weaknesses
in the US that led to the spread of sub-prime poor lending practices becoming a
systemic global crisis, as well as the rationale for regulatory responses. Section
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1.4 summarizes the mechanism of the crisis as it spread to the European Union.
Section 1.5 examines the EU regulatory response to the problems. Finally, Section
1.6 presents the institutional background of the thesis.
1.2 The scholarly representation of 2007–2008
The turmoil of 2007-2008, which is usually labeled as the global financial crisis,
showed us that liquidity and system design matter. Brunnermeier (2009) was one
of the very first scholars to express his opinion on the major events. He provides a
version of what went wrong to cause a series of banking collapses. His version is
formalized in the published model by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Concep-
tually, the funding liquidity constraint averts traders from taking capital-intensive
illiquid positions, and consequently transfer the shock of funding liquidity (e.g.,
higher trade margins) to a shock for market liquidity (that is, the availability of
instruments, such as repurchase agreement deals, to fund banking operations).
In order to grasp the whole situation without resorting to anecdotal evidence, let
us consider the case of Bear Stearns. According to Brunnermeier (2009), the failure
of Bear Stearns was nothing more than the unfortunate coincidence of two factors.
The first factor was Carlyle Capital, an Amsterdam-listed hedge fund, clearing out
its portfolio in order to compensate the rising credit spread between agency bonds
(issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and treasury bonds. The second factor
was a late email on the evening of March 11, 2008 from an unnamed hedge fund to
Goldman Sachs ”asking it to step into a contractual relationship that would increase
Goldman’s direct exposure to Bear Stearns” (Brunnermeier, 2009). Brunnermeier
(2009, p. 88) notes:
Given the late request, Goldman only ’novated’ (accepted) the new contract on the morning
of March 12. In the meantime, the late acceptance was (wrongly) interpreted as a refusal
and was leaked to the media, causing unease among Bear Stearns’s hedge fund clients.
Morris and Shin (2008) presented a paper (published nearly two months before
Brunnermeier (2009)) that attempts to challenge the efficacy of the capital regula-
tion paradigm. They argue in favor of liquidity regulation and the systemic context
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of macroprudential regulation, and they quote from Christopher Cox’s letter to the
Basel Committee:1
As you will see, the conclusion to which these data point is that the fate of Bear Stearns
was the result of a lack of confidence, not a lack of capital. When the tumult began last
week, and at all times until its agreement to be acquired by JP Morgan Chase during the
weekend, the firm had a capital cushion well above what is required to meet supervisory
standards calculated using the Basel II standard.
Specifically, even at the time of its sale on Sunday, Bear Stearns’ capital, and its broker-
dealers’ capital, exceeded supervisory standards. Counterparty withdrawals and credit de-
nials, resulting in a loss of liquidity - not inadequate capital - caused Bear’s demise.
Morris and Shin (2008) argue that the main cause of the failure of Bear Stearns
was maturity mismatch, in which long-term assets were funded by short-term lia-
bilities. Thus, the story falls in line with the ”black swan” concept: the systematic
inherent fragility (maturity mismatch) and interconnectedness turned into a huge
meltdown due to an event with extremely low probability in theory, in other words,
it constituted a ”butterfly effect”. It is clearly stated that this butterfly emerged
from a rollover risk of a bank’s funding instrument, stemming from, in opinion of
Brunnermeier (2009), provoked by CNBC panic.
It is worth noting that Brunnermeier (2009) relies on the unreferenced Gold-
man Sachs’ contract acceptance, while Morris and Shin (2008) cite a favorable
communication paper for their arguments. At the same time, in both papers the au-
thors neglect the unfavorable oversight reports available when they were working
on their drafts. On September 25, 2008, Report No. 446-A2 was released, but it
was probably neglected by the authors as it was evidence that did not fall in line
with the story of prudentially compliant banks failing under systemic risks.
Report No. 446-A underlines several facts about Bear Stearns’s failure, which
do not make a perfect fit with the lost of confidence story. The major statements
from the audit results are as follows (my clarifications and comments are in square
brackets):
1 Chairman Cox Letter to the Basel Committee in Support of New Guidance on Liquidity Man-
agement, 2008-48, see www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm.
2 Audit of SEC’s Oversight of Bear Steams and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised
Entity Program, Report No. 446-A, https://www.sec.gov/files/446-a.pdf
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• Bear Stearns was fully compliant with Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Pro-
gram’s Capital Ratio And Liquidity Requirements.
[A careful reading of the document’s methodology appendix on page 71 reveals the
fact that the scope of the audit did not imply recalculation and validation of the data
provided by the CSE firms, which simply means that the audit did not validate the
actual compliance.]
• Bear Stearns was not compliant with the spirit of certain Basel II standards and we did
not find sufficient evidence that Commission’s Division of Trading and Markets (TM)
required Bear Stearns to comply with these standards. [i.e. Pillar II, statement 777:
”Supervisors should take appropriate actions where the risks arising from a bank’s
credit risk concentrations are not adequately addressed by the bank”.]
TM became aware of that risk management of mortgages at Bear Stearns had numerous
shortcomings:
– lack of expertise by risk managers in mortgage-backed securities at various times;
– lack of timely formal review of mortgage models: persistent understaffing;
– a proximity of risk managers to traders suggesting a lack of independence;
– turnover of key personnel during times of crisis;
– the inability or unwillingness to update models to reflect changing circumstances.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, TM missed opportunities to push Bear Stearns ag-
gressively to address these identified concerns.
• TM authorized (without an appropriate delegation of authority) the CSE firms’ inter-
nal audit staff to perform critical audit work involving the risk management systems
instead of the firms’ external auditors as required by the rule that created the CSE
program.
Aside the falling apart claim about Bear Stearns as a compliant bank, Brunner-
meier’s (2009) story about Goldman’s late acceptance being perceived as ”hesita-
tions” starts to look perverse upon re-watching the actual CNBC interview from
12 March 2008. On that day, there were two videos: one in the morning (9:48 a.m.
ET) and one in the evening (≈3 p.m. ET). In the morning, CNBC’s David Faber
asked Bear Stearns’s chief executive Alan Schwartz to clarify the information he
got from a reliable source:
So when I am told by a hedge fund, that I know well, that last night they tried to close
out a mortgage credit protection / a mortgage position with Goldman Sachs that they had
bought a year ago. Bear was the low bid and I am told the Goldman would not accept the
counterparty risk of Bear Stearns.
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In the evening video, Faber commented on the morning interview:
I have heard that this trade did actually go through, Goldman did say: ”All right now we
will accept Bears as a counterparty”
These interviews suggest that the actual point of the story was that there was a
quite reliable source reporting on Goldman’s refusal to ”novate” the contract with
Bear Stearns. As time passed, that information appeared to be the truth. According
to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2010): Final Report of the National Com-
mission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
(pages 287-288):3
Hayman Capital Partners, a hedge fund in Texas wanting to decrease its exposure to sub-
prime mortgages, had decided to close out a relatively small million subprime derivative
position with Goldman Sachs. Bear Stearns offered the best bid, so Hayman expected
to assign its position to Bear, which would then become Goldman’s counterparty in the
derivative. Hayman notified Goldman by a routine email on Tuesday, March 11, at 4:06
P.M. The reply 41 minutes later was unexpected: GS does not consent to this trade.
That startled Kyle Bass, Hayman’s managing partner. He told the FCIC he could not
recall any counterparty rejecting a routine novation. Pressed for an explanation, Goldman
the next morning offered no details: Our trading desk would prefer to stay facing Hayman.
We do not want to face Bear. Adding to the mystery, 16 minutes later Goldman agreed to
accept Bear Sterns as the counterparty after all.
The story of regulative forbearance, failure to meet Basel II standards and poor
risk management practice is transformed into a recognized series of publications
related to bank runs and arguments for liquidity regulations. Brunnermeier (2009)
sold the story with Goldman Sachs as a delayed response mistakenly perceived
by the market as a rejection, while CNBC reported that Goldman Sachs actually
rejected entering into the contractual relationship with Bear Stearns. Morris and
Shin (2008) cite an early letter from Cox to the Basel Committee in April 2008,
not noticing the later audit results which do not fit with their arguments.
Brunnermeier (2009) turned the pieces of evidence into the wrong market in-
terpretation of Goldman’s late acceptance that caused a bank run on the regulatory
compliant bank, and which was explained by Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009)
3 Available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/content-detail.html
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model via liquidity spirals. It is worth noting that the model, which the authors
had first tried to publish in 2005, was accepted for publication in the same year
as Brunnermeier’s article on the crisis, and that both papers have since then been
cited more than 3,000 times each. Does it mean that academics provide unbiased
studies and deliver effective risk mitigation practices? Do we actually learn what
went wrong from recent financial studies? One might consider the possibility that
not all efforts have been made to learn this.
In this section, I have described and illustrated some major problems of the in-
stitutional and academic structures around the banking industry and the consequent
policy implications. In short, scholars may risk moral hazard by pushing their ar-
guments such that they misreport the actual events or data. Furthermore, regulators
might be prone to strengthen the credibility of their decisions by basing them on
reports that might be subject to misrepresentation problems. As a result, regulatory
and supervisory amendments supported by widely cited academic papers may have
a chance to pass and be adopted. Nobody can give a full guarantee that the Basel
III regulatory amendments are not subject to similar problems. The wrongly ad-
dressed problems within the banking industry lead to unintended consequences of
unknown magnitude. This thesis addresses the reproducibility of datasets, which
are used in the essays.
1.3 The global financial crisis of 2007: The bigger perspective
In an economy, several things might go wrong and lead to the sort of financial
downturns known as financial crises. Claessens and Kose (2013) identify four types
of financial crises: debt crisis (the inability to borrow in debt markets, whether ex-
ternal or domestic); currency crisis (depreciation of the local currency exchange
rate); sudden stop crisis (large reversal of capital flows); and banking crisis (failure,
losses, or runs in the banking industry). Some of these crises often occur simulta-
neously or follow each other. Some crisis events occur due to similar fundamentals,
or a crisis event may trigger the fundamental cause of another. For instance, sudden
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stops may trigger a bank run, while a domestic debt crisis may lead to a protracted
deterioration in the quality of banks’ assets.
Given the series of financial crises over the last 100 years (for a summary of ma-
jor financial crises, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2013)), the global financial crisis of
2007-2009 has created an invaluable empirical opportunity to acquire information
previously not available to academics. As mentioned above, the high social dam-
age caused by the global financial crisis has brought extensive social attention to it.
Following the disclosed information and comments from various parties, such as
bankers, supervisors, and auditors involved in the investigations, researchers have
started to look more at the banking system design and institutional quality. In Sec-
tion 1.2, I discussed an example of scholars fitting reality to their models. In this
section, I focus on various facts which governmental and supervisory commission
reports claim to be sources of institutional weaknesses that led to the financial cri-
sis.
The probability of a country being involved in the global financial crisis is based
on the trigger source of unsupervised foreign banking exposure to the US financial
industry. Therefore, without a loss of generality, the summary of the causes of the
crisis may be limited to US coverage, and exposure (or the second order condition:
exposure to the exposed entity) of a certain country to US losses is determined by
country-specific supervisory and regulatory factors (for further details, see Section
1.4).
The narratives of the extensive bank lending in the wake of the financial melt-
down had been discussed widely long before the start of the global financial crisis.
The improperly supervised lending institution might take speculative positions us-
ing funds, which are protected by the deposit insurance safety net - the classic
”heads I win, tails you lose” situation (Bernanke, 2002). In a speech from 2002,
Bernanke made a statement that very much describes what would happen five years
later:
When this moral hazard is present, credit flows rapidly into inelastically supplied assets,
such as real estate.
Given the academic background and the deep ex ante understanding of the un-
derlying processes of bubbles, Bernanke (2002) expressed his concerns about not
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having resolved the regulatory response to price bubbles. That Bernanke’s pro-
nounced concerns remained unaddressed has led to a classic case of regulatory
forbearance and, as a consequence, the worst financial recession since the Great
Depression.
The practitioners’ perception of academic reasoning was classified by Bernanke
(2002) into two camps: lean-against-the-bubble strategy; and aggressive bubble
popping. These strategies to address a price bubble advocate a monetary policy
response at different rates of intensity. However, Bernanke’s (2002) argument is
that neither of these views is consistent with practice, since monetary policy is not
the proper instrument to deal with putative bubbles. Aspiring bubble poppers pay
a high price by the risk of vanishing economic growth, while soft, safe popping
would not have any effect on a heated market.
Bernanke’s (2002) main argument is not to allow speculative misuse of the
safety net in the first place; or, failing that, to intervene and fix the problem when it
is recognized. Later, Bernanke (2015, p. 127) explained why supervision does not
work either:
Stationing on-site teams of examiners at the same large banks for protracted periods could
have made them too willing to accept the prevailing assumptions and biases at the institu-
tions they supervised.
Any efforts to formalize and unify the supervisory process were pushed back.
The 2005 regulatory initiative of Susan Bies to make supervision more central-
ized was resisted by the Reserve Bank presidents. Later, the drafted guidance on
non-traditional mortgages (70 FR 77249 from December 29, 2005) met unprece-
dented pressure from Congress and the financial industry. According to the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), the Fed initiative was torn to shreds by the
American Bankers Association (which said the guidance ”overstate[d] the risk of
non-traditional mortgages”) and by Congress (”[saying] that we were going to deny
the dream of homeownership to Americans if we put this new stronger standard in
place” - Susan Bies).
The results of governmental investigations provide a totally different picture of
the crisis compared to the academic picture of liquidity problems. The problems
seem not to be within the Basel II framework, but rather with the Fed’s inability
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to put Basel II standards in place or to provide any kind of response to the evident
problems of the deteriorating lending practices. The misalignment of the institu-
tional authorities and safety-net abuse led to a global dissemination of the crisis.
The conflict of interest between the Fed, on the one side, and Congress with the
bankers, on the other, underlines the importance of clear and stable communication
channels and the necessity to have a major consensus between all players in the
market. The failure of the Fed’s regulatory enforcement might be a result of an in-
ability of the Fed to communicate clearly about the seriousness of the situation and
the necessity to take active steps. The personal or institutional disagreement (i.e.,
unaligned incentives) on supervisory discipline caused unprecedented economic
disruptions. This is the lesson that has not been properly studied: the disagreement
displays the underlying conflict of interest that might result in serious turmoil.
1.4 The European perspective on the global financial crisis
The global financial crisis came to the EU through the US sub-prime mortgage
exposure. The bank holding companies held huge investment funds within their
structure. These funds were directly exposed to sub-prime products. This section
aims to align the spillovers from the US and the regulatory response at the Eu-
ropean scale. The series of dates and events during the financial meltdown follow
Guille´n (2009), who provides the most extensive documented timeline of the global
economic and financial crisis, while the ECB’s and other authorities’ reactions and
auxiliary details are derived and systematized on a manual basis with all the refer-
ences enclosed.
The first warning bell rang on February 7, 2007, when HSBC announced loan
impairment charges and other credit risk provisions of US$8.8bn. Michael Geoghe-
han, the HSBC Holdings plc Group Chief Executive from 2006 to 2010, during a
conference call on February 8, the transcript of which is available under HSBC
investor disclosures, commented on additional provisioning (p. 3):
There’s enough industry information out there, not to dwell on that too much, but the
reality is, what we’ve looked at – and this is in some depth; my hands are all over this
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and we have been sort of focusing on this all the time since we gave you our last trading
update, both with the HSBC Finance and with our investment bank, and myself involved,
directly – where we see the situation is that we are looking at different areas and where we
believe that the first lien mortgagee will foreclose – and we’re seeing a lot of that going
on– we are then saying, well, it’s unlikely we’ll get anything for the second lien.
Shortly thereafter, on March 12, Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, member of the ex-
ecutive board of the ECB, discussed the competitiveness of European financial
markets at the Washington Economic Policy Conference, Washington, D.C.:4
A comparison with the United States, for example, suggests that the dispersion of mortgage
rates across US regions is lower than among euro area countries. Therefore, the ECB
broadly supports the European Commission’s initiative to review existing impediments to
the integration of European mortgage markets and the potential benefits of market-led and
regulatory measures to address them. Particularly in the secondary market for mortgages,
and in the funding practices, I see significant potential for integration.
By April 2007, the concerns about the imperfectly globalized financial market
were becoming more and more pronounced, but mostly on a conceptual level. On
April 18, Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the ECB, expressed his concerns re-
garding the development of credit derivatives at the 22nd Annual General Meeting
of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), Boston. The opac-
ity and unsupervised net credit risk exposures and concentration of positions in line
with liquidity and systemic risk amplifications were the most pronounced worries
during his speech. On July 28, Jos Manuel Gonzlez-Pramo, member of the exec-
utive board of the ECB dealing with the financial stability assessment of central
banks, was confronted by the increasing complexity and interdependencies of fi-
nancial systems due to the rapid pace of innovation and the ongoing globalization
and integration of financial markets.
August is a vacation month sometimes referred to as ”August shutdown”. Dur-
ing that month in 2007, there were no documented speeches by representatives of
the ECB. However, two European financial institutions got hit by spillovers from
the US sub-prime market: BNP Paribas and Sachsen Landesbank. The official po-
4 Interested reader may access the full transcript of that and following speeches at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
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sition was presented by Jean-Claude Trichet during a hearing at the Economic and
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on September 11, 2007:
A number of European banks admitted direct or indirect exposures to the US mortgage
market. Yet it is important to remark that the credit losses were not significant enough to
materially impact the soundness of core financial institutions.
Trichet characterized the market situation as ”a correction phase which can, as
frequently observed in such situations, comprehend episodes of hectic behaviour, a
high level of market volatility and elements of over-shooting”. One month later, on
October 10, Trichet reported witnesses of tentative signs of normalization in some
parts of the credit and financial markets. On December 19, Trichet reported to the
European Parliament:
With financial systems undergoing a process of de-leveraging and re-intermediation, un-
certainty surrounding the financial stability outlook for the euro area has heightened and
may persist until it becomes clearer how the potential balance sheet effects of the turbu-
lence will be spread across individual financial institutions.
The previous statement about the bank’s credit losses and estimated exposure to
US sub-prime remained unaddressed in his speech.
The argument from this communication between the European Parliament and
the ECB is rather clear. The inertness in understanding the situation, followed by
the lack of authority to get the proper data and to form a comprehensive picture,
led to the rare communication by the ECB in a time of distress, when, instead,
a clear communication strategy was needed to impose discipline on the disturbed
and volatile markets. Moreover, the informational asymmetry about real exposures
to the toxic instruments and differences in estimation of realized losses created a
potential for speculative misuse of the safety net, bringing us back to the argument
of Bernanke (2002) about the effect of credit flows on real estate resulting from
moral hazard.
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1.5 Institutional amendments of the Basel III EU regulatory
regime
Clearly, the devastating financial meltdown during the global financial crisis had to
be addressed by significant changes in regulation and supervision. The benchmark
practices of banking supervision has historically been developed and formalized by
BIS. Aside from minor changes in definitions and model parameters, each supervi-
sory regime is usually referred to by one of the stylized frameworks developed by
BIS. As of 2018, there have been three regimes that superseded one another: the
Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III accords. The last of these resulted from rethinking
after the experience of the global financial crisis.
In the most concise summary of the Basel III framework, it is important to un-
derline the strengthening of capital requirements and enhancement and formaliza-
tion of supervisory practices regarding liquidity regulation. However, the terms of
the second decade of the 21st century is the total loss absorption capacity (TLAC)
and the resolution procedure. The TLAC is an indicator by which the resolution
plan has to come into force. The maintenance of consistent resolution procedures
required a number of institutions to be established to support the efficient procedure
to resolve any financial intermediary’s insolvency without altering the functions of
the financial system. The major institutions - the Financial Stability Board and the
Single Resolution Board (SRB) - are the products of the new supervisory frame-
work.
The SRB decides the resolution mechanism to be applied in the case of a bank’s
distress. As of 2018, the rhetoric behind the major resolution principle is for all
unimportant financial institutions in distress to wind down. The authority of the
SRB is applied to the banking union, but Sweden is not part of the single reso-
lution regime. Financial intermediaries in Sweden are instead subject to the local
resolution framework. Before the single supervisory mechanism was in place, all
banks enjoyed the non-Brussels supervision and close contact with the regulatory
authority. In recent years, one of the major financial institutions (i.e., Nordea) failed
to reach consensus with the Swedish authority and changed residency to a member
country of the Banking Union. The divorce was about the resolution fees.
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While the real reasons of Nordea’s departure from Sweden and move to Finland
are subject to various speculations, the historical precedent of regulatory arbitrage
was observed, which has underlined the major problem in banking supervision:
regulatory avoidance. If a financial intermediary is out of tricks to maintain busi-
ness as usual, it may move out. Obviously, there are two main scenarios: either the
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority lacks the resources to deliver adequate
due diligence and we are going to see more of the similar departures, or Nordea
is not in an adequate state to continue to operate under the close supervision of a
small, focused ”watchdog”. Time will tell which of these is the case.
1.6 Industrial background of the thesis
The previous sections have presented the core US and European events that consti-
tute the institutional background of my thesis. While these events are not consid-
ered directly throughout the thesis, the understanding of the events are crucial for
contextualizing the issues covered by the essays of the thesis. The Google Scholar
engine yields more than a million documents related to ”financial crisis” for the pe-
riod from 2007 to 2018. While the subjects and reasoning in these documents vary
extremely, almost all of them have in common an acknowledgment of the sources
of the initial seeds of the global financial crisis: credit losses from the sub-prime
mortgage exposures. This is the so-called patient zero. In my thesis, the focus is on
the role of financial intermediaries in mortgage lending in the European context.
It is important to outline that the thesis focuses only on regulated financial institu-
tions as transmitters of public goods; that is, a bank mediates residential mortgages
according to public supervision and regulation in the interest of its equity holders
or other stakeholders.
A regulated financial intermediary in the post-crisis institutional environment
is incentivized to retain mortgages on the balance sheet following the ”skin in the
game” principle or to securitize it via ”simple, transparent and comparable” secu-
ritizations in line with the Basel III Revisions to the securitization framework. The
retention of long-term mortgage lending on the balance sheet is challenging for a
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bank under the Basel III liquidity regulations. The core principle of the Basel III
liquidity framework requires that a bank match the maturity of its assets and liabil-
ities, which implies a requirement to finance residential lending by funding sources
with similar maturities.
Historically, banks have funded loans via demandable deposits. Extremely
short-term funding used for long-term assets is the fundamental characteristic of
a bank, ensuring the social benefit via liquidity insurance (Diamond and Dyb-
vig, 1983) and delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984). The short-term demandable
debt ensures the bank’s due diligence and imposes discipline over asset allocation
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). Financial development over the last twenty years has
led to retail deposits being supplemented with wholesale funding. Huang and Rat-
novski (2011) underline the central role of wholesale as a propagation funding
mechanism during the global financial crisis. The professional market players ac-
cumulate and supply enormous volumes of liquidity to the banking sector and pro-
voke fast lending expansion that compromises credit quality. Short-term wholesale
funding is also subject to a run in the case of noisy signals. Thus, it sounds rea-
sonable to impose restrictions on banks’ funding maturity. Problems arise in the
current economic conditions in which residential mortgages are supplied at low in-
terest rates. The necessity to fund low-profit long-term mortgages with long-term
funding instruments poses a challenge for banks.
One way to issue a long-term funding instrument, at very low interest rates,
is to ensure its exceptional creditworthiness. Here, I introduce the CBs instrument,
which is a secured top-quality long-term funding instrument for residential lending.
The use of CBs has grown to become one of the major sources of bank funding.
As of 2017, the amount of CBs outstanding in Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and Finland constituted 32 %, 25 %, 17 %, 15 %, and 13 % of the countries’
GDP respectively (according to my calculations based on the World Bank data for
GDP, and the Covered Bonds Label for outstanding amounts of CBs). It is worth
mentioning the Danish CBs, as outstanding CBs in Denmark are more than 1.2
times larger than the country’s GDP. In fact, despite the recent establishment of
legal frameworks, CBs in the Nordic countries represent sizable portions of the
GDPs (see Figure 1.1).
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Fig. 1.1: Geographical overview Covered Bond Legislation in Europe (year of in-
troduction / latest substantial amendment). Source: Sto¨cker (2011, p. 33).
The most distinct features of the use of CBs as a funding instrument is collateral.
A CB is a type of secured funding backed up by separation into ring-fenced covered
pool residential mortgages, which in turn are guaranteed by the market value of
residential property. The ring-fenced characteristics ensure the principle of assets
segregation, according to which the bank should assign the specific set of mortgage
contracts that are separate and continue to exist until the CBs mature. In order to
ensure the ability of the covered pool to exist until the maturity date of the CBs,
and to prevent early liquidation due to a fall in the underlying assets’ value (that
is, residential property), the mortgages included in the covered pool are subject to
loan-to-value caps (on average, 85 %). Additionally, the covered pool is larger than
the outstanding amount of CBs to ensure the solidity of the CBs. While an issuer
is solvent and continues to manage the covered pool, it commits to supplement the
sour quality or prepayment of mortgages and to replenish them with new ones or a
cash equivalent to support the quality of the covered pool. For a more formalized
description of CBs, see Prokopczuk et al. (2013).
Currently, the most common framework of CBs funding is the issuance of CBs
by a universal credit institution (see Figure 1.2), where the covered pool remains
on the bank’s balance sheet (Sto¨cker, 2011). The presence of assets attributed to
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3.2.2  Fundamental issues
In this model the fundamental issue is the insol-
vency segregation of the cover assets within the 
bank. If there is an insolvency procedure on the 
issuer, it must be very clear that the cover assets 
will be ring fenced or encumbered so that they 
will be reserved to secure the covered bonds. 
Historically, over many years this was achieved 
via pledge structures.15 It was only in 1900 that 
the German Mortgage Bank Act regulated an 
insolvency priority for Pfandbrief holders. But this 
meant that covered bonds and cover assets would 
have been part of the insolvency estate and the 
insolvency procedure. Luckily, there has been no 
insolvency procedure over a German Pfandbrief 
issuer since 1900. In 1998 this insolvency privi-
lege was changed into a legal segregation16, 
enlarged with a lot of details in 2004 (and 2010) 
– a lot of them were adopted likewise by other 
countries in the following years.
3.3 Model 3
The covered bond issuer is a universal credit 
institution, either with a qualified covered bond 
license ( e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany 
since mid 2005, Iceland, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Sweden) or without the need of a qualified 
license (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia).
3.3.1 Characteristics
The issuer originates, services and funds eligi-
ble and non-eligible business, eligibility criteria 
apply to cover assets and the covered bond issu-
ance is governed by a special legal framework. 
3.3.2 Fundamental issues
The core of this model is the insolvency segrega-
tion of cover assets from the insolvency estate of 
the same legal entity, the credit institution - even 
to a higher extent than in model 2.
This can be shown on the German example. 
The detailed regulations enacted in 2004 were 
regarded as being a new milestone in the 
development of covered bond legislation. On 
this basis, even the special bank principle that 
lasted for such a long time could be abolished, 
switching Germany from model 2 to model 3.
But this was not the end of the legislative 
story. The financial crisis (especially since 
September 2008) encouraged many market 
participants to ask more and more questions 
regarding a theoretical insolvency situation. 
Therefore, further clarifications were intro-
duced in Germany in 2010 to achieve a clear 
understanding in the Pfandbrief Act on the 
legal nature of cover pools in the event of a 
Pfandbrief bank’s insolvency and on the access 
of a cover pool administrator17 to liquid funds 
during difficult times. The cover pool was given 
the status of a non-insolvent part of the insol-
vent Pfandbrief bank – with the rest of the bank 
as the insolvency estate. Thus, the cover pool 
administrator would be able to act as head 
of a bank in respect of transactions with the 
Deutsche Bundesbank; he would also be enti-
tled to issue Pfandbriefe. More precisely, § 2 
IV PfandBG stipulates that the banking license 
will be maintained with respect to the cover 
pools and the liabilities covered there from until 
the Pfandbrief liabilities have been fulfilled in 
their entirety and on time. A revised version 
of § 30 PfandBG addressing the ring-fencing 
of the cover assets from the insolvency estate 
confirms this new approach by introducing the 
new heading ‘segregation principle’18 and by 
referring to the cover assets as ‘insolvency-free 
estates’19. Consistently, the amended PfandBG 
incorporates the term ‘Pfandbrief bank with 
limited business activities’20.
Thus, the amendments of 2010 ensure that 
the cover pool administrator acts on behalf of 
a solvent Pfandbrief bank that is in possession 
of a license to engage in banking business 
in general and in Pfandbrief business more 
specifically, even if the bank itself is insolvent 
and the general banking license withdrawn. 
Hence, the Pfandbrief bank with limited busi-
ness activities is treated as a solvent bank in 
order to comply with the counterparty eligibility 
criteria for central bank open market operation 
with the objective to satisfy its liquidity needs.21
This short update shows that it is not realistic 
to assume that a “perfect” solution could be 
created within a short time. Many pros and cons 
have to be taken into consideration. More than 
200 years were needed in Germany to develop 
the necessary ideas and to regulate in detail by 
parliamentary law the insolvency protection of 
Pfandbriefe. The more and more detailed ques-
tions asked by investors, analysts and rating 
agencies are pushing legislation forward.
Model 3 Covered Bond issuer is universal credit institution
borrowers investorseligible assets
non-eligible assets
Covered Bond issuer
payment of  
principle and 
interest
payment of  
principle and 
interest
grants loans purchase of 
Covered Bonds
15  The lack of a clear legal basis of an insolvency privilege of Pfandbrief holders (called 
the “Pfandbrieffrage”) was the reason that the board members of most German 
mortgage banks met in 1876 for the first time. This in the end led to the creation of 
the Mortgage Bank Act and furthermore to the founding of the predecessor of the vdp. 
See Verband privater Hypothekenbanken, 75 Jahre Verbandsgeschichte deutscher 
Hypothekenbanken, Frankfurt a.M. 1978, p. 13.
16  With this amendment, for the first time a covered bond legislation regulated clearly 
that the covered bonds would not accelerate despite the insolvency of the issuer.
17  According to §§ 30 – 36a Pfandbrief Act the cover pool administrator would be ap-
pointed by court in order to manage the cover pool and to ensure the timely payment 
of the Pfandbriefe. He must be a different person than the insolvency administrator.
18  Trennungsprinzip bei Insolvenz der Pfandbriefbank.
19  Insolvenzfreie Vermögen.
20  Pfandbriefbank mit beschränkter Geschäftstätigkeit.
21  For more details see Stöcker, 2010 Amendment of the Pfandbrief Act, vdp, The Pfand-
brief 2010/2011, pp. 20.
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Fig. 1.2: The model of covered bonds issuance used in most European countries,
where the issuer of covered bonds is a universal credit institution. Source: Sto¨cker
(2011, p. 34).
the covered pool on the bank’s balance sheet enables the amount and quality of
the bank’s assets attributed to unsecured d bt- olders to be understood. CBs are
not the only source of asset ncumbrance. Among others, repurchase agreements
encumber part of the bank’s trading portfolio. The ECB has begun to disclose its
concerns regarding the actual encumbrance levels of banks’ assets and the eligi-
bility of remaining assets in order for the bank to withstand liquidity shortages in
a distressed period (Ahnert et al., 2018). The use of the collateral also introduces
procyclicality by variation of margins, eligibility criteria and haircuts (Houben and
Slingenberg, 2013).
In my thesis, I focus on the role of Basel III regulatory amendments, and on
CBs in particular, to prevent the build-up of risks that may result in a new financial
crisis. The implications of the banks’ reliance on CBs funding have been examined
during the Basel III adoption. The structural change of the regulatory regime allows
the first effects of the banks’ adaptation to Basel III to be studied.
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Chapter 2
Problem Statements and Research Questions
The previous chapter outlined the motivation for studying the funding structure of
banks and introduced the industrial context of the banking literature. In light of the
facts presented in the introductory chapter, it is possible to say that not all problems
revealed by the recent crisis have been addressed yet. There is no consensus in
the community on how to respond to the growing credit flow and the associated
housing market distress discussed by Bernanke (2002). As long as an adequate
policy response is not defined, banking crises will recur.
Given the embedded vulnerabilities of banking, it is reasonable to summarize
the main arguments for why banks cannot be supplemented with an open market.
First, Jacklin (1987) shows that demand deposits facilitate risk sharing in incom-
plete markets. This means that financial markets and banks are not perfect sub-
stitutes. The existence of bank debt is justified by heterogeneous agents and the
presence of informational asymmetry (Diamond, 1984). The bank exists because
these imperfections exist. Agents who apply for loans differ according to their his-
tory of repayment (Diamond, 1991), their pledged collateral (Holmstrom and Ti-
role, 1997), their probability of engaging in moral hazard (Boot and Thakor, 2000),
or their quality (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)),
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whereas agents who deposit their savings differ according to their preferences to
consume - that is, whether they are ”early” or ”late” consumers.1
In their seminal paper, Bolton and Freixas (2000) analyze the coexistence of
equity issues, bank debt, and bond financing. They utilize arguments put forward
by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hart and Moore (1995) that equity issuers face
a lemon market and have to bear information delusion costs, while bank debt can
more easily be renegotiated than debt to disperse bond issues. Bolton and Freixas
(2000) explain that the riskiest firms issue equity, the safest firms tap securities
markets to avoid the intermediation costs, and those in between turn to bank fi-
nancing. Additionally, a large strand of literature shows that bank lending produces
economic growth. Initially, this effect was mentioned by James (1987), who shows
that the announcement of a bank loan has an abnormally positive effect on share
returns in comparison to bond financing. Furthermore, Levine and Zervos (1998)
and Beck and Levine (2004), among others, empirically demonstrate a significant
effect of bank lending on economic growth.
These arguments indicate that banks are an invaluable component of a well-
functioning economy. Once there is consensus that the banking industry should
continue exist, the problems revealed during the global financial crisis can ade-
quately be addressed. Following Bernanke (2002), a proportionally increased lend-
ing supply fuels a price bubble in the elastically supplied housing market, which
is extremely hard (or more or less impossible) to cope with. The expanding mort-
gage portfolios of banks should be focused on as a potential source of systemic
vulnerability.
1 Originally, the types of depositors were introduced by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and known
as ”Diamond-Dybvig preference”. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) classify depositors as consumers
with known and unknown preferences to consume.
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2.1 Problem statement
As was discussed the introduction chapter, wholesale funding was a leading mech-
anism of the global financial crisis. The loss of confidence dried up the interbank
market and reduced foreign operations. The ”great retrenchment” of international
capital flows during the crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) led to more intense
use by banks of secured debt to fund their lending. The covered bonds (CBs) fund-
ing strategy is supposed to supplement securitization activity and provide stable
long-term instruments owned by the same professional investors who had previ-
ously provided wholesale funding.
A bank’s investment decisions are justified by the funding disposed by the bank
(Kashyap and Stein, 1994). Under various economic conditions, a bank may expe-
rience either an excessive or a limited supply of funding according to the amount
of depositors’ money and the supply of debt markets. Limited funding (i.e., a credit
or capital crunch) causes the bank to be cautious and to ration investment decisions
by picking the most attractive investment opportunities, thereby adopting credit ra-
tioning (Bernanke et al., 1991). An excessive funding supply (e.g., a savings glut)
forces banks either to relax or dilute lending standards and to fund riskier projects
(Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2017) or to lend money at interbank market inter-
est rates to another bank that is experiencing a lack of funding (Bhattacharya and
Gale, 1985). Most probably, a bank with a lack of funding is either a specialist
in a different economic sector in which the bank with excess funding has no ex-
pertise, or is operating in an area beyond the geographical reach of the bank with
excess funds. Given the time variations of economic conditions and savings rates in
different regions, the interbank market plays a significant balancing role (Freixas
and Holthausen, 2004). This forces economic growth in the areas with insufficient
funding supply.
While the design of CBs is extremely protective for investors (for an extended
discussion, see Prokopczuk et al. (2013)), this thesis raises a concern regarding fi-
nancial stability implications of CBs usage. The treatment of CBs, within the Basel
III framework, also introduces uncertainty regarding the resolution mechanisms.
The immunity status of CBs in the resolution procedure introduces complexity due
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to the necessity to segregate the covered pool from the issuing bank’s assets. Ad-
ditionally, it provides uncertainty about unsecured debt holders’ attributed assets,
which undermines the ability of a bank to raise unsecured funding (Juks, 2012).
On the one hand, collateralized by mortgages, the funding by CBs accentuates
the bank’s sensitivity to residential property prices on the asset side (Maggio and
Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015). It also reduces the ability to raise funds against the same cov-
ered pool during price declines (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). On the other hand,
the classification of CBs as high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and the introduction
of Basel III create demand for CBs’ funding. Due to the simultaneous introduction
of the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio in European countries, more banks have
demonstrated an appetite to hold CBs. The potential growth in funding supply
may contribute to additional lending and, in line with Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
(2006), to a loosening of lending standards. This mechanism is one of the contrib-
utors to an increasing concern about the scarcity of collateral (Levels and Capel,
2012) and increased liquidity risk due to limited asset eligibility for repurchase
agreements (REPOs) as collateral for loans from the central bank (Cecchetti and
Disyatat, 2010).
2.2 Research questions
The availability of bank consumer credit financing is necessary for lifetime con-
sumption smoothing (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). The choice of households to bor-
row against residential property is subject to the expectation of future house prices
and mortgage interest expenses. In line with Kregel (2008), the timing of house-
hold decisions to invest in housing is a moment of uncertainty resolution about
household lifetime earnings and beliefs about future property prices. The link be-
tween house frenzies and money illusion has been studied by Brunnermeier and
Julliard (2008). Low short-term interest rates can create an illusion of lower mort-
gage service expenses and encourage a household to buy a house based on higher
earning uncertainty or lower lifetime income expectations.
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Fig. 2.1: Household debt as a percentage of Net Disposable Income as of 2016.
Source: OECD
The distribution of household debt as a portion of net disposal income across
European countries is shown in Figure 2.1. According to the Swedish mortgage
market annual review made by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Fi-
nansinspektionen [FI]), as of 2018 the largest part of household debt (82 %) is
attributed to mortgages. As the dark green fills Sweden, it is evident that Swedish
household debt is among the highest in Europe, with a significant portion of debt
attributed to mortgage financing.
As of 2018, Swedish real estate prices have not experienced any decline since
the mid 1990s. Various actions have been taken by Swedish authorities in order to
get the situation under control, such as mortgage amortizations and a cap for debt-
to-income ratio. The Swedish situation is in line with the argument by Bernanke
(2002) that credit flows into an inelastic supply of real estate may cause a price
bubble, which is extremely hard to cope with. Bernanke (2015, p. 121) continues
to argue about the inefficiency of the ”lean-against-bubble” strategy:
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Swedish central bankers raised interest rates in 2010 and 2011 in response to concerns
about rising mortgage debt and house prices, even though inflation was forecast to remain
below their target and unemployment was high. As a result, the Swedish economy fell into
deflation, forcing the central bank to cut rates from 2 percent to zero over the next three
years – an embarrassing reversal.
The Basel III proposal to increase the risk weight of residential mortgages does
not seem to be able to reverse the rising trend of residential prices. This poses
additional concerns about the efficiency of risk-adjusted capital requirements to
enforce banks’ discipline. The Basel III liquidity standards do not have any effect
due to long maturities of CBs. Since none of the regulatory amendments are able
to reverse the trend, one might consider studying in depth the sources of growth in
mortgage supply. This thesis assumes that the driver of increased volumes of out-
standing mortgages lies within the banks’ funding conditions that are supported by
the regulatory framework. The central research question is: What are the impli-
cations of the banking regulatory amendments (i.e., Basel III) for the funding
strategies of financial intermediaries in Europe? The thesis analyzes the major
forces that engage banks in one activity (in this case, mortgage lending) given the
easier funding conditions, enforced concentration risks, and excessive exposure to
real estate prices (see Table 2.1).
According to the classic story, once a bank is in the mortgage business, it devel-
ops expertise in the market that enables it to fund more mortgages and better assess
risks related to that activity via information reusability (Millon and Thakor, 1985).
First, at its own risk, the bank makes investments and covers all losses with equity.
No sophisticated investor would fund the operations of a bank that does not have
expertise and a good track record of performance in its operations. Certain factors
limit investors’ screening capacity and incentivize a reliance more on quantity (di-
versification) than on quality, such as widespread real estate lending and the large
pool of investors willing to buy instruments backed by mortgages, the increasing
demand for instruments, and the large pool of banks issuing these instruments. In
line with Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996), the increasing number of banks using
a CBs funding strategy and weakening screening of investors and market discipline
lead to a situation in which more banks start to adopt innovations.
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In line with Manove et al. (2001), the widespread use of CBs may cause that the
less investors (i.e., banks that hold CBs issued by other banks) rely on screening,
the more they demand a ”hard” collateral. The over-collaterization of the covered
pool becomes a hedge against losses, and the further this goes the more collat-
eral is required to keep the wheels rolling. Additionally, banks are prone to herd-
ing behavior (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008), which facilitates the trend. The
widespread use of CBs eases the funding constraints of CBs issuers. The recently
implemented Basel III also treats CBs as a reliable source of funding by assigning
the preferential risk weights (relative to mortgage-backed security (MBS)) and by
granting the eligibility status as an HQLA. Essay A explores the difference in sub-
populations between CBs issuers and non-issuers in order to address the question:
Does Basel III favor financial intermediaries that issue covered bonds?
As more banks start to issue CBs to seize the wagon (Molyneux and Sham-
roukh, 1996), a more diversified pool of CBs issuers results. The more efforts that
are required to screen the growing number of CBs issuers, the fewer are the investor
incentives to make an effort to screen, which makes it easier to pick up the most
over-collaterized CBs issues, and so on. A more detailed analysis of the CBs fund-
ing strategy follows in Essay B, which addresses the following research question:
How does asset encumbrance affect banks’ asset allocations in terms of balance
sheet growth and future encumbrance levels? It explores the covered pool compo-
sition and further lending behavior of particular banks in light of data disclosed on
a voluntary basis.
The asset allocation decision may also be driven by competition structure. The
increased competitiveness of the banking industry may change the banks’ lending
supply. It is impossible to isolate the change in competition for a relatively large
CBs issuer given that most banks are international and operate within several juris-
dictions. Local savings banks are easier to study, but they usually have no option
other than to keep the newly issued mortgage on the balance sheet. Essay C consid-
ers the quite unique association of local Swedish savings banks (SSBs) and a large
commercial bank in Sweden. The commercial bank plays a role of a quasi-central
bank for the SSBs by reallocating excess funding supply among the SSBs. The
excess lending demand in the local market can be fulfilled by the SSBs by selling
32 2 Problem Statements and Research Questions
the excess mortgages to the commercial bank with similar securitization features,
such as junior risk retention and underwriting rights.
Essay C studies the small, financially constrained SSBs, which can either se-
curitize their real estate mortgages or retain the mortgages on the balance sheet.
The decision depends on the market structure, such as the geographical distance
from competitors or the presence of a competing bank branch within the same
geographical area. Essay C poses the question: What is the effect of distance to
competitor banks in the securitization decisions of Swedish savings banks? The
SSBs have almost no access to debt markets and have very limited growth oppor-
tunities. The cooperation with the larger bank is a type of symbiotic relationship
from which both sides benefit: the large bank plays the role of a central bank and
a clearing system, and it provides access to various capital-intensive IT systems,
which would be too costly for the small SSBs to develop itself. The large bank
benefits from a wide branch network of many SSBs across the country and enjoys
equity and stable funding supply provided by the SSBs.
Aside from the changes in the regulatory frameworks and the industry environ-
ment, the most straightforward guess as to why the regulatory changes are unable to
control the lending supply to residential properties is the failure to impose the reg-
ulatory amendments. In other words, the pills do not work because the patient does
not take them. It is hard to control the implementation of the Basel III rules. Usu-
ally, the supervisory agent controls only the compliance of regulatory standards,
but not the adherence to the principles. Essay D formulates the banks’ compliance
and discipline by comparing the perception of the recent regulatory amendments
from both an industry and a supervisory point of view. The study aims to get in-
sight on the following question: How do the characteristics of bank employees
affect banking reform support in Sweden? The essay allows an insight into one
of the least discussed topics in banking by exploring the determinants of bankers’
ability to comprehend regulatory changes and anticipate the implications of such
reforms.
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Table 2.1: Research Questions
Research Question Essay
What are the implications of the banking regulatory amendments (i.e.,
the Basel III) for the funding strategies of financial intermediaries in
Europe?
Common
Does Basel III favor financial intermediaries that issue covered bonds? Essay A
How does asset encumbrance affect banks’ asset allocations in terms of
balance sheet growth and future encumbrance levels?
Essay B
What is the effect of distance for competitor banks in the securitization
decisions of Swedish savings banks?
Essay C
How do the characteristics of bank employees affect banking reform
support in Sweden?
Essay D
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Chapter 3
Literature Review and Industrial Context
3.1 Regulation
There is no consensus among scholars regarding the question why banks should
be regulated. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) provide an explanation by identify-
ing the characteristics of financial institutions that need to be regulated. They find
that the most pronounced characteristics are the following: transformation func-
tion execution; payment system engagement; leverage characteristic; and deposit
insurance. In their view, none of these explanations can be named as the reason for
banks to be regulated. Evidently, the asset transformation function is also provided
by unregulated financial intermediaries. This means that the fact of executing the
asset transformation function is not sufficient for justification of the existence of
regulation. The central role of banks in the operation of the payment system is not
a prerequisite for regulation either, since it arises as a by-product of government
deposit insurance.
Bank leverage is endogenously driven by the bank’s asset risk, which in turn
is controlled by the regulator. The rationale for government deposit insurance puts
the cart before the horse, because it does not explain why government and private
insurance do not provide this coverage. This fact makes deposit insurance only
part of an optimal regulatory package. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) explain the
necessity of regulation by the need to protect small depositors from moral haz-
37
38 3 Literature Review and Industrial Context
ard and adverse selection problems, which is also in line with Coval and Thakor
(2005). Small uninformed investors are unable to perform the duplicating monitor-
ing functions. Because the banks’ debt is primarily held by small depositors, the
free-riding problem among depositors to eliminate the screening costs gives rise to
a need for private or public representatives of depositors, which has been proposed
by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) as the representation hypothesis.
The empowerment of a supervisory agent to watch over financial institutions
does not necessarily lead to a better outcome. Most of the literature considers the
bank supervisory policies and lending integrity - that is, the ability of the bank
to efficiently allocate lending. The example of corruption in lending is a form of
”zombie lending”, that is, when credit flows are directed to insolvent borrowers
in order to hide losses (Bruche and Llobet, 2013). While zombie lending is an
extreme form of lending corruption, simpler examples might be considered. The
different models of banking supervision have an ambiguous effect on lending cor-
ruption. Policies that force accurate information disclosure and provide incentives
for private investors to monitor banks lead to a lowering of the importance of bank
corruption when raising external finance. This is the empowerment view. Even in
countries with highly developed institutions (e.g., effective governments and ad-
herence to the rule of law), Beck et al. (2006) do not find that supervisory power
improves the integrity of bank lending. They advocate that the primary goal of
banking supervision should consist of fostering efficient capital allocation by facil-
itating private monitoring.
The regulatory framework substantially determines the bank market structure,
conduct, strategy, stability, and development (Degryse et al., 2011). A number of
competing arguments have been put forward in academic studies on the regulatory
environment. One strand of literature considers regulatory enforcement as a treat-
ment, while another strand considers it a friction. This discussion goes far beyond
banking stability issues and reflects more than a century of the struggle between
the ”invisible hand” of the market and the ”visible hand” of authority.
On one side of the barricades, deregulation treatment is often associated with a
higher degree of competition (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2016) and lower bank interest
margins (Demirgu¨cˇ-Kunt and Levine, 2004), while the other side argues for stricter
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capital and equity requirements Admati et al. (2013). The capital urge argument
has been criticized: a low capitalized banking system has to be extremely socially
costly to force banks to have higher leverage (Van den Heuvel, 2008).1 Moreover,
banks tend to innovate in order to escape regulatory compliance costs and adopt
regulatory avoidance strategies (Kane, 1981).
The frictions between regulations, implementation of a specific regulation, de-
sign of the supervision process, whether a bank complies with regulation, and aver-
sion of banks to comply with imposed regulations are all factors that cause uncer-
tainty in the expectation of regulatory net effects. The implication from a bank
funding perspective is that we should expect banks to adapt their funding struc-
ture to specific regulations. However, it is not clear whether the adaptation will be
socially desirable nor whether supervision will effectively mitigate incentive con-
flicts between regulators and banks. As will be discussed further in the following
sections, these incentive conflicts are particularly relevant in the light of covered
bonds (CBs) funding strategies, because CBs are seemingly a funding instrument
currently accepted by all of the involved parties.
3.2 Monetary policy and transmission mechanisms
This section emphasizes that banking regulation is conducted by an authority,
which is sometimes also responsible for conducting monetary policy and super-
visory functions. The potential conflict of interest between banking supervision
and monetary policy implementation is underlined by Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1995). To the best of my knowledge, there is no sufficient analysis of conflict be-
tween monetary policy and banking regulation functions. This and the next section
aim to demonstrate the potential source of conflict between monetary and regu-
latory functions by considering the Swedish Central Bank (Riksbank) and Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority (FSA). Since the focus of this thesis is banks’ funding
1 To prevent confusion: a bank’s leverage represents equity scaled by total assets.
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strategies with specific attention to CBs, the next section considers mortgages and
related issues.
Quantitative easing encapsulates twenty-first-century monetary policy. Bernanke
and Reinhart (2004) argue for three methods of monetary policy at low-bound inter-
est rates: shaping interest-rate expectations; altering the composition of the central
bank’s balance sheet; and expanding the size of this balance sheet. The shaping of
the interest-rate policy implies the conditional or unconditional commitment of the
central bank to keep the interest rate at a certain level. In essence, if it is no longer
possible to lower the policy interest rate, the central bank may promise to keep it
low for a period exceeding the one the market believes in. In an extreme case, the
changes to the balance-sheet composition of the central bank stand for an unlimited
commitment to purchase an instrument at a given price (while selling the other),
while an expansion is referred to as quantitative easing.
Let us consider each of these policies in detail. The lowering of the interest
rate as a policy tool theoretically produces an effect up to the so-called zero lower
bound (ZLB) point.2 While the first working papers have begun to elaborate on
an extreme interest rate, moving beyond which there is a reversal of the intended
effect of conventional monetary policy - the ”reverse interest rate” (Brunnermeier
and Koby, 2016). Another paper has considered the implementation of negative
interest rate policies as disintermediation costs. This is because stockpiling cash
in a vault is then a viable alternative (Gabaix, 2016). Thus, shaping interest-rate
expectations is an alternative to easing the interest rate near to the ZLB point.
The direct communication of the central bank in shaping the expectation of
a likely path of future policy rates involves providing forward guidance (Cœure´,
2017). This guidance may be implemented conditionally (which is known as
”Odyssean”) or unconditionally (”Delphic”). In Sweden, the Swedish Central Bank
(the Riksbank) is one of the most extensive users of forward guidance, although
with variable success.
Figure 3.1 shows the market reaction to the Riksbank’s commitment not to
change its refinancing rate for two years. In Woodford’s (2012) interpretation, the
market took on board the Riksbank’s forward guidance and corrected its expecta-
2 To prevent confusion, ZLB refers not to zero interest rate per se, but to the lowest rate applicable.
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Figure 9: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank’s press release on April 21, 2009 that indicated that the repo
rate was “expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011.” Source:
Sveriges Riksbank.
participants evidently had expected an even larger cut in the repo rate than occurred,
and for the repo rate to remain lower, at least for some months, than was indicated
by the projected path. In response to the announcement, the market expected path
rose, though still remaining lower than the path projected by the Riksbank, for the
first few months after April. By early 2010, market participants had anticipated that
the repo rate would already be rising above 50 basis points, whereas the Riksbank
projected it to remain at 50 basis points for another year; but in response to the
announcement, the market expected path for 2010 rose still further.
The result is that an announcement that was intended to shift down the antici-
pated forward path of rates, by announcing that a low rate would be maintained until
the beginning of 2011, and so to immediately lower longer-term interest rates, had
forecast.
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Figure 10: Intraday Swedish OIS rates on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of the Riksbank’s press release (9AM in Sweden, or 3AM EST).
Source: Bloomberg.
exactly the opposite effect: long rates rose, because the entire anticipated forward
path of rates shifted up. What went wrong? While many things happened from one
day to the next — as noted above, the Bank of Canada introduced its own “condi-
tional commitment” six hours after the Riksbank’s announcement — it seems clear
that it was the Riksbank’s announcement that moved market expectations. Figure
10 shows the intraday OIS rates for Sweden on April 21, with the time of the release
of the Monetary Policy Update shown; the entire term structure of OIS rates moved
up within two hours of the release, and well before any news from North America.
What seems to have happened is that market participants took on board part of
the Riksbank’s forward guidance, and modified their own forecasts to conform more
with it: the projection of a path that never fell below 50 points convinced many that
(contrary to prior expectations) the Riksbank would not cut the repo rate below that
level. This implied an increase in the projected path for the next two quarters. But
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Fig. 3.1: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and af r the Riksbank’s press release on April 21, 2009 that indicated that the repo
rate was ”expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011” vs Intraday
Swedish OIS rates on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line indicates the time of
the Riksbank’s press release (9 a. . in Swede , or 3 a.m. EST). Sourc : Woodford
(2012) based on Svensson (2010) and Bloomberg.
tions, which was contrary to what had b en expected. The intended reaction from
the Riksba k t dump int rest rates had the opposite reaction of a jumped inter-
bank offered rate due to market expectations of the interest rate going down. This
reaction is in line with Bernanke and Reinhart (2004): the forward guidance should
be made based on market beliefs. The same logic holds regarding the forward guid-
ance of assets purchased by central banks.
The Asset Repurchase Program is a monetary stimulus delivered as a response
to the Great Recession. The massive expansions of central banks’ balance sheets,
together with unconventional accumulation of public debt, are the ”helicopter
drops of money”, to use Gabaix’s (2016) term. Debt redistribution by supplement-
ing a bank’s debt with public debt, thereby recapitalizing the bank at the expense of
public funds, is a reality that has been criticized by many. The core concern is the
following: how does an additional debt solve the indebtedness problem? Eggerts-
son and Krugman (2012) argue that the assumption of the statement ”debt is debt -
it does not matter who owes the money” is fundamentally wrong. At the aggregate
level, the net amount of debt is always zero: the debt in one part is a saving in an-
other one. This implies that the level of debt is a concern only if the mechanics of
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debt accumulation and constraints under various indebtedness levels are different
across agents. It follows that additional debt accumulation by some actors can ease
the problems caused by over-borrowing by other actors in the past. Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012) imply that deficit-financed government spending may, in princi-
ple, avoid the situation of highly indebted or leveraged households pulling down
the aggregate demand, causing in its turn an increase in unemployment, and so on.
3.3 Institutional arrangement of the banking industry
Before the global financial crisis, the financial intermediation process was not em-
bedded in most DSGE models (Beyer et al., 2017). This means that, in the mod-
els, financial frictions had no influence on the real economy. While the post-crisis
literature aims to fill this gap, this section sums up the effect of bank’s heteroge-
neous behavior on the real economy. Despite enormous efforts taken in recent years
to harmonize supervisory and regulatory institutional set-ups, European banking
regulation and supervision have not yet converged. An extreme aversion to cen-
tralization of banking supervision is demonstrated by the Swedish government.
This section analyses the banking-related literature in connection to Swedish in-
stitutional arrangements, which are in contradiction with the European regulatory
amendments.
The basic framework of banking regulation as a taxation is provided by Kane
(1981). The analysis starts with a hypothesis formalized by Niskanen (1971):
government maximizes its budget constraint on the minimum service quality de-
manded by encumbered politicians. Given the short-term period of encumbrance,
every politician seeks to unveil the weaknesses of the banking system, increasing
the chance of re-election. On the other side, the system is much more forgiving of
delay than of ill-considered actions. As Jean-Claude Juncker has stated: ”We all
know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we have done it.”
In contrast, central bank positioning is longer term, and the position of regulator
will most likely next be held by the industry. Unless the regulator ensures that the
functions will be held by its agency and not be overtaken by a competing insti-
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tution, the budget of the regulatory agency depends on the size of the supervised
industry. Following the arguments of Kane (1981), the change of Nordea’s head-
quarter should be succeeded by a budget reduction for the Riksbank and the FSA
due to fewer institutions and a lower total value of assets having to be supervised
after Nordea’s departure.
Costly reforms are postponed due to uncertainty and a long-term period of re-
turn (Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013). One country may also benefit from the costly
reforms or monetary policy taken by another country, which creates a sort of
free-rider problem and further prolongation of policy introductions (Dedola et al.,
2013). For instance, the four Swedish commercial banks that operated outside Swe-
den benefited from the European Central Bank’s asset repurchase programs. As of
2018, according to the FSA, the total household debt was SEK3.14 bn or 68 %
of GDP. Two thirds of Swedish residential mortgages were funded via the CBs
(≈SEK2.3 bn), which is a secured funding source introduced in 2004.
A so-called war of attrition arises due to the ability of one group to postpone the
costly reforms and shift the burden to forthcoming groups. Thus, delayed stabiliza-
tion arises due to political stalemate over burden distribution (Alesina and Drazen,
1991). In order to illustrate the regulative forbearance and the war of attrition as
a first approximation, it is plausible to consider the amortization requirements in
the Swedish residence market. Since 2014, the FSA has repeatedly underlined the
need for stricter requirements for mortgages.3 At the same time, the Swedish Min-
istry of Finance has proposed to exempt newly built homes from the amortization
requirement. The Riksbank opposed both proposals.4
Based on the presented theoretical literature, it is interesting to elaborate on
why the Swedish Ministry of Finance would argue for the exclusion of newly built
dwellings from the amortization plan. Given the rapid urbanization and infrastruc-
ture problems of suburban areas, someone probably finds it more reasonable to
support the mature established neighborhood and not to give a further boost to the
already overheated construction industry. As discussed previously, the policy of
3 The amortization plans were enacted only in 2016. Further, the FSA has made an ef-
fort to link the indebtedness cap linked gross income. Press releases are available at
https://www.fi.se/en/published/press-releases/
4 See the Riksbank’s Notices from October 29, 2015.
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forward guidance, implemented by the Riksbank, influences the long-term interest
rate expectations. In recent years, the Swedish economy has twice bounced to the
ZLB point. The consequences of this policy is that lower interest rates support the
residential property prices. Price stability is necessary to prevent the spiral of self-
fulfilling mortgage foreclosures driven by decreasing residential property prices
given the required regulatory enforced de-leveraging.
The aversion of Swedish policymakers to allow market corrections is based on
the rationale of supporting the stability of residential property prices. The proposed
exclusion of new-build dwellings from the amortization plan makes the purchase
of newly constructed property cheaper. Once (if) approved, this subsidy might spur
demand and support the construction industry. The newly built apartments become
more expensive, since customers are able to tolerate higher interest payments given
the absence of amortization. This inevitably leads to higher indebtedness levels
among buyers of newly constructed properties. Consequently, the other residential
properties are priced in relation to the new-build alternatives. Conditionally on the
readiness of banks to issue mortgages on the growing market and to fund them
with CBs, the imposed amortization requirements do not affect the indebtedness
of consumers, but they change the preference of the most indebted consumers to
buy newly constructed properties. At first glance, the considered policy action to
limit the striking indebtedness was undermined by the subsidy to the construction
industry and, presumably, led to a shift of the riskiest borrowers to newly built
apartments. The intentions of regulatory amendments and their implementation
might be pulled apart.
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
4.1 Background
The scarcity of empirical studies in the financial intermediation literature is a re-
sult of several factors. The first factor is that financial intermediation is a com-
plex cross-border process with significantly different standards and frequencies of
disclosure. The data comparability and applicability are very limited due to the
voluntary nature of disclosure. Given this, two potential concerns arise: selection
bias in analysis based on voluntary disclosure (the object discloses only favorable
information), and data comparability. Both concerns have to be considered in the
empirical strategy.
The second factor is the highly dynamic environment of financial intermedia-
tion. This implies significant constraints on the statistical power of estimations. It
is almost impossible to isolate the effect of one regulatory measure due to a simul-
taneous introduction of a multiple regulatory framework. The gradual introduction
and ongoing revisions of regulatory frameworks weaken their potential stratifica-
tion.
The third factor relies on the connectivity or interconnectedness of the financial
intermediation process. This interdependence justifies the presence of systemic risk
embedded in the process. The connectivity implies a self-fulfilling process, which
introduces a substantial bias in the studies on the effect of regulations. It gives
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rise to numerous problems often addressed as omitted variable biases or as con-
cerns about the presence of parallel trends. For these reasons, many studies in the
financial intermediation literature are subject to model misspecification concerns.
This leads to various model specifications and methodological modifications used
to address the concerns, and a consequent lack of comparability of results.
Recent publications within the financial intermediation literature have increas-
ingly coped with the issues discussed above by exploiting proprietary data for their
estimations. This trend has given rise to a number of publications co-authored by
the owners of this proprietary data (e.g., analysts at central banks and supervisory
watchdogs). It is worth considering that co-authorship with supervisory represen-
tatives may cause a bias towards banking reforms and endanger the impartiality of
academic judgment. This issue has begun to attract attention. For example, Colan-
der et al. (2009) considered the lack of information about the actual empirical per-
formance of the models used for building financial intermediation contracts as one
source of the global financial crisis.
Overcoming the proprietary data usage problem could lead to more reproducible
empirical research in the financial intermediation literature. Thanks to the recent
data collection and processing improvements often referred to as big data process-
ing, the utilization of unstructured data allows researchers to diminish their depen-
dency on proprietary data when studying financial intermediation and to facilitate
the reproducibility of the results.
For the purpose and scope of the analyses conducted in this thesis, the commer-
cial databases were considered as a benchmark for previous studies, but this is no
longer enough. The compilation of various data sources and self-disclosure reports
were analyzed according to appropriate matching algorithms. The matching strat-
egy has to be underlined separately due to the scope and inconsistency of financial
disclosures (e.g., the covered pool report is disclosed at a national level, while the
balance sheet report is given on an aggregated basis). The scope of the analysis
implies using unstructured data methods on newly introduced voluntary reporting
(e.g., harmonized transparency templates) disclosed at the national level in the EU.
The overrepresentation problem is inherent in the self-disclosure reporting process,
so different matching strategies were considered.
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This thesis utilizes various data sources to address the research questions intro-
duced in Section 3.3. The data sources were defined based on availability, process-
ing time and relevance of the source. It is important to emphasize that the European
institutional framework does not provide centralized data disclosures related to fi-
nancial intermediaries at an entity level. A researcher in banking may only rely on
commercial databases, which have a limited coverage of European financial insti-
tutions. In this thesis, I have utilized the SNL database as the primary source for
balance sheet data.
This thesis attempts to cover the topic by considering particular banking estab-
lishments (either restricted by institutional or geographic characteristics), most of
which, unfortunately, were not covered by any of the databases available at the time
of this study. Such a narrow sampling procedure must either be based on specific
data availability or on specific activities in which a bank is involved.
The encumbrance of banks’ assets is not reported on a systematic basis. The
disclosure of covered pools attributed to covered bonds (CBs) holders has been
subject to evolving transparency standards in its early stage. The datasets of Essays
A and B are available due to Article 129(7) of the Capital Requirements Regulation
(CRR):
Exposures in the form of covered bonds are eligible for preferential treatment, provided
that the institution investing in the covered bonds can demonstrate to the competent au-
thorities that:
• it receives portfolio information at least on:
– the value of the cover pool and outstanding covered bonds;
– the geographical distribution and type of cover assets, loan size, interest rate and
currency risks;
– the maturity structure of cover assets and covered bonds; and
– the percentage of loans more than 90 days past due;
• the issuer makes the information referred to in point (a) available to the institution at
least semi-annually.
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Based on Article 129(7) of the CRR, the Covered Bond Label Foundation was
created in line with the primary purpose ”to highlight to investors the security and
quality of covered bonds, and to further enhance recognition of and trust in the cov-
ered bond asset class”.1 Under the Covered Bonds Label, the disclosed information
is presented in a format according to the Covered Bond Label IT infrastructure.
The Covered Bonds Label is a voluntary disclosure, which implies registration
costs, annual fees, and costs for additional issues. As specified under Article 129(7)
of the CRR, the labeled CBs issuers are committed to providing, on a quarterly
basis and based on the National Transparency Template, regular, accurate and up-
to-date information on the covered pool.
The European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) represents another source of
data. This institution was created by the European Mortgage Federation, which
serves as the key talking partner of the European Commission, the European Par-
liament, the Council of the EU, the European Banking Authority, the European
Central Bank and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on all mortgage
industry-related questions. The ECBC’s main objective is to be the point of refer-
ence for matters regarding the CB industry and to operate as a think tank, as well
as a lobbying and networking platform, for CB market participants.2 The Covered
Bond Label, together with the ECBC, serves as the primary data source in order to
identify the CBs issuers for further analysis.
The backbone of the dataset for Essay C was designed via usage of Google API
services and industry information. The information about Swedish savings banks
(SSBs) was generously provided by the Swedish Savings Banks Association (Spar-
bankernas Riksfo¨rbund). The organization represents SSBs’ interests to authorities
and serves as a consultative body and the negotiating party on issues of importance
to SSBs. The reports are available on an annual basis and contain a wide range of
financial information, mainly based on balance sheet and income statements. This
thesis has also benefited from information provided by another industry represen-
tative: the Swedish Bankers’ Association (Svenska Bankfreningen). The Swedish
Bankers’ Association keeps track of most dates of the closure of banks’ branches.
1 For further information see https://www.coveredbondlabel.com/About-mission-objectives/
2 For further information, see https://hypo.org/
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This information contributed significantly to the distance estimations between local
SSBs and the local branches of commercial banks.
Finally, the data enabling the research question of Essay D to be addressed came
from Torbjo¨rn Jacobsson, the Chief Risk Officer for Avida Finance. The survey
rounds of 2016 and 2017 were run by him, and the survey of 2018 is a product of
myself and my co-authors. The contact list was partially provided by the Swedish
Bankers’ Association.
4.3 Data Processing
Big data is a relatively new term in scholarly research, but it is a system component
for the industry. Laney (2009) defines the term ”big data” by three components:
volume, variety, and velocity (or the ”three V’s”). The first two components speak
for themselves: the magnitude and diversity of data require a specific IT infras-
tructure to process. The proliferation of digital devices has led to an unprecedented
speed of data generation (Gandomi and Haider, 2015). Velocity is the fundamental
component of utilizing the data. As of 2018, the data generated by the banking in-
dustry in Europe is not available to be processed automatically in its current form.
Currently, researchers are overwhelmed by the amount of reports disclosed by
banks, such as annual reports, press announcements, and communication letters,
which are almost impossible to process. The public supervision of the banking in-
dustry is in its ”Dark Ages” whenever the generated data is not suitable for making
an informed decision. Consumers, who face limited choices, are totally blinded and
misled by the inability to process information, which is necessary for the informed
choice of a financial intermediary.
This situation is of great importance, not due to the risk of small consumers
bearing higher expenditure, but because it has a fundamental weakness that un-
dermines financial system stability. Beck et al. (2006) show that regardless of the
degree of public institution development and law integrity, regulatory and supervi-
sory efforts that do not facilitate the public oversight will lead to inefficient credit
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allocation by financial intermediaries. Beck et al. (2006) refer to this effect as cor-
ruption in lending.
Obviously, the European academic community has no influence or institutional
rights to demand access to structured information on financial intermediaries,
which regulators and supervisors have at their disposal. Additionally, no academic
institution has enough influence in Europe to be accepted as a representative on be-
half of all European researchers and to aggregate the information from the banking
industry in order to facilitate transparency and due diligence.
The investor information disclosures, which are available via the World Wide
Web, are a fertile area for web-mining research. Information retrieval (IR) via web-
mining is part of artificial intelligence, especially the sub-areas of machine learn-
ing and natural language processing (Kosala and Blockeel, 2000). The IR process
focuses on automatic rather than manual retrieval and on structured information
rather than unstructured data (Van Rijsbergen, 1979).
The velocity of data processing is subject to the structure of information. It
can be structured as a database, semi-structured with a hidden or a varying data
structure, or unstructured. This thesis mostly addresses information available on
the Web, but with no clear data structure. For example, harmonized transparency
templates are available on the Web, but the process of report retrieval is subject to
web-mining.
The process of IR of harmonized transparency templates can be divided into
several stages: definition of the population of CBs issuers; the information trans-
parency check (i.e., the verification of the availability of disclosures for machine
processing); reports retrieval; machine reading of reports; and data cleaning. The
pull of CBs issuers is not available in a consistent manner. Instead, the combination
of several sources was employed to get the most complete list of financial interme-
diaries who issue CBs: the Covered Bonds Label issuers directory, and the ECBC
issuers directory.
All information is available in XML, which is a semi-structured information
format subject to missing attributes, multiple values, variant attribute permuta-
tions, exceptions and typos (Hsu and Dung, 1998). Additional complications were
caused by using different encoding standards and disclosures of entities’ legal
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names, which prevent automatic matching between the same financial institutions
extracted from different web pages. The most evident example of such a mismatch
is that the same CBs issuer is disclosed on web pages under different names. For
instance, SEB (a Swedish bank) is named as ”SEB” on the ECBC website and as
”Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ)” on the Covered Bonds Label website.
Another journey one has to go through is to retrieve the files from the individual
bank’s web pages, most of which are specifically designed to prevent unauthorized
machine file retrieval. There is a separate strand of literature that studies the ethics
of web crawlers Giles et al. (2010). In essence, every crawler should respect the
Robots Exclusion Protocol, which is a set of domain-specific rules specified for
”robot.txt” files. The unethically designed web crawler may cause serious disrup-
tion to the domain, such as a Denial of Service Attack, which in turn leads to server
shut down. The principles of safe IR are discussed by Eichmann (1995). For the
purpose of Essay B, the web crawler was designed to yield the harmonized trans-
parency templates in the most ethical way to the best of my knowledge. The crawler
gathered more than 3,000 files in 24 hours, out of which around 2,000 files were
relevant.
Another source of information available on the Web is the commercially fo-
cused data provider. This is due to early stage development providing a certain day
limit of free queries and endowment for developers. One of the most powerful and
largely unexplored data sources for researchers is Google’s API services. In this
thesis, two major data sources were used to compile the spatial branch distribution
of SSBs: Google Places API and Geocoding API. The former was used to locate
the current branches of the SSBs; the latter was used to get the longitude and lat-
itude of the closed branches provided by the Swedish Bankers’ Associations. The
data was retrieved as output in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format.
Section 4.3 underlines the non-trivial methods and data sources used in this
thesis. The rest of Chapter 4 is devoted to methods of data analysis and study
design.
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4.4 Study Set-up
As underlined in Section 2, society is interested in the role of banks in contributing
to economic growth. So, it is implied that a bank funds opportunities that cannot
be funded by bonds or equity financing, in line with Bolton and Freixas (2000).
The central problem is that banks are prone to herding behavior by undertaking
correlated investment decisions in order to minimize the costs of borrowing in
future (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008). In this case, observing the other bank’s
performance does not reveal any additional information about the given bank. All
banks are similar, and good news about one bank mean good news about every
bank. However, bad news about one means bad news about everyone else. Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008) claim that the former effect dominates the latter. Banks’
herding behavior is studied in Essay A.
Additionally, debt is the least information-sensitive security (Dang et al., 2015).
A trade with low information sensitivity does not require the investor to perform
due diligence. In Dang et al.’s (2015) set-up, trading ”debt-on-debt” preserves sym-
metric ignorance because it minimizes the incentive to produce private information
about the payoffs. Hence, debt is the least information-sensitive security (i.e., it is
liquid). CBs are the bank’s debt-on-debt, which is mortgages. The shock about the
fundamental value of mortgages creates incentives to perform due diligence and
exaggerates shock propagation to ”debt-on-debt” instruments. Properly function-
ing funding markets allow banks and other firms to manage their cash balances
and short-term liquidity needs. Given the vital role of funding markets, Dang et al.
(2015) have reached a preliminary assessment that collective ignorance supports
informational insensitivity of ”debt-on-debt” instruments.
At first glance, it may seem to be counterintuitive to aim to collect data about
the ”debt-on-debt” instrument, which, according to (Dang et al., 2015), is meant
to stay information insensitive. However, this thesis attempts to study the effect
that leads to an initial negative shock. Excessive lending and erosion of lending
standards are two of the fundamentals that may become public news and lead to
incentives to perform due diligence.
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The status quo of the usage of the CBs funding strategy is maintained if the issu-
ing of information-insensitive CBs increases the information sensitivity of holders
of junior debt and equity. It implies that secured funding introduces higher moni-
toring incentives for debt and equity holders. The anticipated effect of increasing
due diligence should make banks more cautious about their investment decisions.
The first assumption of Essay B is that the earnings of banks with a higher portion
of secured funding should be less volatile in comparison to the earnings of other
banks.
In Dang et al.’s (2015) set-up, the secured depositors are ultimately informa-
tion insensitive compared to secured funding, which is conditionally information
insensitive. This means that secured deposits do not perform due diligence even in
the presence of a negative shock. From this is derived the prediction of Essay B:
deposit funding erodes the screening incentives of unsecured debt and equity hold-
ers. Hence, a bank with a larger deposit base experiences less pressure by issuing
CBs, and we may not find any differences in the performance of banks issuing CBs
compared to other banks.
The imperfect information sensitivity elasticity between secured debt and junior
stakeholders introduces market discipline imperfections, which might be abused by
banks so that they can continue business as usual. On the one hand, cheap secured
funding sources, together with lack of due diligence, lead to higher interest rate
margins and, thus, higher earnings. On the other hand, they cause asset segregation
by attributing high-quality loans to the covered pool and leaving junior stakehold-
ers with whatever is left.
In the case of CBs, the logic is straightforward: the best mortgages end up in the
covered pool, while the rest stay on the balance sheet. The securitization decisions
work differently. The bank decides which of the mortgages to sell out and which
to keep on the balance sheet. Even if the framework is different, the contingency
mechanism in the case of mortgage quality deterioration is similar. Essay C ex-
plores the set-up in which the SSBs may transfer part of the mortgages to a large
commercial bank (Swedbank) on the condition that it bears the first tranche losses.
While the quality of the bank’s assets is opaque, the transferred volume of loans
and the bank’s total assets is provided by the Swedish Savings Banks Association.
56 4 Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Small SSBs have to segregate their assets and transfer part of them to Swedbank
due to capital constraints, liquidity or funding needs, and so on. The due diligence
process between Swedbank and SSBs is not known. The information asymmetry
persists and is proxied by the distance between Swedbank’s closest branch to the
local branch of the SSB. As with covered pool asset segregation, the various im-
plications for mortgage retention decisions and transfer strategies are explored in
Essay C.
The financial literacy literature is enormous, but it mostly concerns consumer
behavior (e.g., see Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)). A summary of the situation can be
borrowed from Lusardi and Tufano (2015): the more literate people are, the better
they are at wealth accumulation and smooth consumption. In light of this, it might
be of interest for society to ensure that bankers are able to provide financially lit-
erate support for consumers’ lifetime wealth accumulation. It may, for example,
be expedient to ensure that banks’ top management teams understand the neces-
sity of regulations. Of course, no one would be allowed to question the financial
literacy of banks’ top management teams. Instead, Essay D operates in terms of
professional self-perception or self-esteem. The bankers with high self-confidence
and competence related to the regulatory changes and overall banking operations
are expected to have a different attitude towards upcoming changes.
Chapter 5
Summary of Research Contributions
Chapter 5 presents the results of the essays on which this thesis is based. The es-
says aim to contribute to the understanding of the implications of banking regula-
tory amendments (i.e., the Basel III accord in this thesis) for the funding strategies
adopted by financial intermediaries in Europe. Essay A is the result of joint work
with one of my supervisors, Assistant Professor Viktor Elliot. The idea and moti-
vation for the paper was developed as a joint effort. I am the first authors of the
Essay because I came up with study design, performed data collection and estima-
tions. The analysis and conclusions are the result of joint work. In this essay, we
aim to answer whether the Basel III accord favors CBs issuers over other financial
intermediaries. Section 5.1 presents the main conclusions of Essay A.
Section 5.2 summarizes the findings of Essay B. This essay presents one of the
first descriptions of data related to banks’ asset encumbrance attributed to CBs.
This data was utilized to study the existence of banks’ propensity to increasingly
resort to secured funding. Essay B assesses how the asset encumbrance affects the
banks’ asset allocations in terms of balance sheet growth and future encumbrance
levels.
Section 5.3 focuses on the findings of Essay C. In this essay, I analyze the driv-
ing factors behind small SSBs segregating newly issued loans based on the degree
of competition the bank faces. Essay C focuses on the effect of distance to com-
petitor in securitization decisions of SSBs.
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Section 5.4 describes the contributions made by Essay D. This study is a result
of collaboration between academia (i.e., Viktor Elliot and me) and industry (i.e.,
Torbjo¨rn Jacobsson 1). We study how the characteristics of bank management af-
fect banking reform support in Sweden. I am the first author, since I came up with
the study idea and performed all estimations. My co-authors (and particularly Mr.
Jacobsson) did most of the data collection, while the analyses was a joint effort.
Essay D explores one of the least discussed question in the literature relating to the
bankers’ support of the regulatory amendments.
5.1 Essay A: Do covered bonds issuers differ from non-issuers
under the new Basel III liquidity regulation?
The Basel III accord provides significant amendments to the securitization activ-
ity on which banks heavily relied before the global financial crisis. The intrinsic
role of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) before the crisis poses a question about
the regulatory amendments stemming from the crisis’s aftermath. With the loss of
confidence and disintermediation processes, secured funding has started to play a
feasible role in the European banking industry. An alternative to MBS is CBs.
The Basel III accord is designed to ensure that the use of CBs by banks does not
allow them to build up similar risks and exposure that resulted in the global finan-
cial crisis. These risks imply excessive exposure to residential properties together
with poor underwriting standards. The correctly designed regulatory framework
excludes the possibility to abuse the use of CBs in order to gain faster growth
relative to conventional banking. In Essay A, we assume a potential deviation in
the response to the new Basel III regulatory amendments between European banks
that issued CBs and those that did not. Consequently, we address the concern of
asymmetrical regulatory treatment of banks issuing CBs.
The study characterizes the evolution of banks’ characteristics around the Basel
III accord adoption. The results show that under the Basel III framework, CBs
1 CRO Avida of Finans
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issuers demonstrate higher asset growth rates. Our conclusion implies that the new
Basel III and Liquidity Regulation framework particularly favor banks that rely on
a CBs-driven funding strategy.
5.2 Essay B: Covered bonds funding usage: Evidence from asset
encumbrance of European banks
As high-quality secured funding instruments, CBs maintain the credit availabil-
ity for mortgages. CBs also introduce encumbrance on the banks’ balance sheets.
The segregation of mortgages with low loan-to-value ratios and commitment to
re-pledge the sour-quality loans with those that fulfill the requirements or cash
equivalents result in potential weaknesses in the European banking industry.
In Essay B, the new disclosure filings are utilized to address the research ques-
tion: How does asset encumbrance affect banks’ asset allocations in terms of bal-
ance sheet growth and future encumbrance levels? The study is based on a data
collection procedure designed to obtain the asset encumbrance attributed to the
CBs funding strategies adopted by European banks. The variable of interest is the
effect named ”asset depletion”, which stands for the difference in the growth rates
of the bank’s total assets and the segregation of its assets by pledging mostly mort-
gages to a covered pool attributed to holders of CBs. The analysis is made due to
growing European Central Bank concerns about the level of asset encumbrance of
European banks.
The data analysis shows the early findings based on available data. A major con-
tribution is the finding that the significant growth of asset deterioration is followed
by high asset encumbrance. Another finding is that once a bank starts to rely on
CBs funding, it is expected, according to the current time frame, that its growing
reliance on CBs will be maintained during the next period. This result demonstrates
the potential locked-in effect of CBs funding: once a bank starts to fund its needs
via secured funding, it tends to increase its reliance on this funding strategy. This
in turn starts a spiral of assets encumbrance.
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5.3 Essay C: The role of distance and securitization decisions of
the Swedish savings banks
Banks’ decisions to segregate assets, and the rationale for which loans to sell or en-
cumber and which to retain on the balance sheet, are subject to extensive academic
debate. One of the key determinants of the segregation principle is the degree of
competition the bank faces.
Essay C studies of small savings banks’ behavior given the presence of a com-
peting commercial bank branch. The essay studies the relation between the struc-
ture of banks’ branch networks and the assets transfer between SSBs and Swed-
bank, a large commercial bank in Sweden. The cooperation with Swedbank allows
the SSBs to balance their lending demand and savings supply within a narrow geo-
graphical area by transferring part of newly issued loans to Swedbank. This in turn
allows the SSBs to fund the increasing lending demand and to compete with other
large commercial banks.
The geographical proximity of a branch of a commercial bank is a proxy for
the degree of competition that the local SSB faces. The closer the branches of
the commercial and the SSB, the more intense the competition. Moreover, SSBs
face informational asymmetry by transferring loans to Swedbank. The greater the
remoteness of Swedbank’s branches, the more informational asymmetry exists be-
tween Swedbank and the local SSB. Geographical remoteness limits the ability of
the SSB to transfer a loan.
The results yield the following conclusions. Decisions of SSBs to retain loans
are subject to the nature of competition they face. Once a local SSB operates close
to a branch of a commercial bank that specializes in relationship lending, the SSB
competes by issuing more loans. These loans are consequently retained on its bal-
ance sheet. This effect persists once the SSB competes with Svenska Handels-
banken. The opposite effect is observed when the close commercial bank uses
transactional lending. Given the proximity of Nordea, SEB, and La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar,
the portion of loans retained by SSBs is smaller.
5 Essay D 61
5.4 Essay D: Time for change: The role of professional
self-esteem in relation to industry support of banking
reforms in Sweden
In Essay D, we utilize unique survey data to address the research question: How do
the characteristics of bank employees affect banking reform support in Sweden?
We study the effect of professional self-esteem on the acceptance of regulatory
changes by the top management of Swedish banks. In particular, we analyze the
effect of self-reported proficiency. We call professional self-esteem, or simply self-
esteem - on the opinion of how regulatory changes will affect the Swedish banking
industry.2 Our analysis is based on comprehensive survey data collected by top
managers and industry experts in the Swedish banking industry each year from
2015 to 2018.
Two complementary approaches are used to address the individual attitude to-
wards the anticipated effect of the Basel III accord requirements on the Swedish
banking industry. The first approach relies on a small subsample of industry out-
siders (advisory and regulatory representatives) as a potentially unbiased reference
point. The second approach is based on Rossi et al.’s (2001) model, which was
specifically developed to cope with individual-scale usage heterogeneity in similar
surveys with Likert-scale discrete ratings.
The results show that the respondents who self-report as more literate in bank-
ing operations and regulations tend to demonstrate a higher approval of regulatory
efforts. These respondents are also more positive towards the anticipated effects of
the new regulatory framework on the banking industry. The study results underline
the urgent need for clearer regulatory communication strategies. The financial reg-
ulation authority might achieve better regulatory discipline if it makes an effort to
contribute to overall banking literacy.
2 In line with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, we measure self-worthiness based on proficiency.
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5.5 Discussions, implications, and future research
The conclusions of the essays presented in the thesis have straightforward policy
implications. The year 2018 marks a decade since the most serious economic melt-
down in modern history. One might consider ten years as a reasonable distance of
time from which to address the consequences of the distress of the largest financial
intermediaries.
The adjustments to the current regulatory regime are a way to address the weak-
nesses exposed by the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, these amendments may
become a source of new unintended risks. CBs are protective of investors, but they
impose risks on the issuing bank. Given the presence of safety nets, these risks
may not be fully priced. In the short term, they lead to a competitive advantage
for the issuing bank. In the long term, the excessive reliance on CBs generates as-
set encumbrance and may create the risk that the bank cannot survive a liquidity
shock.
The globalization of financial markets is a source of weakness in the financial
system. However, once the toughened competition looks to develop a closer re-
lationship with clients and better due diligence, the relationship lending starts to
flourish.
Any change in regulatory standards imposes a burden on the regulatee to adapt,
but those ready to change turn out to be those knowledgeable about the changes. If
the relationship is truthful, then an improved communication strategy and regulatee
support (which are analogous to customer support) would be likely to make the
process of changes occur more easily.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, banks’ disclosure and transparency
have undergone significant improvements. However, although considerable effort
has been made in that direction, there is still a long and, more importantly, ex-
pensive way to go. Banks are still prone to avoid making an effort to facilitate
the disclosure standards. On the one hand, the associated investments in the IT in-
frastructure favor only large banks with enough scope to compensate themselves
for expenses (again, consider the first TBTF argument). On the other hand, IT in-
frastructure investments produce considerable public expenditure to maintain the
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facilities of central banks. The Covered Bonds Label market initiative is considered
in Essay B, but it also suffers from a number of issues.
While this thesis is a small step towards the unification and facilitation of pub-
lic monitoring, more studies are needed to put forward the institutional role of
the academic community in banking supervision. The European data liberalization
process is inexcusably slow given the scope of the issues revealed by the global fi-
nancial crisis. Shortcut options based on market initiatives have started to emerge,
such as the harmonized transparency templates disclosures. However, the usability
of this framework is at an early stage. Further steps should definitely be taken in
that direction.
The results and conclusions of this thesis are made in collaboration with a num-
ber of industry associations that aim to promote the transparency and efficiency of
the banking industry. While the findings of this thesis underline the important role
of regulatory and supervisory authorities, the communication between academia
and ”watch dogs” is limited. There is a manifest need for further promotion of
transparency of regulatory and supervisory procedures for the sake of academic
integrity and reproducibility of results.
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6.1 Introduction
The roots of the global financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 are typically attributed
to mortgage–backed securities (MBS)1 and the residential property price bubble
(Gorton and Ordon˜ez, 2014). The underlying mechanics of how price bubbles turn
into a crisis are still the subject of extensive debate. The traditional view implies co-
integration of property prices and such fundamentals as real income, population,
construction costs, and land supply (see Wheaton (1990), Capozza et al. (2004),
and Ortalo-Magne´ and Sven (2006) among others). Perhaps the most prominent
among the non-conventional arguments is the hypothesis that property prices are
subject to behavioural bias. Case and Shiller (1988) observe backward-looking ex-
pectations, which are inherent in property prices. In the absence of declining prop-
erty prices, the market players extrapolate the recent increase in the prices and
overestimate the future capital gain from owning a residential property.
The non-conventional set of studies argue that there is no cointegrating relation-
ship between property prices and real estate market fundamentals (Gallin, 2006).
Coleman IV et al. (2008) explain the growth of house prices from 2003 up to 2006
by the displacement of private asset-backed securities issuers for the government-
sponsored enterprises, which led to a disconnection of market prices from their
fundamentals. They claimed that the subprime lending and subsequent events were
a result of fundamental changes in the legal, political and regulatory environment,
which resulted in strong incentives for a surge in lending and securitization by pri-
vate issuers under loosened underwriting standards. Those practices turned out to
be unsustainable and resulted in the most severe meltdown since the Great Depres-
sion.
In this essay, we consider the regulatory treatment of the covered bonds (here-
after, CBs) under Basel III as a potential cause of the eased lending constraints and
loosened standards, which, in line with the argument of Coleman IV et al. (2008),
may result in growth in property prices and trigger a similar chain of events as de-
scribed earlier. The current regulatory framework treats CBs as a ”problem-free”
alternative to MBS with considerable investor protection via minimum overcollat-
1 The underlying collateral constitutes the debt contracts on US residential property.
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eralization (OC) requirements and dual resource (i.e., investors have an additional
claim on residual bank assets). A CB issuance is not followed by asset segregation,
and pledged to covered pool (CP) collateral is kept on the balance-sheet and mon-
itored by the mortgage originator. Since 2007, CBs outstanding in Europe have
increased from EUR 2 trillion to EUR 2.5 trillion by December 2016.
The increase in CBs usage by European banks has also led to steadily increasing
levels of asset encumbrance, something that is closely monitored by the European
Banking Authority (EBA). A EBA report on asset encumbrance (EBA, 2017), sin-
gles out CBs as the major source of asset collateralization. According to the report,
the weighted average ratio of asset encumbrance in European banks was 26.6% as
of December 2016. While a high encumbrance level is problematic in itself, the
EBA (2017) is specifically concerned with the rising encumbrance of central bank
eligible assets resulting from replenishment of assets downgrades in the current CB
pools.
In relation to the Basel III framework, few financial instruments have been dis-
cussed on social media so fiercely as CBs (both within and outside Europe). The
earlier versions of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) proposal issued in Decem-
ber 2009 called for 20 – 40 % discount on CBs at the high-quality liquid assets
(HQLA) level 2 composition. Mauricio Noe, managing director of debt capital
markets at Deutsche Bank as of 2010, extended his critique against the initially
proposed haircuts in an interview with the Financial Times on 23 of April 2010,
saying that CBs would be ”whacked” by the banks if the proposed haircuts want
ahead. The later versions of the Basel III proposal assign a preferential 15 % hair-
cut on CBs (subject to certain criteria). The same preferential treatment does not
apply to traditional MBS. Residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), with
similar features of risk retention and full recourse, are subject to a 25% haircut.
This drives a regulatory wedge between these two rather similar instruments. The
new bank resolution framework (bail-in procedure) also favors CB holders by pro-
viding safeguards in the case of resolution. This favorable regulatory treatment
is addressed in this essay under the introduced notion of a ”covered bonds easy-
living” hypothesis.
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Jon Nicolaisen, the deputy governor of Norges Bank, discussed the implications
of CB funding strategies at the European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) plenary
meeting, Oslo on 6 April 2017. He stated that the preferential regulatory treatment
of CBs, together with low risk weights for residential mortgages, incentivize banks
to expand further into mortgage lending. Two potential downside effects follow
from this. First, the potential crowding out effect of corporate lending due to ex-
tensive mortgage lending increases the banks’ exposure to price changes of the
underlying collateral (i.e. house prices) and heightens bank leverage. Second, the
reduction of eligible assets on the banks’ balance sheets hampers the credit and
liquidity risk profile of the sector.
In this study, we stress ”CBs easy-living” arguments. In particular, we esti-
mate the effect of Basel III adoption on the European CB issuers. High demand
for HQLA, preferential treatment of long-term funding, and lower risk weights for
residential mortgage lending may favor CB issuers. We test whether the new regu-
latory framework allows CB issuers to perform better than those who do not issue
CBs. The estimations are based on a genetic matched sample of CB issuers versus
non-CB issuers for the period before (2012 – 2013) and after (2015 – 2016) the
introduction of the Basel III LCR. We employ the difference-in-difference (also re-
ferred as diff-in-diff) approach in a study designed to test the presence of a potential
treatment effect from the introduction of Basel III.
We find that there is an effect of the Basel III introduction on CB issuers com-
pared to non-issuers. CB issuers demonstrate higher asset growth rates after the
Basel III adoption, given the estimations are performed on the balanced sample of
banks with not statistically different characteristics as of 2012. The existence of a
regulatory policy that is aimed to substitute one practice with a better one from a
regulatory point of view is not a surprise. In essence, we show that there is in fact
support for the CBs easy-living hypothesis, but it is still unclear whether CBs are
actually a more stable instrument than RMBSs. Further research should strive to
make this distinction clear in order to confirm that the current preferential treatment
of CBs is indeed well motivated.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the literature on the
Basel III framework and the regulatory treatment of CBs. Section 6.3 discusses the
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empirical strategy of this research. Section 6.4 presents the data description. Sec-
tion 6.5 describes the matching strategy. Section 6.6 reports the estimation results.
Section 6.7 addresses the robustness and validity concerns. Section 6.8 summarizes
our findings, draws the conclusions, and elaborates on future investigations.
6.2 Literature
While the securitization of mortgage lending is the scourge of the century, we
should strive to understand what would have been the consequences of the global
financial crisis if MBS would have been supplemented with CB financing earlier.
Would it have been less severe? In order to address this question, we need to outline
the fundamental difference between CBs and MBS.
The empirical evidence about credit risk allocation between securitized and
retained-on-balance-sheet loans is ambiguous. In a sample of European banks, Far-
ruggio and Uhde (2015) find that only less risky banks with a higher loan portfolio
quality are more actively engaged in securitization, while Affinito and Tagliaferri
(2010), based on sample of Italian banks, find that less profitable and riskier banks
are more involved in the securitization process.
Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) discuss a bank’s choice to fund a newly issued
loan by emitting deposits or to securitize the loan by selling it to investors. With-
out information asymmetry about asset quality and government interventions, the
banks are indifferent between these options. The regulation and footings-related
subsidies2 may affect the bank’s funding model by prompting retention of newly
issued loans on the balance sheet. At the same time, when adverse selection is in
place, higher-quality loans are securitized whereas lower-quality loans are kept on
the bank’s balance sheet (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987).
While the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) policy papers3
blame the savings glut on the emerging markets, absence of due diligence, man-
2 That is, subsidized access to a lender-of-last-resort and underpriced deposit insurance (Green-
baum and Thakor, 1987)
3 See BCBS Report on asset securitization incentives (BCBS, 2011)
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agerial compensation schemes, an so on, most scholars agree on that the price
bubble of the US housing market is one of the primary sources of the crisis (for
a review, see Thakor (2015)). Nevertheless, the quality of the lending standards is
still beyond the scope of policy consideration.
Given that the laxer lending standards built up the baskets of ”lemons”, which
subsequently were pulled out for securitization, it is unclear how the supplementa-
tion of securitization with CBs is going to address this issue. The first argument in
favour of that initiative is the ”skin in the game” principle. This means that the loans
retained on the bank’s balance sheet are better monitored. This logic goes against
the argument of Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), where the poorer-quality loans are
funded through insured deposits. The depositors’ monitoring incentives are diluted
by deposit insurance schemes or explicit/implicit government guarantees, causing
the implosion of stricter capital regulations (e.g., Admati et al. (2013)). The igno-
rance of MBS investors about the quality of underlying assets can be similar to that
of the insured depositors under the presence of the same safety nets. Discussion
about implicit government guarantees can be found in Acharya et al. (2011). The
authors argue that, in the absence of implicit guarantees and safety nets, profes-
sional investors are better at risk assessment compared to the insured small depos-
itors. Moreover, such practices as junior risk retention (when the originator retains
the riskiest tranche of the issue) also implies ”skin in the game”.
Regulators are concerned about the adverse selection problems, when the poorer-
quality mortgages are securitized. The same principle holds in the case of segrega-
tion of assets on the bank’s balance sheet. The CB issuer chooses which mortgages
to include into the cover pool (CP) and which to retain on the balance sheet. In
line with Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), given the absence of depositors’ due dili-
gence, the lower-quality loans are funded by deposits and higher-quality loans are
segregated to CP.
CBs are also starting to attract attention in the academic literature due to
their rising importance for the financial institutions as a refinancing tool (e.g.,
Prokopczuk et al. (2013) and Larsson (2013)). Carbo´-Valverde et al. (2017) com-
pare CBs and MBSs, concluding that CBs and MBS share some familiarity with
each other, but that, at least before the crisis, these instruments were primarily used
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for different purposes: CBs were used to improve the issuer’s liquidity position and
MBS were used to reduce risks.
The study by Filippo et al. (2016) of a bank’s choice between secured and un-
secured money market funding shows that riskier banks substitute unsecured fund-
ing with secured funding. Ahnert et al. (2018) present a theoretical framework in
which CBs issuance allows the increase of expected value of bank equity by financ-
ing more profitable investments, while shifting balance sheet shock to unsecured
debt holders and thereby increase banking fragility. Meanwhile, the preliminary re-
sults of Garcia-Appendini2017CoveredIndustry show that asset encumbrance lev-
els have no real effect on bank risk.
Juks (2012) shows that the recovery values of unsecured claimants diminish
when the share of secured funding increases. When banks replenish an unsecured
with a secured source of funding, the loss recovery ratios of unsecured debt might
be affected. The presence of uncertainty about the future pay-off structure due to
the inability of banks to pre-commit seniority of claims fulfillment hampers the
bank’s access to the unsecured market.
The study in this essay is also related to literature on the effects of liquidity
regulation on bank funding models in general, and specifically to those works that
study the Basel III adoption in 2015 and how banks have adjusted their balance
sheet structure to meet the LCR minimum requirements. For example, Duijma
and Wiertsa (2016) find that banks respond to the Dutch LCR (DLCR) shortfall
by increasing the stable funding, not by increasing HQLA holdings. In contrast,
Banerjee and Mio (2017) report that UK banks respond to liquidity regulation
tightening not only by liability changes, but also by increasing HQLA holdings.
Similarly, Bonner (2016) reports that preferential treatment increases banks’ de-
mand for governmental bonds beyond their own risk appetite. Moreover, they find
that higher HQLA holdings have a negative effect on bank lending.
Although growing, literature on CBs is still scarce and to the best of our knowl-
edge no previous papers have tested how the LCR requirements affect CB is-
suers versus non-issuers. Specifically, our study assesses whether the potentially
favorable regulatory framework for CB issuers, without endogenizing the risk of
washing-out the high-quality unencumbered assets from the balance sheet, may
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hamper the bank’s access to unsecured markets and worsen the bank’s liquidity
position.
6.3 Empirical strategy
6.3.1 Industrial Setup
In our study, we rely on a sample of EU CB issuers. The advantage of relying on
a cross-country sample of EU banks in order to estimate how the potentially pref-
erential treatment influences CB issuers is that it allows us to move beyond the
large unbalance imbalance between issuers and non-issuers groups of in a partic-
ular country. We test if banks, which are relying on CBs funding, enjoy benefits
from the new Basel III framework compared to banks that do not exploit the CB
funding strategy. As noted above, the initial Basel III proposal was much less pref-
erential then the final version towards banks exploiting a CB funding strategy than
the final version, which that is currently being implemented.
The first question to address is whether Basel III favours CB issuers over banks
that do not issue CBs. The effect is driven by the preferential eligibility status of
CBs for inclusion in HQLA with a haircut of 15% versus a haircut ofs 25% haircut
for RMBS. The lower haircut to for holding CBs by a bank for the purpose of
LCR calculation supports the demand for this instruments and eases the funding
constraints of banks, which that rely on CBs as a funding instrument.
The second question to consider is what bank characteristics will be affected
the most, if Basel III favours CB issuers over non-issuers. The most straight for-
ward expectation is that those banks that, which issued CBs before the Basel III
introduction, have a possibility to can increase mortgage lending via additional is-
suance of CBs. Of course, it is a case this would only be the case if the bank is
not capital -constrained. In that case, we might expect excessive assets growth of
banks that, relying on CBs funding. The asset growth of CB issuers can be via (a)
supplementing ”old” mortgages, which were previously held on the balance sheet
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and not pledged to the CP, and, for example, e.g. increasing corporate lending, or
(b) issuing new mortgage lending and pledging it to the CP.
The third question to address is which CB issuers are expected to be most af-
fected most by the Basel III introduction. We expect the most pronounced effect
to be on the issuers which who were issuing CBs before the Basel III adoption.
This is because the CBs of established issuers have a historical performance, and
the increased demand for CBs affects more the large and established issuers. On
the other hand, the small CB issuers were previously funding funding-constrained,
and so, under eased market conditions, the small and risky CB issuers experienced
the biggest (positive) shock, if the. We assess whether this effect is still in place.
While we cannot certainly predict whether small or large CB issuers are affected
the most, it is reasonable to assume that the most preferential position would be for
the banks that hold a sufficient mortgage lending portfolio with that simultaneously
have low loan- to -value ratios and are at the same time as it is not fully pledged to
CB holders. Unfortunately, there is no data available on the unencumbered mort-
gages held at on the bank balance sheets.
Another potential determinant of the shock significance is the date when the
bank started to issue CBs. The Basel III enforcement designed a favorable regu-
latory framework for CB issuers and investors by imposing the LCR framework
since 2015. While there is extensive cross-country variance in the legal enforce-
ment schedule for the LCR, we are primarily interested in the aggregate demand at
the EU- level.
We follow the unified harmonized implementation schedule to be in place for
year-end observations of 2014 (formally, January 1, 2015) at a minimum of 60%
that gradually increased up to 80% as of by the 2016 year-end. So, we expect the
anticipation and adoption period to be 2014. Given that, we drop 2014 year-end
observations as our anticipation period. The pre-treatment period is determined
before 2013, while the post-treatment period is after 2015.
The innovation diffusion is a function of the innovation desirability (Molyneux
and Shamroukh, 1996). The adoption of the softened CB treatment within the Basel
III framework increases the desirability of CBs, but it is reasonable to assume that
late adopters do not fully experience the positive shock from the regulatory treat-
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ment of CBs. In the awake of regulatory amendments, banks tend to develop this
compliance strategies and make adjustments before the regulation is in place. If
the precautionary compliance argument holds, we may find the most significant
effect for the CB issuers who issued CBs before the ”precautionary” compliance
was made (i.e., before 2014). Thus, we expect that Bonner (2016)’s findings of an
increased aggregate demand for government bonds under the new liquidity require-
ments also imply the increased demand for CBs and lead to improved economic
conditions for CB issuers.
The probability of being a CB issuer before the Basel III proposal is not ran-
dom. The determinants of a CB funding strategy lies in the dimensions of capital
structure, business models, funding strategies, and profitability. In order to address
imbalances in the sample between CB issuers and non-issuers, we follow the grow-
ing strand of literature exploiting various matching algorithms in line with Gropp
et al. (2018) and Almeida (2012). We exploit the generic optimization algorithm
following Sekhon and Mebane (1998) and Diamond and Sekhon (2013); in addi-
tion, we use a similar set of covariates to those in Gropp et al. (2018) to capture
the potential differences between the CB issuers and non-issuers for the general
population: total assets, capital ratio, customer loans as a share of total assets, non-
interest income as a share of total operating revenue, deposit funding as a share of
total assets, and net income over total assets.
6.3.2 Methodology
Once we have a balanced sample of the financial intermediaries that issue and do
not issue CBs, we may test for the existence of the effect of the Basel III regula-
tion on CB issuers vs non-issuers. The most established way to test for this effect
is to employ the difference-in-difference estimations to test for the presence of a
potential treatment effect from the favorable regulatory framework for CBs.
In this study, we assume that each bank exploits improved economic condi-
tions by expanding its balance sheet. Several arguments support this assumption.
The too-big-to-fail argument implies the preferential treatment of banks in the
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case of distress. Recently, this argument has been supported by a separate regu-
latory framework for systemically important financial institutions. Also, a number
of studies document the existence of economy of scale in banking. For a more
specific discussion, see Davies and Tracey (2014).
We estimate the regression specification 6.1 in order to determine the treatment
effect of LCR implementation on CB issuers compared to the control group of
non-CB issuers. The CB issuer ·A f ter stands for difference in differences (DID),
where CB issuer is equal to 1 for CB issuers and 0 for non-CB issuers, and A f ter
is determined as the post-treatment LCR adoption period after 2014. We test how
the reliance on a CB funding strategy affects the bank’s ability to grow - that is, to
increase the bank’s total assets.
Yi,t = α+βCB issueri×A f tert + γBank Controlsi,t +υi+νt + εi,t . (6.1)
The DID estimation is based on the parallel trend assumption (PTA), which
means that, in the absence of treatment, the control and treatment groups would
have behaved similarly. Unlike in the controlled laboratory experiments, it is im-
possible to isolate the treatment effect with constantly changing economic con-
ditions. The banking industry is characterized by dense changes in the economic
and regulatory environment in the post-crisis period. The state policy of precau-
tionary capitalization, bail-outs, restructuring, and other government interventions,
together with a number of country-specific regulatory and political changes intro-
duced in parallel, have resulted in the inability to test for the PTA.
The failure of PTA does not exclude the applicability of DID estimations.
Chabe´-Ferret (2017) outlines that the proper matching strategy on pre-treatment
outcomes enables to get consistent DID estimations to be attained. The various
matching strategies result in the set of control groups, matched with the treatment
group via different sets of pre-treatment covariates. It allows us to perform the DID
estimations and make an inference about a presence of the effect.
The strictest matching strategy is designed according to the following logic.
Under the assumption that the major effect took place during the period of pre-
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cautionary compliance in 2014, the presence of the shock from the Basel III intro-
duction can be tested by DID estimations based on matched groups of CB issuers
who started to issue CBs before 2014, versus the control group of CB issuers who
started to issue CBs after 2014. This matching strategy eliminates the claim about
the uniqueness of banks issuing CBs. The problem with this study design is that the
estimation is biased towards the group of issuers who started to use the CB funding
strategy after 2014. It may turn out that the late (i.e., post-2014) adopters of a CB
funding strategy were, for example, capital constrained during the pre-treatment
period. The matching strategy based on the capital covariate leads to selection bias
of the early adopters, who were consequently also capital constrained and could
not realize the growth potential due to regulatory restrictions on asset growth. That
leads to the false rejection of the studied effect presence. Moreover, the following
matching strategy is not applicable due to the small sample of the late issuers with
non missing data on the variables of interest. The matching strategies are discussed
in details in Section 6.5.
6.4 Data
Our dataset is mainly constructed from annual entity-level balance sheet data, col-
lected through the SNL database. The coverage of the European banks is limited
in the SNL, which means that we are restricted to those banks that have filed the
consolidated data on variables of interest for the period from 2012 to 2016. The
variables of interest are summarized in 6.1.
The list of CB issuers was accessed through the European Covered Bonds Coun-
cil’s (ECBC) official webpage as of 2018. The ECBC sample of the treated group
consists of 318 non-consolidated CB issuers across Europe as of 2018. In order to
eliminate potential bias from complex corporate structures of bank holding com-
panies (BHC) and to match with SNL dataset, we aggregate the level of analyses
in the case of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) usage up to the bank and further
BHC levels. The issuers are identified and matched with SNL dataset via domain
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics
Variable (SNL Key) Mean SD Min 25% 75% Max Mean SD Min 25% 75% Max
2012 2016
Total Assets (132264) 16.5 1.9 11.8 15.5 17.5 21.4 16.6 1.8 11.8 15.5 17.5 21.5
Capital Ratio (133176) 17.6 13.2 0.9 13.0 18.4 167.6 20.7 27.5 8.1 15.4 20.5 416.6
Leverage Ratio (133084) 7.2 3.9 0.9 5.0 8.3 30.1 8.8 3.7 1.6 6.0 11.0 22.6
Risk-weighted assets / Assets (227010) 50.5 20.0 1.4 36.4 64.5 100.9 48.5 19.0 3.2 33.9 60.7 96.3
Net Loans / Assets (133095) 61.4 19.2 4.6 51.7 76.0 91.6 62.4 18.2 7.9 52.3 76.4 89.2
Noninterest Income / Operating Revenue (13345) 31.1 28.5 −171.1 22.2 43.9 95.5 33.5 28.6 −257.7 22.8 45.0 95.0
Depository funding / Assets (132288/132264) 55.7 21.8 1.3 41.8 71.1 91.7 60.6 19.7 2.3 51.0 75.5 89.4
Net interest income / Assets (133377) 1.7 1.3 0.1 1.0 2.1 9.3 1.7 1.2 0.1 1.0 2.0 10.1
Asset Growth (133962) 4.2 14.8 −43.2 −1.1 6.6 73.6 3.5 12.4 −43.3 −1.8 6.9 85.1
Total Assets are log scaled; number of banks is 221
of the banks’ webpages, which is analogue to unique key given the consolidated
SNL dataset. This procedure yields a sample of 142 banks.
In order to define the set of CB issuers, which exhibited the CB funding strate-
gies during the finalisation of the Basel III proposal, we rely on additional data from
the Covered Bonds Label and Moody’s. The Covered Bond Label was created by
the ECBC and maintained by the European CBs issuer community. It discloses the
CB issues of registered CB issuers. Given that information, we collect the most re-
cent year of issues for each CB Label registered CB issuer. Additionally, Moody’s
discloses the rating actions related to the CBs issuance. We collect the date of the
fist Moody’s rating actions of CBs issuance available via Moody’s webpage. The
specified strategy allows us to identify, at the best proximity, the earliest dates,
when a bank can be classified as a CB issuer. The following procedure allows us to
approximate the date for 99 out of 143 CB issuers. As noted before, we are inter-
ested only in banks, issuing CBs before 2012. Further merge with SNL data gives
a sample of 47 CB issuers (as of 2012) with observed variables of interest.
6.5 Matching
The effect of regulatory amendments on the CB treatment is of interest for the fol-
lowing study design. At best, the experiment design implies the randomly assigned
treatment for a drown sample of CB issuers versus non-treated CB issuers - that is,
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a control group. This means that the observed covariates of treatment and control
groups have the same joint distributions. Obviously, this is not the case for this
essay, or for many other observational studies.
The generic optimization algorithm (for specific discussion, see ? and Diamond
and Sekhon (2013)) is commonly used for multivariate matching based on the Ma-
halanobis distance. It minimizes the largest observed covariate discrepancy at every
step. For details on the implementation of the generic optimization algorithm, see
Sekhon (2011).
This study expects to find the following. Given an assumption that a bank ex-
ploits every opportunity to acquire profitable assets if there is no capital or other
regulatory constraint, we should observe the most successful banks expanding their
balance sheets in the absence of severe crises. If the new regulatory framework
changes the banking competition in favor of certain types of banks, we can observe
the discrepancies in performance of the banks that should otherwise demonstrate
similar performance.
We derive the variables used for the matching procedure given the assumption
that the observed covariates of the treatment and control groups should have the
same joint distribution. The CB issuance alters bank balance sheet due to the pres-
ence of CP on the asset side, and symmetrically on the liability side the CBs super-
sede the deposit funding. We estimate probit regression with a dummy dependent
variable, which is equal to 1 if a bank issued CBs in 2012 and 0 if not. The results
are presented in Table 6.2.
Following Gropp et al. (2018), we use the share of non-interest income in rev-
enue to control for the banks’ business models. If we were to drop this variable,
it could produce an imbalanced sample because the non-issuers of CBs might re-
ceive more of their income from trading activities and commissions compared to
the CB issuers. Banks that are more like hedge funds are able to grow in assets
significantly faster due to increased market operations. Table 6.3 presents the pre-
treatment summary statistics before and after the matching procedure for the group
of CB issuers against the non-issuers of CBs as of 2012. During 2012 there was
still a significant presence of regulatory interventions. In order to eliminate bias
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Table 6.2: Probit regression for status of CB issuer
The table reports the estimation results of predictors to use a CB funding strategy as of 2012. The
significance levels are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
CB issuer
Total Assets 0.124∗∗∗
(0.035)
Total Capital Ratio −0.108∗∗∗
(0.029)
Noninterest Income / Operating Revenue −0.006
(0.004)
Net interest income / Assets −0.575∗∗∗
(0.215)
Net Loans / Assets 0.016∗∗
(0.007)
Depository funding / Assets −0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)
Asset Growth 0.001
(0.008)
Observations 221
Akaike Inf. Crit. 183.632
driven by atypical market events, we adjust the sample by removing the outliers of
asset growth.
Table 6.3: Pre-Treatment Bank Characteristics
The table reports the means for the samples of CB issuers, non-issuers, and matched non-issuers
of CBs for 2012. Asterisks indicate the p-values of the bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(n=1000) at the significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Notations: CR - Capital Ratio;
TA - Total Assets; IntInc/TA - Net Interest Income / Assets; Dep/TA - Depository funding / Assets;
Loans/TA - Net Loans / Assets; NonIntInc/Rev - Non-interest Income / Operating Revenue
Statistic N CR TA IntInc/TA Dep/TA Loans/TA NonIntInc/Rev
Unmatched Sample
CB issuers 21 14.5 18.4∗∗∗ 1.4∗ 45.9 ∗∗∗ 63.8 30.6
Non-CB issuers 123 17.1 15.9 2 61.3 64 31.3
Matched Sample
CB issuers 21 14.5 18.4 1.4 45.9 63.8 30.6
Non-CB issuers 21 15.5 18.3 1.3 45.8 63.7 34.8
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It is evident that given the sample of control and treatment groups, there are
significant imbalance in regulatory capital, banks’ size, profitability, and funding
strategies. The rest of the covariates are presented in order to show that the match-
ing procedure does not introduce imbalances in the covariates of interest. The qual-
ity of the matching outcome is defined by the lowest K-S p-value: the presented
matching outcome yields the lowest p-value (≈ 0.15) for Net Loans over Assets.
As the difference between samples is not significant for any of the covariates, the
matching can be considered to be successful.
6.6 Discussion of results
This section presents the results of the model specification introduced in Section
6.3. The variable of interest is the growth of banks’ assets during the period of the
Basel III draft discussion and, following its adoption, from 2012 up to 2016. The
central interest of the essay is to examine the effects of the Basel III introduction on
the group of banks, that received a preferential treatment from the adopted Basel
III version versus the original one.
Under the same regulatory regime (as is the case in the EU), the banks are more
alike than any other entities within the same industry. This statement is supported
by the presence of systemic risk and the high importance of counterparty risks.
The banks are prone to take a correlated investment decisions for various reasons
(see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)). Accordingly, similar banks tend to invest
in similar assets, which, given equal access to the market and efficient regulations,
should produce similar profits. Having similar performance and size coefficients,
the market should treat similar banks identically. These facts lead to the conclusion
that similar banks should demonstrate similar growth rates. However, once a shift
in the regulatory framework produce a structural imbalance towards a certain group
of banks, we might observe deviations.
Assuming that each bank exploits the opportunity to grow, the eased funding
constraints should result in assets growth. By definition, this growth does not affect
the profitability due to the presence of costs per unit of funding. Table 6.4 presents
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the sample means for the EU CB issuers versus non-issuers in order to show the
shift in the data features, which drives the benchmark results.
Table 6.4: Bank Characteristics
The table reports the means the samples of CB issuers, and non-issuers as of 2012 and 2016. Stars
indicate p-values for the Welch Two Sample t-test. The significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01. Notations: CR - Capital Ratio; TA - Total Assets; IntInc/TA - Net Interest Income /
Assets; Dep/TA - Depository funding / Assets; Loans/TA - Net Loans / Assets; NonIntInc/Rev -
Non-interest Income / Operating Revenue
Statistic N Growth CR TA IntInc/TA Dep/TA Loans/TA NonIntInc/Rev
Unmatched Sample - 2012
CB issuers 21 2.9 14.5 18.4∗∗∗ 1.4∗ 45.9 ∗∗∗ 63.8 30.6
Non-CB issuers 123 3.4 17.1 15.9 2 61.3 64 31.3
Unmatched Sample - 2016
CB issuers 21 1.1∗ 19.3 18.4∗∗∗ 1.3$∗∗∗ 52∗∗∗ 65.9 33.8
Non-CB issuers 123 4.1 18.1 16.1 1.9 65.4 63.6 30.9
Matched Sample - 2012
CB issuers 21 2.9∗∗ 14.5 18.4 1.4 45.9 63.8 30.6
Non-CB issuers 21 5.1 15.5 18.3 1.3 45.8 63.7 34.8
Matched Sample - 2016
CB issuers 21 1.1 19.3 18.4 1.3 52 65.9 33.8
Non-CB issuers 21 2.1 19.7 17.7 1.2 51.8 66.3 32.2
As of 2012, the raw means comparison of unmatched samples indicates sig-
nificant imbalances in the banks’ size, funding structure and profitability. The CBs
issuers are on average larger in assets, rely less on deposit funding, and earn less on
interest-bearing assets. Given the similar share of interest income in revenue, it is
possible to conclude that CB issuers are less profitable relative to the control group.
As of 2016, the imbalance persists in the same set of covariates. Additionally, the
comparison between the samples show significant imbalance in asset growth in
favour of banks that do not issue CBs.
The matching procedure introduces balance in the set of covariates used for
matching. Surprisingly, the improved sample likeness introduce a significant dis-
crepancy in the assets growth of the treatment and control groups. In the wake of
the Basel III adoption, the control group exhibits significantly higher growth rates
relative to CBs issuers. Unlike for the unmatched samples, where the difference
persists in 2016, the asset growth of the matched treatment and control groups
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are not statistically different as of 2016. It is also important to note the increased
reliance on depository funding after the Basel III adoption.
Table 6.5 reports the baseline results of the model specification presented earlier,
estimated on the raw and matched datasets. The results indicate an opposite finding
for the treatment effect. Estimated over the unmatched sample, the results indicate
a negative effect of the Basel III CB treatment on the CB issuers relative to the
banks not issuing CBs. However, the model run on a balanced dataset produces the
significant positive effect of treatment.
Table 6.5: Baseline results - The effect of the Basel III on CB issuers balance sheet
growth vs non-issuers of CBs
The table reports the estimations results of the effect of the Basel III introduction on asset growth
of banks. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Asset Growth
Raw sample Matched sample
CB issueri×A f tert −2.35∗ 4.61∗∗
(1.31) (2.31)
Depository funding / Assets 0.07∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.17)
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES
Observations 1,105 170
R2 0.02 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.02 0
F Statistic 11.26∗∗∗ (df = 2; 1103) 5.23∗∗∗ (df = 2; 130)
The share of depository funding is a significant determinant of assets growth
for estimations on both datasets. On the unmatched sample, more reliance on de-
pository funding results in higher asset growth. The matched dataset indicates the
opposite relationship between banks’ assets growth and usage of deposits as a fund-
ing source. Due to sample difference and limited industry coverage, it is hard to say
which results are closer to the true relationship. The theoretical argument suggests
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that wholesale funding (which is typically market-based) is easier (i.e., faster) to
establish relative to expanding the depositors’ base. So, lower reliance on deposi-
tory funding usually leads to higher reliance on wholesale funding, which is easier
to expand. If this argument is correct, the estimation results on the matched dataset
are in line with the banking literature.
It is worth noting that the matched control group demonstrates a drop in assets
growth during 2016 relative to 2012, while the unmatched control group experi-
ences increased growth rates during the same period. The period studied is subject
to serious regulatory adjustments and increased regulatory burden for larger finan-
cial institutions. It is logical to expect slowed growth rates, which is in line with
the matched dataset.
6.7 Limitations of analyses and validity of results
A weakness of our analysis is that, due to the severe consequences of the global
financial crises and the subsequent government interventions, it is impossible to
check whether the PTA holds. The correctly performed matching procedure can
produce an unbiased estimation in the case of a correctly specified model. While
the performed analysis addresses these problems as far as possible, given the data
availability and sample size, the validity of the conclusions is subject to further
investigation.
One of the major concerns with DID estimations is that the post-treatment dif-
ferences may be partially driven by various asymmetric effects of the control and
treatment groups arising from common trends rather than from the treatment it-
self. In line with Banerjee and Mio (2017), we are aware that our results may be
partially driven by the common trends affecting financial institutions in different
ways. One potential concern is the European Central Bank (ECB) macroprudential
policy in general and its quantitative easing in particular.
The quantitative easing implementation mechanism is the ECB asset purchase
program (APP), which was gradually implemented from 2012 and was in place as
of 2018. The ECB inflation target is managed via the purchasing of assets (ECB
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APP) that may have different effects on different types of banks. One of the aspects
of APP is the CB purchasing program (CBPP), which started in June 2009 and was
gradually extended until 2017 (CBPP1, CBPP2, CBPP3). In contrast to Banerjee
and Mio (2017), tthe fact that APP affected the CB issuers more than other banks
strengthens our conclusion of the presence of preferential treatment of CB issuers
by European regulatory and supervisory agents. The CBs easy-living argument still
holds in that case.
It is an empirical quest to determine whether Basel III imposes structural im-
balances in the competition by introducing discretion in the treatment of similar
financial institutions. The subsidies built into a regulatory regime is not necessarily
an undesirable outcome. The regulator may subsidize more prudent practices, but
the question remains whether the usage of CBs over traditional securitization is a
more prudent practice.
6.8 Conclusion
In this essay, we have investigated the Basel III regulatory adjustments of CB is-
suers versus non-issuers. We performed difference-in-difference estimations of the
balance sheet growth rates after the Basel III implementation. In order to address
the inherited bias between CB issuers and the population of European banks, we
used a genetic matching procedure to balance pre-treatment characteristics of CB
issuers and a non-CB control group.
Our results support the CBs easy-living hypothesis: CB issuers demonstrate a
higher asset growth compared to the control group of non-issuers. This exercise
shows that, on average, the CB issuers seem to outperform similar non-issuing
banks. These results support the recent policy concerns regarding the preferential
treatment of CB issuers due to the established favorable regulatory framework. Our
findings contribute to the discussion regarding the potentially asymmetric regula-
tory treatment of CB issuers by Basel III. This imbalance may result in potential
spillovers from providing favorable conditions towards secure funding.
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In conclusion, the current preferential treatment of CB funding strategy has
started to raise political and academic concerns regarding the unintended con-
sequences of excessive reliance on secured funding. The heightened exposure to
house prices on an upward trend may introduce the backward-looking bias, when
the players do not consider the trend change and overestimate the future growth
of residential property prices. Once the trend reverts, the falling value of under-
lying assets forces banks to supplement the deteriorated assets with high-quality
mortgages or cash. The non-encumbered assets start to deteriorate faster given the
supplementing of the residual high-quality assets with deteriorated in quality and
non-eligible loans from CP. The growing interconnectedness due to cross-holdings
of CBs is another potential concern that should be further investigated.
References
Acharya, V. V., Anginer, D., and Warburton, A. J. (2011). The End of Market
Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees. SSRN
Electronic Journal.
Acharya, V. V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2008). Information contagion and bank herd-
ing. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(1):215–231.
Admati, A. R., Demarzo, P. M., Hellwig, M. F., and Pfleiderer, P. (2013). Fallacies,
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank
Equity is Not Expensive. Working Paper.
Affinito, M. and Tagliaferri, E. (2010). Why do (or did?) banks securitize their
loans? Evidence from Italy. Journal of Financial Stability, 4(6):189–202.
Ahnert, T., Anand, K., Gai, P., and Chapman, J. (2018). Asset Encumbrance, Bank
Funding and Financial Fragility. The Review of Financial Studies, hhy107.
Almeida, H., C. M. L. B. &. W. S. (2012). Corporate Debt Maturity and the Real
Effects of the 2007 Credit Crisis. Critical Finance Review, 1(1):3–58.
Banerjee, R. N. and Mio, H. (2017). The impact of liquidity regulation on banks.
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35:30–44.
BCBS (2011). Report on asset securitisation incentives.
Bonner, C. (2016). Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks’ Demand for
Government Bonds. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48(6):1195–1221.
88 6 Essay A
Capozza, D. R., Hendershott, P. H., and Mack, C. (2004). An anatomy of price
dynamics in illiquid markets: analysis and evidence from local housing markets.
Real Estate Economics, 32(1):1–32.
Carbo´-Valverde, S., Rosen, R. J., and Rodrı´guez-Ferna´ndez, F. (2017). Are Cov-
ered Bonds a Substitute for Mortgage-Backed Securities? Journal of Economic
Policy Reform, 20(3):238–253.
Case, K. E. and Shiller, R. J. (1988). The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and
Post-Boom Markets. New Haven, Conn.
Chabe´-Ferret, S. (2017). Should We Combine Difference In Differences with Con-
ditioning on Pre-Treatment Outcomes. Technical report, Toulouse School of
Economics (TSE).
Coleman IV, M., LaCour-Little, M., and Vandell, K. D. (2008). Subprime lend-
ing and the housing bubble: Tail wags dog? Journal of Housing Economics,
17(8):272–290.
Davies, R. and Tracey, B. (2014). Too big to be efficient ? The impact of implicit
funding subsidies on scale economies in banking. Journal of Money, Credit &
Banking, 46(February):219–253.
Diamond, A. and Sekhon, J. S. (2013). Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal
Effects: A General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Ob-
servational Studies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3):932–945.
Duijma, P. and Wiertsa, P. (2016). The Effects of Liquidity Regulation on Bank
Assets and Liabilities. International Journal of Central Banking, 12(2):385–
411.
EBA (2017). The annual EBA report on asset encumbrance.
Farruggio, C. and Uhde, A. (2015). Determinants of loan securitization in Euro-
pean banking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 56:12–27.
Filippo, M., Ranaldo, A., and Wrampelmeyer, J. (2016). Unsecured and Se-
cured Funding. University of St. Gallen, School of Finance Working Paper No.
2016/16.
Gallin, J. (2006). The Long-Run Relationship between House Prices and Income:
Evidence from Local Housing Markets. Real Estate Economics, 34(3):417–438.
Gorton, G. and Ordon˜ez, G. (2014). Collateral crises. American Economic Review,
104(2):343–378.
Greenbaum, S. I. and Thakor, A. V. (1987). Bank funding modes. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 11(3):379–401.
Gropp, R., Mosk, T., Ongena, S., and Wix, C. (2018). Bank response to higher
capital requirements: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment. The Review of
Financial Studies, 32(1):266–299.
Juks, R. (2012). Asset encumbrance and its relevance for financial stability. Tech-
nical report, Sveriges Riksbank.
References 89
Larsson, C. F. (2013). What did Frederick the great know about financial engineer-
ing? A survey of recent covered bond market developments and research. The
North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 25:22–39.
Molyneux, P. and Shamroukh, N. (1996). Diffusion of financial innovations: the
case of junk bonds and note issuance facilities. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 28(3):502–522.
Ortalo-Magne´, F. and Sven, R. (2006). Housing market dynamics: On the contri-
bution of income shocks and credit constraints. Review of Economic Studies,
73(2):459–485.
Prokopczuk, M., Siewert, J. B., and Vonhoff, V. (2013). Credit risk in covered
bonds. Journal of Empirical Finance, 21(1):102–120.
Sekhon, J. S. (2011). Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with
Automated Balance Optimization: The Matching package for R. Journal of
Statistical Software, 42(i07).
Sekhon, J. S. and Mebane, W. R. (1998). Genetic optimization using derivatives.
Political Analysis, 7:187–210.
Thakor, A. V. (2015). The Financial Crisis of 2007-09: Why Did It Happen and
What Did We Learn? The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 4(2):155–205.
Wheaton, W. C. (1990). Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching
Model. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6):1270–1292.

Chapter 7
Essay B: Covered bonds funding usage:
Evidence from asset encumbrance of European
banks
NATALIA KOSTITCYNA
91
92 7 Essay B
7.1 Introduction
Since the end of the 1980s, secured debt has been perceived in light of the following
statement by Tirole (2006, p. 169): ”Only weak borrowers pledge collateral.” While
this may be the case for consumer lending, banks use short-term secured debt, such
as a repurchase agreement (REPO), for asset and liability management purposes.
REPOs are typically backed up by high-quality debt instruments. The conduits
and structured investment vehicles, such as residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS), are also a type of instrument that is defined as ”debt-on-debt” in line
with the REPO. The ”debt-on-debt” instruments are information insensitive. This
means that they are backed up by debt (i.e., government, corporate, or consumer
debt) and an investor should not have to perform due diligence in order to use it
for funds management (Dang et al., 2015). The applicability of RMBS for funds
management justifies the widespread use of these instruments in the wake of the
global financial crisis.
Exposure to toxic assets backed up by subprime mortgages is widely recog-
nized as a major build-up mechanism of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (see
Hellwig (2009) and Thakor (2015) among others). From a regulatory point of view,
covered bonds (CBs) are a favorable alternative form of secured bank funding to an
RMBS. CBs are qualified by the Basel III accord as a high-quality liquid asset and
enjoy a preferential 15 % haircut relative to the 25 % haircut for similar RMBS.
When issuing CBs, there is a segregation of mortgages in a ring-fenced bankruptcy
remote covered pool (CP) with recourse to the issuer’s balance sheet. When buy-
ing CBs, investors are immune to bail-in write downs and enjoy the regulatory and
voluntarily imposed over-collateralization of the CPs.
By issuing CBs, a bank makes an obligation to maintain the quality of the CP
and to replenish assets of deteriorated quality. Hence, the attributes of CBs make
them a highly rated secured funding instrument, but at the same time banks’ grow-
ing reliance on CBs as an important funding vehicle is starting to raise concerns.
It has implications for financial system stability. In a European Banking Authority
(EBA) report on asset encumbrance in 2017, CBs were highlighted as the major
source of asset collateralization. The report raised a concern about the scarcity of
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collaterals during a potential decline in property prices. It noted that, as of Decem-
ber 2016, the weighted average ratio of asset encumbrance in European banks was
26.6 %. Because banks have committed themselves to maintaining the quality of
their CPs, there could be a deficiency of assets eligible for REPO deal instruments.
Secured funding offers a wider range of funding opportunities than unsecured
funding. However, excessive reliance on secured funding could make the bank vul-
nerable. The reason is that there could be restricted access to unsecured funding
stemming from high levels of asset encumbrance and depleted quality of the assets
attributed to the unsecured debt holders (Haldane, 2011). In line with REPO secu-
rities, CBs are a source of a bank’s asset encumbrance, which results in a pledge of
the bank’s assets to the contract possessor.
This essay addresses Haldane’s (2011) hypothesis about banks’ propensity to
increasingly resort to secured funding strategies. In order to document the effect of
transition, the asset depletion effect is defined in line with Greenbaum and Thakor’s
(1987) assumption that the highest quality assets are pledged to the CP. The asset
depletion effect is the difference in growth rates between assets pledged to CB
holders and a bank’s total assets (for a formal definition, see Section 7.4). By limit-
ing the reliance on secured funding, the bank can diversify its funding sources and
ensure access to the secured funding markets in case of distress. However, once
the risk of residual assets is concentrated to depositors and junior debt holders, it
introduces fragility incurred by high asset encumbrance (Haldane, 2011).
The main results support the policy concerns raised by Haldane (2011). The re-
sults indicate that banks tend to fall into excessive reliance on CBs funding. This
tendency is partially mitigated by higher capital buffers. Ahnert et al. (2018) im-
plied that a high encumbrance ratio should prevent further abuse of secured fund-
ing. The results fail to demonstrate this effect. This is potentially explained by the
encumbrance levels not yet being bounded.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the related
literature. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 describe the data collection process and methodol-
ogy respectively. Section 7.5 summarizes the data. Section 7.6 presents the results,
and Section 7.7 concludes the essay.
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7.2 Related literature
The seminal paper of Myers (1977) on corporate borrowing introduced the ”un-
derinvestment problem”. The core mechanism behind underinvestment is the con-
flict between debt and equity holders, which results in the foregoing of positive
net present value projects. The underinvestment problem is related to the classic
principle that every profitable opportunity should be realized. As highlighted by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), shareholders are prone, in the presence of risky debt,
to engage in asset substitution whereby a riskier project is substituted with a less
risky one. According to Stulz and Johnson (1985), both underinvestment and as-
set substitution problems can be alleviated by the issuance of secured debt, which,
compared to risky debt, does not require costly debt covenants and monitoring.
Dang et al. (2015) built on the Stulz and Johnson’s (1985) rationale for the
existence of secured debt. The informational insensitivity of secured debt is the
fundamental characteristic of collateral in the inter-bank markets. In Dang et al.’s
(2015) terms, ”debt-on-debt” is the least informational-sensitive funding instru-
ment. It allows banks to perform asset and liability management without incurring
costs of due diligence. Additionally, the access to different funding markets pro-
vides a hedge against disturbances in one of the funding markets by substitution of
funding sources (Chan-Lau and Oura, 2016). CBs have been widely discussed as a
viable instrument that allows banks to diversify their investor bases and attain easy
access to market funding (cf., Buchholst et al. (2010)).
The current literature on CBs is mainly focused on evaluating them (Packer
et al. (2007); Prokopczuk et al. (2013)). The implication of CBs funding on sys-
temic financial system is covered by Ahnert et al. (2018), whose basic idea is in
line with the argument of Stulz and Johnson (1985). Issuance of CBs mitigates
the underinvestment problem (bank funding effect) but deludes the risky debt and
depositor claims (risk concentration effect). Prudential monitoring and regulatory
surcharges are desirable for balancing the contradictory effects and limiting banks’
asset encumbrance and segregation. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) have shown
that higher-quality loans are segregated and securitized, while lower quality loans
are funded through deposits and retained on the balance sheet.
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Haldane (2011) introduced the self-fulfilling tendency of banks to utilize se-
cured funding instruments. The issuance of CBs introduces a risk of subordination
by assigning preferential claims on the pool of assets to a new secured debt holder.
In a state of liquidation, the bail-in regime allows banks to write down the unse-
cured debt holders’ claims. The immunity of CBs holders from these write downs
makes CBs an attractive funding tool due to attributed assets for claim fulfillment.
Following asset segregation, banks’ intensive usage of secured funding dur-
ing normal times introduces a scarcity of eligible assets (available for collateral).
The collateral scarcity reflects a reduced amount of eligible assets available on the
banks’ balance sheet for liquidity management purposes. Banks with deteriorating
asset quality are more prone to liquidity shocks due to encumbered eligible assets,
which otherwise would have been used to attract secured funding in the event of
distress (Levels and Capel, 2012).
In line with Haldane (2011), Ahnert et al. (2018) developed a theoretical model
where the bank does not internalize the social costs of servicing the guarantee.
This incentivizes the bank to excessively encumber assets by choosing socially in-
efficient levels of a privately optimal encumbrance. In the set-up of Ahnert et al.
(2018), asset encumbrance is limited by the diminishing value of CBs holders’ re-
course rights to the bank’s residual assets. Moreover, the residual assets attributed
to unsecured debt and equity holders should potentially prevent banks from em-
barking on excessive assets encumbrance.
Garcia-Appendini et al. (2017) confirmed that the issuance of CBs subordinates
the unsecured claims and, consequently, makes them riskier. The results demon-
strate the negative total effect of CB issuance on the risk profile of a bank. In line
with Ahnert et al. (2018), Garcia-Appendini et al. (2017) concluded that the risk
concentration effect dominates the bank funding effect.
Ahnert et al. (2018) addressed the negative externalities that are generated by
CBs funding by setting up the cap on asset encumbrance, capital charges, and
Pigouvian taxation. Limits on asset encumbrance are adopted by Australia and
New Zealand, while Canada and the United States have ceilings on the amount of
secured funding. The Pigouvian taxation in the form of inclusion of encumbrance
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levels in deposit insurance premiums has existed in Europe since 2015 according
to the revised Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSD).
This essay formulates the hypothesis that banks increasingly resort to secured
funding, as advanced by Ahnert et al. (2018) and Haldane (2011). The risk assets
concentration effect due to asset encumbrance heightens the incentives to finance
on secured terms. It leads to the banks’ self-fulfilling tendency to move further
and further into secured funding. The following sections address the mechanism of
increasing encumbrance by examining the relationship between the growth rate of
total assets and assets pledged to the CP, namely asset depletion effect.
7.3 Data collection process
Several different data sources were used in order to analyze the effect of the CBs
funding strategy. This essay relies on the harmonized transparency template, which
is a form of voluntary disclosure developed by the Covered Bonds Label. The Cov-
ered Bonds Label aims to promote transparency and efficiency in the CBs market.
Membership of the Covered Bonds Label is subject to an initial fee and annual
subscription fees thereafter. The fees primarily contribute to the maintenance and
development of reporting standards for disclosure requirements. The list of CBs
issuers is collected via the Covered Bonds Label web page.1
The next stage of the data collection process was to retrieve the harmonized
transparency templates for each issuer. The manual download of about 2,000 har-
monized transparency templates (each on its own web page) would take an enor-
mous amount of time and effort. Thus, I decided to develop a web crawler to auto-
mate the process. The principles of automatic information retrieval are subject to
domain-specific rules, which are called the Robots Exclusion Protocol. Each web
crawler should follow that protocol in order to minimize the number of queries
to the bank’s domain server. The web crawler should also maintain cookies in or-
der to comply with the acceptable use privacy policy. For example, most reports
1 see https://www.coveredbondlabel.com/
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are accessible only after the confirmation of the user’s jurisdiction for regulatory
reasons.
Since the scope of this essay is restricted to European issuers and the retrieval
of information took place in Europe, no regulatory violations were committed. The
web crawler was designed according to current best practices in the information
retrieval literature and was realized via the R software environment for statistical
computing and graphics (R Core Team, 2018).2 It should be noted here that the
data download process of approximately 2,000 files took more than 24 hours even
when using the web crawler, so it would not have been feasible to perform the
retrieval manually.
Most of the collected files are in the Microsoft Excel Open XML format spread-
sheets. The velocity of semi-structured XML files can be improved by the informa-
tion retrieval tools, which are also available via the R environment. For the purpose
of this study, the following variables were targeted: issuer name, URL, reporting
date, currency of the report, assets attributed to CP, outstanding CBs, and so on.
The collection process conducted in this research is one of the first attempts to
utilize the disclosed information for an academic study. Thus, one objective was to
collect and organize these data for further research purposes. However, currently
available reports present a number of issues when it comes to automatic data anal-
ysis. For instance, with respect to currency, the standardization of report filings
should be unified and in line with the official ISO 4217:2015 guidelines.3 Cur-
rently, the European issuers fill in the currency field as follows: ”EUR” (preferred
according to ISO 4217:2015), ”EURO”, ”EUROS”, ”EURO CURRENCY”, and
use a wide range of letter cases. Even after correcting for letter cases, only two-
thirds of the Eurozone issuers provide the currency nomenclature according to ISO
4217.
In terms of encoding, the harmonized transparency template is available only in
English and should be filled out in English according to the Covered Bonds Label.
However, some issuers fill in the name of the jurisdiction in their native language
and with usage of non-Latin letters (some issuers do not fill in the field at all). There
2 See the latest version available at https://www.r-project.org/
3 Further information is available at https://www.iso.org/
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are cases when the local currency has been entered instead of the country. Such
discrepancies in the way the templates are filled in are difficult to track down and
correct, especially if the same issuer discloses several templates for different CPs.
The adoption of ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (or any other standardized nomenclature
of countries) for country abbreviation would significantly increase the efficiency
of data processing. Another serious issue is date format. The dates are reported in
more than 20 different variations, including month names in various abbreviations.
The conclusion here is that all the specified discrepancies limit the automated data
processing, which leads to potential data exclusion. This results in a smaller data
set overall.
In my view, unification according to current international standards should be
introduced to facilitate more predictable, efficient and transparent data processing.
This would facilitate reliable academic studies that lead to more robust conclu-
sions. Such standards should also be promoted among the issuers who submit their
reports.
In total, the processing of templates was made via more than 500 coding strings.
The processing time for the fully automatic information retrieval from 1,500 files
took more than 24 hours.4 A further complication of the analysis arose from the
removal of historical reports from the issuers’ web pages. For scholars interested
in studying CBs, it is important to maintain their own records of the reports. A
cleaned version of the dataset presented in this study is available on request.
Although the harmonized transparency template disclosures are based on regis-
tered CPs, they must be aggregated at bank group level. This study utilized the SNL
database as a primary source of balance sheet information and parent company re-
trieval. The CBs dataset was aggregated to the bank entity level with a preliminary
local currency conversion to EUR by the European Central Bank (ECB) rates at the
reporting date. The SNL key was attributed to each CB issuer based on the domain
of the issuer’s web page. If the issuer was a subsidiary of another bank, further
aggregation of the data was performed accordingly.
4 The proposed data collection and processing algorithm is available from the corresponding
author upon request.
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7.4 Methodology
In order to study the asset depletion effect of a bank’s CBs funding strategy, this
essay utilizes the balance sheet disclosures to show the evolution of bank assets
encumbrance and secured financing. Secured funding requires the covered assets
to be pledged to secured debt holders. In case of insolvency, banks that rely ex-
tensively on secured funding clearly have fewer assets available for depositors and
unsecured debt holders. The eligibility and quality of retained assets attributed to
junior stakeholders (referred to as qualitative asset deterioration) cannot be studied
due to limited information disclosure. However, the portion of assets attributed to
the holders of CBs (referred to as quantitative asset depletion) is available via the
data collection process outlined in the previous section.
Quantitative asset depletion is in place when the growth rate of the CP, attributed
to the holders of CBs, is higher than the bank’s asset growth. Therefore, asset de-
pletion takes place when a bank funds its ongoing operations via CBs without a
similar growth in total assets. This effect may be observed in various scenarios. For
instance, a bank may pledge additional assets to the CP due to regulatory require-
ments to maintain the quality of the CP, and, hence, it substitutes the deteriorated
assets with higher-quality assets (i.e., CP replenishment). An asset depletion may
instead be a result of a substitution of unsecured with secured funding. A bank
could turn to secured funding due to absence of liquidity in the unsecured mar-
ket because of a liquidity crisis (systemic) or a rating downgrade (idiosyncratic).
Finally, an increased demand for secured funding may be a result of supply side
effects, such as reduced market rates in the secured funding market. In essence, up
to certain limits, asset depletion as defined here is not necessarily evidence of bank
fragility. It may just be a result of strategic diversification of bank funding sources.
Zooming in on the determinants of the evolving reliance of banks on CBs, there
are essentially three states of asset depletion: stagnated (State 2), which is when
the growth rate in CP is similar to the growth rate in total assets; asset depletion
(State 3), which is when the growth rate of the CP is higher than the growth rate in
total assets; and reverse asset depletion (State 1), which is when the growth rate of
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the CP is lower than the growth rate in total assets. This is formalized in equation
7.1.
7.1: Definition of asset depletion states
The equation specifies the definition of asset depletion states in numerical order: 1 - reverse asset
depletion, 2 - stagnated asset depletion, 3 - asset depletion. The parameter α reflects the sensitivity
cut of point of states definition. For the purpose of the study α is the mean of the first (25%) and
the third (75%) quantile of the bootstrapped empirical distribution for asset depletion.
Stateit θ =

1, if (CPit−CPit−1CPit−1 −
TAit−TAit−1
TAit−1 )<−α,
2, if | CPit−CPit−1CPit−1 −
TAit−TAit−1
TAit−1 |≤ α,
3, if (CPit−CPit−1CPit−1 −
TAit−TAit−1
TAit−1 )> α.
(7.1)
This representation of asset depletion is made for tractability of the results and
to discard any minor deviations from the main results. It was assumed that the
future states depend only on the current states and the determinants of transition,
which I will discuss next.
7.5 Data description and stylized facts
This essay utilizes the SNL database as a primary source of balance sheet informa-
tion and parent company retrieval. The CBs data was aggregated to the bank entity
level with preliminary local currency conversion to EUR by the ECB rates at the
reporting date. If the issuer was a subsidiary of another bank, further aggregation
of data was performed accordingly.
The availability of balance sheet disclosure for European banks is limited in
SNL. Consequently, there were two restrictions on the analysis: a small observa-
tion number, and limited balance sheet information about issuers. The entities with
fewer than three consecutive periods of data available were dropped. This further
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limited the sample size. In total, the data collection process yielded 290 data points
for 39 CB issuers during the period from March 2016 to September 2018.
Definitions of key variables and summary statistics are presented in Table 7.1.
Asset depletion was defined according to formula 7.1. Asset encumbrance is the
portion of total assets attributed to CBs holders: CPit/TAit . The CP and outstanding
CBs were converted from the reported currency into EUR using the ECB conver-
sion rate for the reporting date.
Table 7.1: Summary statistic
The table reports summary statistics for the variables of interest. Over-collateralization is con-
structed as the amount of assets pledged to the CP net of outstanding CBs and scaled by outstand-
ing CBs. Asset encumbrance is the amount of assets pledged to the CP scaled by total assets.
The quarterly observations are from March 2016 to September 2018 for 39 European banks.
Abbr. Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Panel A: SNL data
Total Assets, bn EUR TA 331 474 6 51 378 2,234
Core capital, % CET1 17.30 6.08 7 13.0 19.8 40
Total Capital, % TC 19.89 7.75 8.07 14.41 22.44 51.63
Leverage ratio, % LR 6.56 1.81 3.46 4.97 8.07 10.87
Deposits over TA, % D TA 50.31 17.00 4.62 37.02 64.14 84.79
Panel B: Harmonized Transparency Templates Data
Covered bonds outstanding, bn EUR CB 24.85 28.79 1.23 4.78 32.18 154.42
Covered pool, bn EUR CP 36.97 35 1.73 8.3 54.04 164.26
Mortgages pledged to CP, bn EUR CP m 35.45 33.61 1.73 8.14 54.04 154.42
Panel C: Author’s calculations
Over-collateralisation of CP, % OC 77.37 103.30 3.45 18.58 78.78 612.96
Asset encumbrance, % AE 24.25 19.04 1.11 8.57 35.84 86.06
Asset deterioration, % AD .60 9.08 −91.16 −1.53 1.63 70.35
Number of observations N 290
The categorical variable of asset depletion reflects a significant deviation in the
growth rate of assets attributed to CBs holders in the CP and the growth rate of
total assets. This procedure yields the three states outlined above: reverse asset
depletion (State 1), stagnated asset depletion (State 2), and asset depletion (State
3). The transition matrix for the states is presented in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Transition matrix of Asset depletion states
The table reports the transition matrix of our three states. The rows (i ∈ {1,3}) indicate the
States of time t, and related the columns ( j ∈ {1,3}) are the States of time t +1, the number in
the cell for Statei, j is the number of observed transitions from Statei to State j . The table should
be interpreted as follows: the number of observations when the reverse asset depletion quarter
transits to the subsequent period of the stagnated asset depletion - State1,2, is 21. The numbers
of observations when the states do not change and are maintained for at least two quarters -
Statei, j|i= j , are 16 obs. for State1,1, 109 obs. for State2,2, and 16 obs. for State3,3.
State names −→ State 1 −→ State 2 −→ State 3
Reverse asset depletion State1−→ 16 21 15
Stagnated asset depletion State2−→ 17 109 20
Asset depletion State3−→ 17 20 16
The sample for this essay consists of banks issuing CBs, while excluding mort-
gage brokers and other non-bank installments. The sample is an unbalanced panel
dataset with at least three subsequent observations available. The estimated raw
mean of asset encumbrance shows that on average a quarter of all CB issuers’ as-
sets are attributed to CB holders. On average, the CP exceeds the CBs outstanding
amount by 77 %.
7.6 Empirical analysis and discussion
This essay studies the determinants of asset deterioration. The asset deterioration
effect takes place when the growth rate of assets pledged to the CP and subse-
quently attributed to the CBs holders at the time of default exceeds the growth rate
of a bank’s total assets. The benchmark model specifies the fixed effects model of
the asset deterioration effect. The specification shows how the previous state con-
tributes to subsequent states. The results of the estimations are presented in Table
7.3.
The results in Table 7.3 suffer from several standard problems, including limited
historical data, due to the recent introduction of the harmonized transparency tem-
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Table 7.3: Main Results
The table reports the results of the fixed effect regression. The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable:
Asset deterioration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lag(Stateitθ) 8.318∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗ .121∗∗∗ .128∗∗∗ .135∗∗∗ .156∗∗∗
(.783) (.034) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.032)
dAEit/dt .984∗∗∗ .989∗∗∗ .989∗∗∗ .989∗∗∗ .989∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
lag(dTAit/dt) .005 .039∗∗ .043∗∗ .040∗∗∗
(.006) (.016) (.017) (.015)
dCET 1it/dt .007
(.005)
dLRit/dt .022∗∗∗
(.005)
lag(Stateitθ) : lag(dTAit/dt) −.018∗∗ −.020∗∗ −.016∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.007)
lag(Stateitθ) : dCET 1it/dt −.005
(.004)
lag(Stateitθ) : dLRit/dt −.017∗∗∗
(.003)
Observations 290 290 235 235 235 235
R2 .320 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
Adjusted R2 .181 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
F Statistic p value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
F Statistic df (df = 1; 240) (df = 2; 239) (df = 3; 184) (df = 4; 183) (df = 6; 181) (df = 6; 181)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
plates. Accordingly, the results should be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, the
results demonstrate the intuitive logic introduced by Haldane (2011). When asset
deterioration increases significantly, there is an increased probability of a continu-
ing trend of asset deterioration in future. Contrary to the predictions of Ahnert et al.
(2018), the higher asset encumbrance of banks’ assets does not restrain banks from
further increasing their usage of secured funding. Thus, when banks start relying
on CBs, they continue to expand their reliance on CBs funding. The effect becomes
more pronounced when the asset encumbrance increases. The extent to which this
effect remains as further data becomes available is open to debate, but regulators
and investors ought to monitor the developments closely.
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Table 7.4: Supplementary Results
The table reports the results of the fixed effect regression. The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable:
Asset deterioration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lag(Stateit2) 7.009∗∗∗ .169∗∗∗ .161∗∗∗ .157∗∗∗ .159∗∗∗ .153∗∗∗
(1.361) (.051) (.053) (.052) (.052) (.046)
lag(Stateit3) 16.645∗∗∗ .239∗∗∗ .239∗∗∗ .223∗∗∗ .243∗∗∗ .296∗∗∗
(1.565) (.068) (.070) (.070) (.071) (.063)
dAEit/dt .984∗∗∗ .990∗∗∗ .990∗∗∗ .990∗∗∗ .989∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
lag(dTAit/dt) .005 .033∗∗∗ .034∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗
(.006) (.010) (.010) (.009)
dCET 1it/dt .001
(.003)
dLRit/dt .003
(.002)
lag(Stateit2) : lag(dTAit/dt) −.043∗∗∗ −.044∗∗∗ −.045∗∗∗
(.013) (.013) (.011)
lag(Stateit3) : lag(dTAit/dt) −.031∗∗ −.036∗∗ −.029∗∗
(.016) (.016) (.014)
lag(Stateit2) : dCET 1it/dt .001
(.006)
lag(Stateit3) : dCET 1it/dt −.013∗
(.008)
lag(Stateit2) : dLRit/dt −.006
(.006)
lag(Stateit3) : dLRit/dt −.039∗∗∗
(.006)
Observations 290 290 235 235 235 235
R2 .324 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
Adjusted R2 .182 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
F Statistic p value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
F Statistic df (df = 2; 239) (df = 3; 238) (df = 4; 183) (df = 6; 181) (df = 9; 178) (df = 9; 178)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Referring to Table ??, where instead of lag(Stateitθ) the dummy for each state
is introduced, it would seem as if the potential reverse effect of asset growth ap-
pears only when the secured funding capacity is drained and banks have to turn to
alternative funding sources. However, these alternatives might be even less sustain-
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able and would most likely come at a sizeable cost, such as short-term wholesale
funding.
The separation of states in Table 7.4 indicates that it is difficult for a bank to
get out of the asset deterioration state once it has entered into this state. However,
an alternative explanation might be that the bank does not hurry to normalize the
activity and continues to segregate assets by pledging them to the CP in order
to fund asset growth. Again, it does not necessarily imply that banks are fragile,
but given the pronounced role of total asset encumbrance it may support the EBA
concern about banks’ asset encumbrance.
Another implication of the analysis is that the banks’ leverage and capital are
somewhat binding for their ”over-usage” of CBs funding. Once a bank is in the
third state, both capital and leverage have negative coefficients (see Table 7.4).
This may be interpreted, in line with Ahnert et al. (2018), as capital regulation
being a way to restrict asset encumbrance.
7.7 Conclusion
Banks that are currently exhibiting CBs-based growth are expected to continue on
this path, especially at higher rates of asset encumbrance. This result supports the
rhetoric on ”worrying” asset encumbrance levels by the EBA and underlines the
urgent need for further studies in this field. Ahnert et al. (2018) proposed the limits
on asset encumbrance as an ex ante arrangement, while the Pigouvian tax is the
socially optimal ex post policy remedy. Without prejudice to the results of Ahnert
et al. (2018), if the effect of increasingly resorting to secured funding is in place,
the ex ante policy of limiting the asset encumbrance levels leads to the bank being
bounded by legal limits. The effective ex post Pigouvian tax might exaggerate the
fragility of an over-encumbered bank. Given that the marginal incentives to encum-
ber assets are increasing the usage of secured finding, ex ante progressive taxation
potentially addresses the marginal increase in incentives to continue to use secured
funding. The results of my study indicate that the strengthened capital requirements
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introduced by the Basel III accord potentially addresses the encumbrance problem
by lowering the speed of asset deterioration.
The analysis presented in this essay underlines several important topics. Despite
the recent market initiatives from the Covered Bonds Label Foundation and the
European Covered Bonds Council, the public monitoring of CBs is a challenging
technical task. Manual data collection is not feasible and the availability of data
collection processes is crucial for timely empirical financial studies.
Automatic collection and data processing can be significantly improved by the
introduction of a standardization of the procedure for filling in the harmonized
transparency templates. The consistency of the retrieved data could also be im-
proved by making amendments to Article 129(7) of the Capital Requirements Reg-
ulation or the Covered Bonds Label eligibility criteria, which may clarify the re-
quirements to disclose historical reports for at least N previous periods.
Moreover, automation in this regard should in future be favored and facilitated
by Covered Bonds Label restrictions on automated data collection, such as by re-
moving cookies requirement and requests limitations. This will help to advance
the transparency of financial studies and better validate the results, with benefits
for academic research and society as a whole.
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8.1 Introduction
The fundamental role of securitization in the recent financial crises underlines the
importance of banks’ lending behavior (see Gorton (2009) and Thakor (2015)).
Once a cornerstone of risk management, securitization became a scapegoat (Caprio
et al., 2010). Although ten years have now passed since the global financial crisis,
the true roots of the crisis remain a mystery. The academic debate is ongoing about
whether the nature of the crisis was insolvency (Thakor, 2018) or liquidity risk,
as suggested in the seminal paper by Brunnermeier (2009). The former argument
implies that the inefficient incentives scheme led to loosened underwriting stan-
dards and worsened due diligence. The latter assessment argues that system design
which serves the securitization process is liable to exacerbate shocks. If the former
argument is true, then we should primarily address the securitization process; if the
latter argument is true, then the system design should be addressed.
This essay strives to contribute to the literature that aims to understand the driv-
ing factors behind banks’ decisions to securitize. In particular, this study examines
the effect of competition on the lending decisions of local savings banks. I analyze
a unique dataset consisting of internal transfers between Swedish savings banks
(SSBs) and their inter-organizational collaboration partner Swedbank to investigate
whether the presence of large commercial bank branches changes the behavior of
the SSBs. The SSBs and Swedbank function under a collaborative non-competing
agreement whereby the SSBs hold equity in Swedbank and Swedbank provides
various services for the SSBs, including IT business solutions and support, and le-
gal and compliance services. Therefore, Swedbank can be said to play the role of
a quasi-central bank for the SSBs.
The literature commonly views the relationship between competition and lend-
ing supply through the lens of banks’ incentives to engage in relationship-based
versus transaction-based lending (Rajan, 1992). However, the current literature is
ambiguous as to what type of lending is actually preferred under competition. For
example, Degryse and Ongena (2007) found that relationship-based lending tends
to become more important when competition increases. This result stands in con-
trast to the common view advanced by Petersen and Rajan (1995) that the presence
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of competing banks keeps local banks from investing in relationship-based lending
due to sunk costs for opaque borrower quality audits and low switching costs.
The process of securitization in the SSBs functions as a means to move from
on-balance sheet relationship-based lending to off-balance sheet transaction-based
lending by transferring loans to Swedbank. This essay studies whether the deci-
sion of an SSB to securitize a loan (i.e., by transferring it to Swedbank) is subject
to the level of competition on the local market and the informational asymmetry
between Swedbank and SSBs. The Swedish banking industry is dominated by four
large commercial banks and a cooperative bank: Swedbank, Handelbanken (SHB),
Nordea, SEB, and La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar. Excluding Swedbank, the other four banks are
the major local competitors of SSBs. The framework of this study is designed to
estimate the decisions of SSBs, given the branch presence of a competing com-
mercial bank (i.e., SHB, SEB, Nordea, or La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar), to securitize a loan
contract by transferring it to Swedbank.
Based on data from the Swedish Banking Association, we can observe a persis-
tent trend of branch closures among the Swedish banks. This trend is particularly
pronounced in Nordea, which during the period from 2010 to 2016 closed 167
branches, and Swedbank, which during the same period closed 92 branches. The
branch network of SSBs shrunk from 258 branches to 219 over the same period.
This trend is expected to continue, partially because of digitization and ongoing
consolidation in the banking industry.
This study’s results show that the competition between large commercial banks
and small rural savings banks in Sweden neither produce the common effect of less
relationship lending in line with Petersen and Rajan (1995), nor greater relation-
ship lending in the spirit of Degryse and Ongena (2007). The effect of a commer-
cial bank’s presence within the geographical reach of the local SSB depends on
the competing strategy of the commercial bank and depending on that may have
positive or negative sign.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 8.2 provides a brief litera-
ture review on the topic of interest. Section 8.3 presents the study’s data source and
methodology. Section 8.4 reports the baseline regression statistics, and Section 8.5
concludes the study and provides an interpretation of the results.
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8.2 Literature review
The interaction between relationship-based lending’s feasibility as a lending tech-
nology and the market power of banks has been studied in relation to small opaque
businesses with restricted access to financial markets (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).
Small regional banks survive competition with large commercial banks by building
up relationships with customers. This is done by setting loan conditions based on
a combination of hard information in terms of financial indicators and collateral
values, and soft information about borrowers produced over time. The processing
of soft information incurs costs for the bank. Thus, relationship-based lending is
more costly for a bank than a transaction-based loan (Boot and Thakor, 2000).
The relationship and transaction loans are priced differently. One view is that
relationship lending is valuable because, when length of relationships increases, a
borrower pays less interest and is less likely to pledge collateral (Berger and Udell,
1995). The other view offers a different rationale for the existence of relationship
lending. The transactional loans are cheaper during normal times, but, in the event
of a crisis, the relationship loans are more likely to be renewed and they experience
a lower rise in interest rates. Bolton et al. (2016) have presented a model in which
only opaque borrowers choose to pay a higher intermediation spread in normal
times in order to get continuation lending in a crisis. Sette and Gobbi (2015) found
that credit growth by relationship lenders is 4.6 % higher, and that in a crisis the
increase in the cost of credit by relationship lenders is 50 basis points lower than
that by transactional lenders.
The rationale for why small banks enter into relationship-based lending was dis-
cussed by Nakamura (1994). He argued that a mouse bank (i.e., a small bank) is
better than a large bank at maintaining close relationships and monitoring opaque
borrowers. Moreover, Hakenes et al. (2015) noted that the presence of the mouse
bank supports regional development and alleviates credit rationing of small opaque
borrowers. The constraints of limited geographical reach and concentration risks
may be eliminated by various multi-bank pooling arrangements (Gintschel and
Hackethal, 2004). In this study, the pooling arrangement established by the SSBs
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is presented in the form of collaboration with one of the largest commercial banks
in Sweden. In this arrangement, Swedbank buys loans from the SSBs.
The borrower-lender proximity discussion was begun with the seminal paper
by Petersen and Rajan (1994). Their paper addressed the issues of banks’ market
structure and credit contractions. The most recent study of borrow-lender proxim-
ity has been that of Beck et al. (2019). They found that, despite considerable tech-
nology development in lending, the distance between the borrower and the lender
still functions as a significant determinant of the probability of the bank engaging
in relationship lending. DeYoung et al. (2008) discussed the controversy behind
credit scoring and other technology development, as well as the role of geographi-
cal proximity as a determinant of relationship lending.
Increased competition may either reduce or increase a banks’ relationship lend-
ing. As Petersen and Rajan (1995) argued, increased competition may shrink profit
margins and, thus, shift the banks’ preferences towards transaction-based lending.
Boot and Thakor (2000) proposed that higher levels of competition may instead
encourage banks to become more client-oriented by introducing product differen-
tiation and entering into closer customer relationships.
Studies on market structure and asset segregation are still limited. Salop (1979)
developed a model in which the degree of competition is determined by geograph-
ical proximity when the borrower faces transportation costs. Degryse and Ongena
(2007) utilized the model developed by Salop (1979) to study bank branch ori-
entation in the choice between relationship-based and transaction-based lending.
They found that high-level local competition leads to a higher probability of the
bank engaging in relationship-based lending, in line with the argument of Boot and
Thakor (2000). Recently, De Haas et al. (2018) found that local bank competition
can impede the formation of long-term lending relationships with firms.
This essay addresses the decision of local SSBs to segregate and transfer part of
their loans to Swedbank. Accordingly, this study combines insights from literature
related to the local market structure as well as literature related to risk management
in banks. In line with Freixas and Rochet (2008), a bank may use securitization to
execute its asset and liability management. Additionally, by transferring parts of
its loan portfolio, the small local bank can alleviate the credit contraction problems
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that might result from regulatory capital or liquidity shortages (Bernanke et al.
(1991); Stanton (1998)).
Depending on the level and type of local competition, the mouse bank can uti-
lize various pooling arrangements in order to protect its local market. The deter-
minants of the chosen strategy are based on the degree of information asymmetry
that the competing commercial bank faces (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2003). Once the
large commercial bank enters an area, the bank acquires local knowledge. Techno-
logical development has led many commercial banks to start downsizing in order
to optimize the branch network by closing ”brick-and-mortar” branches. The data
on pooling arrangements between Swedbank and SSBs is an interesting setting to
examine whether or not the geographical proximity affects the assets segregation
given the exit of a competing commercial bank from the local market.
The effect of commercial bank proximity is subject to the business model em-
ployed by the commercial bank. Zineldin (1996) described the Swedish banks’
business models as they were in 1993. Back then, Nordbanken (NB - now Nordea)
was the main competitor to the SSBs when it came to savings, particularly in the
form of salary deposits. More recently, Handelsbanken (SHB) has become a major
competitor of the SSBs. Larsen et al. (2014) found that the business models and
the strategic priorities of SHB and the local SSBs are almost identical.
8.3 Methodology and data
This essay employs various data sources to reconstruct the geographical distribu-
tion of Swedish banks’ branches over the studied period. The initial data came
from the Google API Places service, which allows the Place ID of every entity
tagged with bank type to be retrieved. This information was further used to esti-
mate distances between bank branches. The recent advancement of digital services
also allows it to be determined whether the operations of the local branches have
been permanently closed. Unfortunately, there is no information about the date a
branch was opened or closed. The operational status of a bank branch is given as
the moment of information retrieval. The operational status of each bank branch in
8.3 Methodology and data 115
a given year is derived from banks’ branch closure dates provided by the Swedish
Bankers’ Association. The dataset covers 53 SSBs from 2010 to 2015. Balance
sheet data of these banks were provided by Sparbankernas Riksfo¨rbund.
The geographical proximity of a commercial bank affects the following lending
choices of the relatively small local SSBs: (a) whether to set up loan terms based
on soft information, which is more costly to collect and process, or only on hard
information; (b) whether to compete with the commercial bank and try to maintain
the SSB’s niche by offering competing loan terms, or to specialize in lending to
customers that are not of interest to the commercial bank; (c) whether to transfer
part of the loans to Swedbank and use excess liquidity to meet lending demand, or
to keep the loans on the balance sheet until maturity.
The main hypothesis of the study is the following. The presence of a competing
commercial bank within the geographical reach of a local SSB affects the SSB’s
decision whether to transfer its loans to Swedbank (i.e., to securitize) or not. By
definition, the loans sold to Swedbank are transactional. The lending policy of
the SSB’s competitors may ambiguously affect its lending portfolio composition.
For instance, SHB is considered to be the SSBs’ main competitor for commercial
loans. This fact is indirectly shown by the lowest average distance (see Table 8.1)
between SHB and SSBs. Nordea and SEB exhibit predatory behavior for mortgage
(i.e., consumer) lending. As a community bank of a relatively smaller size than the
commercial banks, La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar is considered to be the most friendly neighbor
of the SSBs. Swedbank does not compete with SSBs under their agreement.
Following the methodology of Degryse and Ongena (2007), the Closeness of
Competitor for the proximity measure was transformed as (1+distance to bank)−1.
This transformation implies the weakening effect of distance between the branches
of the SSBs and the commercial banks. In the case of close distance (i.e., the dis-
tance is close to zero), the ratio is 1. In order to control for potential informational
asymmetry between SSBs and Swedbank as a constraint on securitization of loans,
I employed Remoteness of Swedbank as (1−Closeness o f Swedbank). This al-
lowed explicit interpretation of the effect of a closely located competing commer-
cial bank (closeness = 1) given the remoteness of Swedbank (i.e., remoteness is
close to 1, too). This interaction shows the marginal effect of competition when
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Table 8.1: Summary statistics
Summary Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Relational lending, % 396 59 13 33 50 67 100
Commercial lending, % 396 32 13 5 24 40 67
Consumer lending, % 396 41 13 8 32 47 75
SME lending, % 396 26 9 0 20 31 51
Distance to Nordea .km 396 19 19 .04 .3 28 151
Distance to SHB .km 396 7 9 0 .1 12 34
Distance to SEB .km 396 25 24 .07 8 38 118
Distance to La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar .km 396 18 26 .04 .4 27 189
Distance to Swedbank .km 396 26 21 .05 15 31 151
Closeness of Nordea, % 396 29 38 1 3 78 96
Closeness of SHB, % 396 56 41 3 8 93 100
Closeness of SEB, % 396 23 34 1 3 11 94
Closeness of La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar, % 396 28 37 1 4 72 96
Closeness of Swedbank, % 396 7 14 1 3 6 95
Swedbank is geographically close, namely the ability of SSBs to transfer more or
fewer loans due to informational asymmetry derived via Remoteness of Swedbank.
Table 8.2: Pearson correlations
The table reports the Pearson correlation for measures of closeness between commercial banks
and savings banks. The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Closeness of Nordea SHB SEB La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar Swedbank
Nordea 1
SHB .48∗∗∗ 1
SEB .4∗∗∗ .33∗∗∗ 1
La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar .6∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .42∗∗∗ 1
Swedbank .29∗∗∗ 0 .27∗∗∗ .12∗∗ 1
The methodology exploits fixed effects models specifications (which are also
known as least squares dummy variables - LSDV) to determine the distance effect
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on the lending behavior of SSBs. The main variable of interest is the local SSB’s
relationship lending defined as the ratio of lending remaining on its balance sheet
to its total amount of loans issued. The supplementary ratios of commercial, con-
sumer and SME lending are the ratio of relating lending types to the total loans
issued by the bank.
Relational lendingi,t = βBank Closenessi,t ×Swedbank remotenessi,t +δt +αi+ εi,t
Even though the competing strategies of commercial banks and SSBs vary, the
branch distribution of all commercial banks is highly correlated due to direct com-
petition between commercial banks. For that reason, each regression considers only
the proximity of one commercial bank branch at the time. First, the probability to
have, for example, an SEB branch given the presence of a Nordea branch is not
zero (see Table 8.2). Second, the subject of interest is the effect of each particular
commercial bank branch on the lending strategy of the particular SSB.
8.4 Discussion of results
The baseline results (see Table 8.3) show an ambiguous effect of a commercial
bank’s presence within the geographical reach of the local SSB. The closeness of
an SHB branch stimulates the local SSB’s relationship-based lending, whereas the
presence of Nordea, SEB, and La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar branches force the SSB to engage
in transaction-based lending. The intense competition between SHB and SSBs is
in line with the findings of Degryse and Ongena (2007):: the propensity of an SSB
to issue relationship lending is higher if there is the presence of an SHB branch.
The SSBs’ competition with Nordea and SEB, given the proximity of these
commercial banks’ branches, puts pressure on the SSBs’ consumer lending and
forces SSBs to engage in transactional consumer lending (mostly mortgages) by
transferring their loans to Swedbank in line with the arguments put forward by
Petersen and Rajan (1995). The transfer of transaction-based mortgage lending
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Table 8.3: Main Results
The table reports the results of the least squares distance method regression specifications de-
scribed in Section 8.3. The dependent variables are ratios of specified lending at each SSB for the
period from 2010 to 2016. Interaction is the independent variable, and it is defined as interaction
between bank closeness and Swedbank remoteness. SHB stands for Handelsbanken, LFS for for
La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar, and SWED for Swedbank. The coefficient values are heteroskedasticity consis-
tent coefficients. The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Closeness of Nordea SHB SEB LFS SWED
Lending β F β F β F β F β F
Relational −2.9 11.3 .6 2.87 −.21 12.68 −.22 9.59 .2 14.27
p-value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Interaction .03 - .001 .003 -
p-value ∗∗∗ - ∗ ∗∗∗ -
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes No No No
Commercial .11 50.6 .12 73.92 .12 44.81 - - - -
p-value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ - - - -
Time FE Yes Yes No - -
Bank FE No No Yes - -
Consumer -.06 13.55 -.07 22.23 -.07 4.97 - - - -
p-value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ - - - -
Time FE Yes Yes No - -
Bank FE No No Yes - -
SME -.06 25.6 -.05 25.43 -.06 22.89 - - - -
p-value ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ - - - -
Time FE Yes Yes Yes - -
Bank FE No No No - -
N 396 396 396 396 396
to Swedbank results in a lending portfolio composition of the SSBs that is biased
towards commercial lending. The remoteness of Swedbank makes the loan transfer
harder for SSBs, thereby positively affecting the portion of lending retained on the
balance sheet of SSBs.
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The following interpretation of the competition effect measured as closeness to
a competing commercial bank branch might have a different explanation. Mean-
while, given the scarcity of the information disclosed, the results show that the
effect of competition on relationship lending is ambiguous. The proximity of a
commercial bank branch may alleviate the relationship lending as well as provoke
securitization based on the business model of the competing commercial bank.
8.5 Concluding remarks
The analysis shows the opposite reaction of small SSBs given the presence of
branches of competing commercial banks. Despite the fact that Nordea, SHB, and
SEB affect the lending portfolio of SSBs in a similar way, the treatment of loans
is fundamentally different. Nordea and SEB stimulate SSBs to issue transaction-
based loans and to transfer loans further to Swedbank. This result supports the
view of Petersen and Rajan (1995) that the presence of a competing bank keeps
the small local bank from investing in relationship-based lending. Once the local
SSB performs due diligence and signals the borrower quality by setting up the loan
terms, the borrower may switch to a bank that interprets a loan granted by SSBs as
a positive signal and takes over the client.
Meanwhile, the proximity of a branch of SHB enforces the local SSB to origi-
nate relationship-based lending and to retain loans on the balance sheet. This find-
ing is supported by Larsen et al. (2014), who suggested that SHB and SSBs share
the same business models and strategic priorities. That likeness forces both SHB
and the SSB to compete by initiating more relationship-based lending, which is in
line with Degryse and Ongena (2007) and Boot and Thakor (2000). This conclu-
sion might further prompt research on banks’ incentives to issue only those loans
that are intended to be kept on their balance sheet. The mechanism behind these
decisions may help to better understand the reasons for the failure of securitization
during the global financial crisis.
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9.1 Introduction
The speed and scope of regulatory amendments have increased dramatically since
the global financial crisis. Recent overviews of the regulatory landscape in bank-
ing include Barth et al. (2013) and Diamond et al. (2017). Caprio et al. (2010)
provided an analogy of the endless game between the regulator and the regula-
tees introduced by Kane (1977) to illustrate the intrinsic source of instability of
the banking industry: the regulated side moves more often and more quickly than
the regulator can. Moreover, Freixas and Santomero (2003, p. 9) commented: ”Not
only is it natural to assume that the regulators pursue their own objective in a world
where their powers are limited by the legal framework, but it is also crucial to take
into account that banks will react to regulation by developing new strategies, like
introducing new financial innovations.” The market for regulation exists and banks
may develop multiple preventive strategies in order to respond to the regulatory
amendments before those amendments are ratified.
How banks address new regulations depends on the strategies they adopt. Wil-
son and Veuger (2017) argued that a bank may adapt to changes in the regula-
tory environment depending on its ability to determine what actions are expected
of it. They emphasized that uncertainty surrounding regulatory behavior in set-
tings where regulatory agents exercise significant discretion can be further exacer-
bated by bureaucratic complexity, changing environmental conditions, and a lack
of transparency in the oversight process. Such uncertainty makes it difficult for the
bank to determine how an individual agent will interpret the law at any given point
in time.
The ability of bankers to interpret the regulatory intentions is of crucial impor-
tance in the current low interest environment, where the forward guidance policy
is used as one of the monetary policy tools (Cœure´, 2017). The principle of for-
ward guidance policy is based on the regulator’s ability to induce and maintain
the banking industry’s intention to act in accordance with the regulatory commit-
ment. For example, in most countries the regulator is committed to maintaining
the refinancing interest rate at a certain level (either conditioned on certain eco-
nomic outcomes, or unconditionally), or to keep the established eligibility criteria
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for repurchase agreement (REPO) deals constant. Calomiris (1999) emphasized
that expectation of government actions will affect banks’ behavior more than will
government words.
In this essay, we study how these expectations are formed and influence banks’
willingness to comply with the regulatory framework. In particular, we ana-
lyze bankers’ willingness to comply (in short, we term it ”acceptance” or ”non-
resistance”) as a potential determinant of anticipation, and we elaborate on how
various personal characteristics may influence banks’ responses to regulatory
change. Regulatory acceptance means that market participants comprehend the ne-
cessity of the policies for the benefit of society. In line with Fiechter et al. (2012),
this means that they do not exploit social and political mechanisms to undermine
the ”supervisory will and ability to act”. Moreover, we assess the relationship be-
tween bankers’ personality traits, such as industry experience and professional self-
esteem, and their levels of acceptance of new regulations.
We employed data from a survey aimed at understanding the attitude of the
Swedish banking industry towards the adoption of the Basel III accord. The survey
was developed by an industry insider in 2015, and, since then, it has been circulated
among industry experts on a yearly basis. The population of respondents consists
of bank employees (industry insiders) involved in any kind of communication with
supervisory agents (i.e., top management and risk and compliance officers). In ad-
dition, data was collected from regulators, consultants and other advisors to the
banking industry (industry outsiders).
We analyzed the data in two steps. First, we described the general attitude to-
wards the recently proposed regulatory amendments, as expressed under the um-
brella term ”Basel III”. The survey reveals a rather blunt critique of the Basel III
regulations for being overly prescriptive and comprehensive to the extent that these
regulations prevent managers from pursuing the business strategy of their banks.
Respondents are particularly worried about how supervisors will implement their
interpretations of the regulations - a worry that has increased slightly over the years
among the industry insiders. According to most of the respondents, proportionality
is lacking from the proposed regulations, and the fact that most of the regulations
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were designed and implemented outside Sweden makes the regulations less sensi-
tive to institutional peculiarities.
In the second step, we analyzed the extent to which self-esteem determines the
respondent’s anticipation. In doing so, we assessed the relation between acquies-
cence and anticipated effect of regulatory changes on personality traits such as
industry experience and disclosed professional self-esteem. In particular, we show
that respondents who rank themselves as more literate in banking operations and
regulations tend to demonstrate acquiescence to a greater extent. These respondents
are also more positive towards the anticipated effects of new regulations.
Our key contribution is the analysis of professional self-esteem as a potential
determinant of policy anticipations. Regulatory change is a stress factor that chal-
lenges bankers to form an understanding of (1) a matter or subject of change, (2)
a process of change, and (3) implications and consequences of that change. If a
person is aware of any kind of changes and is confident about his or her ability to
comprehend the requirements, the adaptation to the new requirement is projected to
be fast. In their study of psychological distress levels, Ormel and Schaufeli (1991)
showed that two-thirds of the variance in distress could be attributed to a differ-
ence in stable symptom levels, namely, the difference in personality traits and self-
esteem levels.
The Swedish set-up is interesting to consider due to recent banking industry
changes, which have resulted in the exit of one of the largest banks from Swedish
to European supervision by the relocation of the Nordea headquarters from Stock-
holm (Sweden) to Helsinki (Finland). This striking decision was motivated by
Nordea’s refusal to comply with higher contribution fees to the Swedish stabil-
ity fund. Ironically, once bailed out as Nordbanken (i.e., the ancestor of Nordea),
Nordea now found it could not justify paying higher resolution fees to the stabil-
ity fund. This provides a fascinating environment to analyze the evolution of ac-
ceptance and anticipation between industry insiders and outsiders of the Swedish
banking industry.
The essay is structured as follows. Section 9.2 summarizes the literature on
banking changes in response to changing regulatory environment and supervisory
oversight. Section 9.3 outlines the study set-up. Section 9.4 describes the data col-
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lection process, and Section 9.5 describes the data and sample characteristics. Sec-
tion 9.6 presents the methodology and study design. Section 9.7 provides bench-
mark results and discussion. Section 9.8 concludes the essay.
9.2 Literature review
Banks act strategically in response to anticipated regulatory actions (VanHoose
(2007); Ongena et al. (2013)). Boot and Thakor (1993) derived a theoretical set-
up in which the supervisor adjusts its closure strategy based on the initial market
belief of the quality of supervision. In their setting, the supervisor is able to monitor
the bank’s true asset allocation with a probability that is determined by the actual
quality of the oversight performed by the supervisor. The market interprets the
bank’s closure as a failure of the regulator to detect inefficient asset allocation.
This set-up leads to regulatory forbearance (regulatory laxity) and stimulates low
bank capitalization, which leads to higher total distortion in social welfare. Thus,
banks have an ex ante ability to cheat and to take on more risk in the first period.
Boot and Thakor’s (1993) model points to the importance of anticipation for the
actions and reactions of the regulator and the regulatees.
The strategies that are formed during anticipation are linked to legitimacy, which
may differ depending on the underlying reason to comply (Suchman, 1995). Such-
man (1995) defines three types of organizational legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and
cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy stems from political, economic, or social interde-
pendencies based on self-interest calculations. This could be exemplified by a bank
that aims for a more relaxed supervisor and relies on over-compliance as a strategy.
Moral legitimacy relies on an evaluation of whether the regulation or supervision
is relevant and coherent in the bank’s view. The market agreement with procedures
and tools used by supervisors forms moral legitimacy. Finally, cognitive legitimacy
reflects the things taken for granted without normative or critical assessment.
The extent to which these strategies lead to ”bad” behavior (e.g., moral haz-
ard) among banks is determined by the ability of the supervisor to deter socially
inefficient asset allocation. The government safety net has been blamed for be-
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ing one of the initial causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 by inducing
a moral hazard incentive to banks’ behavior (Allen et al., 2015). Because banks
expect increased regulatory forbearance during hard times, they retain risky posi-
tions during turmoil in the hope of regulatory support (Acharya and Yorulmazer,
2007). Similarly, Aliaga-Dı´az et al. (2011) set up a model for counter-cyclical cap-
ital requirements; in this model, forward-looking banks anticipate that the capital
requirements will fall in bad times. Consequently, these banks hold smaller capital
buffers than they would in the absence of such anticipations. This means that reg-
ulators should account for the strategic actions of banks in the anticipation phase
(Allen and Gale, 2016).
In principle, well-designed regulations provide the socially optimal outcome
without the possibility of moral hazard. For instance, a regulatory set-up that pre-
vents ex ante the possibility of bank runs was considered by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). They demonstrated that the anticipation stemming from a bank’s ability to
suspend convertibility of deposits prevents a bank run by removing incentives for
consumers with consumption needs in the period after the run (i.e., ”Type 2 agents”
or ”late consumers”) from participating in the run.2
However, besides the regulatory design itself, other factors may still undermine
the efficiency of oversight. Wilson and Veuger (2017) addressed the tension be-
tween the regulator and the bank using geographical proximity as a proxy for in-
formational asymmetry between regulatory expectation and the bank’s interpreta-
tion of anticipating regulatory expectations. They studied the compliance costs in
terms of administrative charges for advisory services and corporate governance in
geographically remote locations. Distant proximity incurs administrative costs for
banks. The costs decline in the presence of other regulatory institutions within the
same region due to information reusability and economies of scale.
As outlined by Fiechter et al. (2012), even when the regulatory framework is
properly designed and the regulation is ratified, the market participants may under-
2 The late consumer will not withdraw during the first period, since she or he has higher utility
from consuming late and believes that when a bank, which is spared the demand from early
consumers, runs out of liquidity, it then suspends withdrawals in order to fully pay off the late
consumers in the next period. The late consumer will always choose not to withdraw early, since
there is no chance to be only partially reimbursed in the second period.
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mine the ability of the regulator to act according to the new regulations. In Fiechter
et al.’s (2012) view, the inefficiency of banking regulation and supervision, which
resulted in the global financial crisis, lies in the ”nuts and bolts” of the supervisory
process, such as regulatory empowerment to act in line with new regulations, polit-
ical support, approval or acceptance of the regulation by the industry, or industry’s
ability to resist policy implementations. If bankers observe some of these prob-
lems, they may adjust their compliance strategy to take advantage of the systemic
weaknesses of banking regulation and supervision.
Mondak (1994) elaborated on two sources of policy legitimacy: institutional
legitimacy and policy agreement. He emphasized the effect of institutional legit-
imacy on policy agreement: the institutional recognition alters the propensity to
agree with policy. Agarwal et al. (2014) studied the discretionary supervision pro-
cess driven by the Riegle Act of 1994 in the US. The Riegle Act means that there
are fixed 12-month or 18-month rotations between state and federal supervisors.
They discussed the laxity of supervision exerted by the state relative to the fed-
eral supervisor in light of the ”race to the bottom” (banks tend to choose the more
favorable supervisor) and ”good cop/bad cop” supervisory strategies. The ham-
pered pragmatic and moral legitimacy in the classification of Suchman (1995) and
the lack of policy agreement in Mondak’s (1994) terms inevitably lead to ”rules
lawyer” behavioral patterns, resulting in regulatory aversion and regulatory arbi-
trage (i.e., the ”race to the bottom”). Thus, the bankers’ attitude towards supervi-
sors may affect the support of regulatory amendments.
From the discussion above, we suggest that the bankers’ response to regula-
tory amendments is a complex multidimensional problem. This problem is partly
addressed by this essay. The monitoring of banks is also a challenge due to the
central role played by banks in the economy. Bank money is often used for trans-
action purposes and plays an important role in the facilitation of trade. Dang et al.
(2017) argued that the money-like characteristics of bank debt is based on its in-
formation insensitivity. Furthermore, they claimed that a bank has to be opaque
in order to provide credit to a firm that cannot be funded via other markets. This
means that banks must remain opaque in order to ensure the proper functioning of
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trade and credit markets, while at the same time they cannot be fully regulated due
to ”regulatory capture”-related problems.
As noted by Woodford (2012), policy anticipations are significant only if banks
truly believe that the promised policy will be in place. Similarly, Bernanke and
Reinhart (2004) argued that if a bank does not believe that certain policy measures
will be executed, then the effect of policy anticipation is zero. A case in point can
be found in the 2016-17 Italian banking crisis. Despite both the Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (Regu-
lation (EU) No 806/2014) being fully operational from 1 January 2016, the Italian
government approved precautionary recapitalization of several Italian banks, such
as Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca.3
If a bank believes that an imposed regulatory amendment is likely to encum-
ber restrictions on banking activity, it may try to avoid it by taking preventive ac-
tions. These preventive actions may be referred to as innovations. However, such
innovations undermine the efficiency of the reform. They are designed so that the
regulator cannot prevent every possible regulatory avoidance strategy. In line with
Thakor (2012), periods in which complex new financial products are introduced
are more likely to be followed by a financial crisis. In this respect, it is important to
understand how banks’ anticipation of regulatory amendments is actually formed.
The recent financial crisis shows that the decisions taken by the management of
banks are detrimental for societal economic growth. The propensity of individuals
to take a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to mind in
revising beliefs introduces behavioral bias. This bias of the banks’ CEOs played a
significant role in the depth of the financial crisis of 2007-09 (Thakor, 2015).
Another strand of literature, which blames banks for the distortion of economic
growth, is related to the ”brain drain” effect. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) doc-
umented the damaging effect of the fast-growing finance industry to aggregate
productivity growth via the higher compensation levels in the industry. Because
compensation is higher, the finance industry tends to attract the smartest specialists
from production sectors, which in turn limits industrial growth and supplements it
with the development of finance.
3 ”Italy sets aside 17bn to wind down failing lenders”, Financial Times, 2 June 2017.
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To date, the most comprehensive empirical study of banking compensation de-
terminants was based on the Swedish registry data in connection with fine-grained
ability assessments from military enlistment at the age 18-19 years, including cog-
nitive and non-cognitive test scores by Bo¨hm et al. (2015). Bo¨hm et al. (2015)
did not find any support for the ”brain drain” argument, even when accounting
for talent in a rich way: pay in finance is extremely high, increasing, and largely
unexplained.
Another factor, which may potentially contribute to the high remuneration in fi-
nance, is the reported working hours and related stress levels. The structural change
in banking core activities due to digitization and the shift to ”home banking”, as
well as a considerable reduction in job positions, intensified the volume of work
for those who remained (Silva et al., 2007).
The changes in banking regulations with respect to policy anticipation are also
related to the higher stress level among banking employees. Giorgi et al. (2017)
summed up the studies of stress levels in the banking industry in response to the
recent changes in banking business models and regulations. They found that most
studies showed that mental health problems had increased in the banking sector,
and that these problems were stress-related. The stress inside the banking industry
is subject to the emerged debate about the abnormal compensation packages paid
out to the executives of bailed-out banks (Faulkender et al., 2010).
Mocci et al. (2001) analyzed the psychological and occupational factors on as-
thenopia (visual discomfort or eye strain)4 of 385 bank workers. Mocci et al. (2001)
reported a negative relationship between self-esteem measured via Rosenberg’s
scale and visual complaints. This result may be interpreted as bankers tending
to demonstrate an avoidance behavior or pretending to have disability problems
whenever they do not feel competent in their positions. Pre-labeling themselves as
partially physically disabled provides a protective mechanism in case of underper-
formance.
The reviewed literature shows a multitude of strategies that management of
banks can decide to follow in anticipation of regulatory changes and the effects
4 The presence of blurred vision, ocular soreness, itching of the eyes, blinking, heaviness of the
eyes, and double vision (Mocci et al., 2001)
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of such changes. This essay attempts to add to the literature by analyzing profes-
sional self-esteem as a filter through which top managers choose their strategies. As
illustrated by the literature review, the extent to which the industry anticipates reg-
ulatory changes to have positive or negative effects will determine their response.
We hypothesize that bankers with high professional self-esteem are better able
to realize and comprehend regulations compared to bankers with low professional
self-esteem. This could potentially mean that bankers with high professional self-
esteem have a smaller tendency to exhibit protective mechanisms by blaming
distorting regulations to secure their positions in the case of underperformance.
Hence, they are more positive towards regulatory change and, as such, will display
less resistance in anticipation of regulatory change.
9.3 Study set-up
The banker exerts effort to adjust the bank’s operations in accordance with an im-
posed regulation. There is no regulation specifically designed to improve the per-
formance of banks. Thus, each regulation implies that a bank must bear the costs
of implementation and compliance. The costs and efforts incurred by the bank de-
pends on the private evaluation made by the banker.
Following Kane (2012), one might consider the following analogue. Speed lim-
its are set up to ensure traffic safety, but they also imply longer traveling times.
A driver wants to minimize fuel consumption and the time to destination. Under
the assumption that the optimal driving speed is higher than the permitted speed,
the driver can choose either to exceed the speed limit or to bear the costs of in-
efficient driving. By exceeding the speed limit, the driver may be sanctioned. The
driver considers the probability of being fined and the penalty rate. If the traffic
regulation is designed properly, the driver chooses to keep to the speed limit and
incurs the cost of inefficient driving. The same logic applies to the banker. If the
probability of being fined and/or the penalty rate are small enough, the banker may
find it profitable to ”speed”.
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The current regulatory regime is based on fines and sanctions imposed by su-
pervisors. Expanding on the driving analogy, the driver may acknowledge a certain
safety implication of breaching the speed limit. Higher speed means that there is
an increased risk to other road users. Given the potential implications of speed-
ing, such as road accidents and infrastructure damage, the driver may drop his or
her speed as a precaution, when, for instance, passing a school area or a retire-
ment facility. Similarly, the banker may consider the systemic implications of his
or her operations and refrain from certain activities that could have implications
for financial system stability.
For the purpose of this essay, we assumed that each regulation is designed to
maximize societal economic growth and to minimize the frequency and costs of
financial crises. Given that every bank is better off in a growing economy, each
bank should also be better off if all banks in the economy follow the regulations.
If the banker does not believe that the imposed regulatory amendments improve
long-term growth, and hence the performance of the bank, the banker may choose
to act strategically via financial innovation, regulatory arbitrage, and so on. In this
essay, we study how industry insiders and industry outsiders perceive the Basel
III regulations and their implications for bank competitiveness and industry de-
velopment. In line with Mocci et al. (2001), we hypothesize that a precautionary
expressed disapproval of the regulations provides an excuse for the bankers to jus-
tify lower performance in the future and gives a signal of managerial readiness to
execute the regulatory avoidance strategies. While the self-confident professionals
demonstrate higher readiness to operate in the strengthened regulatory environment
and tend to show greater appreciation of the regulatory efforts, the low self-esteem
industry participants are more prone to criticize any regulatory change.
9.4 Survey design
This study is based on a questionnaire that was sent to bank representatives in
2016, 2017, and 2018. The population of the respondents consisted of two distinct
categories: insiders and outsiders. The industry insiders were mainly recruited via
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their participation in relevant committees of Sweden’s two main banking industry
organizations: the Swedish Bankers Association and the Swedish Savings Banks
Association. Prior to each round of the survey, both associations assisted in the
identification of relevant respondents by providing up-to-date information about
which individuals were represented in the relevant committees.
The industry outsiders are mainly well-known consultants in the area of regula-
tion. Some of them were suggested by industry insiders to be added to the sample
group as they are former industry insiders or regulators now active in professional
networks. In addition, industry outsiders also consist of advisors, supervisory and
regulatory committee members, and so on, who are collectively dealing with the
Swedish banking industry. This group was used as a benchmark because they were
expected to have a broader and more holistic view on banking, including an open-
ness to non-traditional banking solutions. Furthermore, because they are not di-
rectly paid conditionally on the performance of traditional banking business mod-
els, they may be expected to be less biased towards the regulations.
The non-probability sampling strategy has obvious implications for the external
validity of the study (Shadish et al., 2002). The approach was chosen because it was
seen as a good way to attract respondents via the banking industry organizations,
mainly the Swedish Bankers’ Association, and to attain a high response rate.
The collection process of survey data was the following. First, an email was sent
out a couple of weeks prior to the survey with an invitation to participate. The pur-
pose was to validate email addresses and create an interest for the survey. Second,
the survey was sent out via email with a personal link. Two to three reminders were
distributed during the time the survey was open.
The survey results are anonymous. Specific questions were asked in order to
identify the type of respondent (i.e., insider or outsider) and professional traits
based on self-disclosure. The average response rate for the three surveys was more
than 30 % in all three years. In 2016, the survey was sent to 241 insiders (response
rate 41 %) and 50 outsiders (response rate 54 %); in 2017, it was sent to 279
insiders (response rate 33 %) and 62 outsiders (response rate 48 %); and, in 2018,
it was sent to 359 insiders (response rate 36 %) and 99 outsiders (response rate 31
%).
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The respondents were asked to reflect upon a set of statements relating to the
influence of regulation on the Swedish banking industry. The statements used a
Likert scale ranging from one to five. Each of the integers from one to five im-
plies a specific degree of support for a particular statement, ranging from strongly
disagreeing to strongly agreeing.
9.5 Summary statistics and stylized facts
The survey consisted of two parts: personal and industry-specific information, and
statements. The overall statistics for personal and industry-specific information are
presented in Table 9.1. The industry insiders’ sample was tagged by the type of cur-
rent employment of the respondent: small bank (total assets - TA < 50 bn SEK),
medium bank (TA 50 - 500 bn SEK), and large bank (TA > 500 bn SEK). The
respondents were requested to characterize their specialization and level of exper-
tise. Specialization in the major banking subjects is a dummy variable (yes or no).
Competence was reported according to a self-assessed level (from very poor to
very good) of proficiency in such subjects as banking regulations, laws, and bank-
ing operations.
The descriptive statistics indicate that the experience and overall self-assessed
level of knowledge are above moderate in the sample (i.e., greater than three).
The respondents were expected to be in, or close to, the top management as it is
strategic questions that are considered in the committees where the consultations on
upcoming changes or new regulations are discussed and answered. The banks give
almost all their feedback on consultations via the Swedish Bankers Association or
the European Banking Federation.
The reported level of competence in the banking-related subjects, which is
partly presented in Table 9.1, may be interpreted as noisy signals of professional
self-esteem. Accordingly, we used this self-evaluation of skills to assess whether
self-esteem affects the attitude towards regulatory amendments. We further imply
that once someone has self-proclaimed as an industry expert (i.e., by self-reporting
a high level of skills), he or she is discouraged from making claims in advantage of
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Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics
The table reports descriptive statistics. Size is a categorical variable, ranging from 1 to
3, that is related to Total Assets of < 50B SEK, 50–500B SEK, and > 500B SEK re-
spectively. The variable years yields the working experience in the financial industry, rang-
ing from 1 to 6, which equals less than 2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years,
15-20 years, and more than 20 years, accordingly. Specializations are dummy variables.
Competence refers to the level of knowledge in each category of banking activity, with
values from 1 (equal to very limited knowledge) up to 5 (high degree of competence).
Total Industry insiders Others
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Mean SD
size - - 1 3 2.02 .87 - -
years 4.70 1.28 1 6 4.63 1.26 4.95 1.33
Specialization in
Capital adequacy .37 - 0 1 .35 - .44 -
Liquidity risk / Treasury .29 - 0 1 .27 - .33 -
Law .13 - 0 1 .12 - .23 -
IT / Information Security .07 - 0 1 .04 - .16 -
Competence in
Overall understanding of the regulations 3.91 .97 1 5 3.94 .96 3.79 1.04
Capital adequacy and Liquidity regulations 3.60 1.20 1 5 3.62 1.19 3.46 1.31
The implications of digitalization for banks 3.47 1.12 1 5 3.52 1.10 3.14 1.18
Respondents N 433 333 100
the industry. In essence, this means that the self-assessment should make respon-
dents more honest in their answers.
For example, the scope of regulatory instructions for the recent regulation is
significantly improved. Such efforts would most probably be recognized by a re-
spondent that disclosed his or her proficiency in banking regulation rather than by
a respondent who did not disclose this. Moreover, we tried to check this hypothesis
against the sample of outsiders, who are proficient in banking regulations.
From a methodological perspective, it would be best to use a purely randomized
experiment where respondents answered a survey with and without self-assessment
sections in order to evaluate the influence of self-esteem on anticipation. How-
ever, in our group of respondents (top management level), such an experiment
would likely generate a very low response rate. Additionally, a survey with a larger
amount of questions can be expected to yield a lower number of completed surveys.
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This is because the longer the survey, the more respondents would likely abandon
it in the middle of the questionnaire. Given the uncertainty about response rates
and the different probabilities of getting answers on surveys of different length,
our approach was the best option.
Besides personal and industry-specific information, the survey was organized
in the following blocks: statements related to regulatory efficiency - rules (see Ta-
ble A1); statements related to banking compliance and effect of being legitimate -
compl (see Table A2); the effects of regulation on bank competition - comp b (see
Table A3); the effect of regulation on bank competitiveness in relation to shadow
banks - comp o (see Table A4); the effect of regulation on growth and development
- growth (see Table A5). Overall, the major report for the benchmark subsample
(i.e., industry outsiders) on each block may be summarized as follows:
• Rules (Table A1, Panel A): The scope of banking operations under regulatory
control is expanding, despite regulations and other supervisory disclosures not
being clearly formulated. Moreover, there was uncertainty among the respon-
dents in terms of what regulations will follow, and how upcoming regulatory
amendments will be implemented. This uncertainty is partially due to most of
the regulations deriving from non-Swedish regulatory authorities.
• Compliance (Table A2, Panel A): The process of adaptation to the current
regulatory framework brings structure and orderliness to all banking activities.
This limits the authority of bank management and imposes discipline over the
structure of the whole banking organization.
• Competition within banks (Table A3, Panel A): The heightened regulatory
burden induces structural changes in banking competition by increasing entry
barriers. The tougher competition limits the diversity of banking products and
increases competition for managers and clients.
• Competition with shadow banks (Table A4, Panel A): The competition from
non-regulated financial intermediaries continued to increase in the next two
years following the year of the survey. This means that customers switched
regulated banking products and services for more flexible and less regulated
products and services. Nevertheless, the respondents were hopeful that the
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players offering such products and services would experience stricter regu-
lations in the future.
• Growth (Table A5, Panel A): The further development of banking products
is restricted by the regulatory framework. The compliance procedures blur the
growth focus and lower the ability to adapt to the future challenges of the
banking industry.
The presented statements, supported by most specialists in this field, may look
quite pessimistic. Given the increasing speed and frequency of regulatory amend-
ments, it is important to understand the profile of bankers who are ready to act in
the new environment. The profile of such people is of interest for this essay. We aim
to understand the importance of the respondent profile and to describe the common
patterns currently dominating the Swedish banking industry.
9.6 Methodology and model design
For the study design, we employed two steps of estimations. This section pro-
vides the specificity methods. First, we describe the straightforward analyses used
for tractability and comparability purposes; then, we shortly underline the main
specifics of the Rossi et al.’s (2001) model. As noted above, we chose the industry
outsiders as a benchmark and scaled the answers of industry insiders by means of
the answers given by industry outsiders (also referred to as the major report). The
outsiders tended to provide more unbiased opinions; therefore, their answers could
serve as a benchmark for an opinion deviation analysis. This procedure allowed
us to get rid of variations in means from year to year. Consequently, we could
consolidate the answers of all surveys into one dataset.
The second step involved employing the basic model and the Rossi et al.’s
(2001) model for multivariate ordinal (i.e., based on a Likert scale) survey data with
scale usage heterogeneity.5 Both of these models aim to estimate the respondent-
5 Analysis of Multivariate Ordinal survey data with scale usage heterogeneity (as in Rossi et al.
(2001)) is implemented in R package ’bayesm’(Rossi, 2018) available on: https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=bayesm
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specific parameters, which were subsequently used to estimate the respondent- and
industry-specific determinants of disagreement with the major report.
The true attitude to the survey question is a continuous latent variable with an
unknown distribution of cut-off points. One possible approximation of the respon-
dent’s agreement function is the perceived probability of the statement being truth-
ful. Thus, the cut-off points on the Likert scale were distributed via a parameter
that is similar to risk aversion. In other words, one respondent may choose five
(strongly agree) under the perceived probability of the statement being true of at
least 70 %, while a more ”risk-averse” respondent would choose five only if the
perceived probability of the statement being true is more than 90 %. The major ad-
vantage of this representation is that the middle score signals uncertainty about the
statements. Hence, the choice of three will become a purely uninformative signal,
where true and false are equally possible. This allowed us to aggregate ”Do not
know”, ”NA”, and mid-score, and to interpret them as equally uninformative. We
focused only on the explicitly expressed opinions concerning each statement in our
analysis.
9.6.1 The basic model
The following model description is based on the statement of the Rules block.
The summary statistics for each block are reported in the Appendix. The explicitly
expressed attitude of the respondent is presented via the parameter observed ratio
of opinion offer - Expr %, and is equal to all respondents of the corresponding
type, net of those chosen ”non-informative” options scaled by total.
Our benchmark constitutes the expressed attitude towards each statement by
the industry outsiders. Formally, the separation between the two groups are made
such that the population of industry insiders are denoted Φ , with the correspond-
ing sample φ , whereas the population of industry outsiders are denoted Θ , with a
corresponding sample θ . Having the set of expressed attitudes towards statement j
( j ∈ {1,M}) by respondent i (i ∈ {1,N}) from the sample of outsiders - i ∈ θ , i.e.
xi j, we define the benchmark for statement j for period t by:
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Our benchmark constitutes the expressed attitude towards each statement by
the industry outsiders. Formally, the separation between the two groups is made
such that the population of industry insiders is denoted Φ , with the correspond-
ing sample φ , whereas the population of industry outsiders is denoted Θ , with a
corresponding sample θ . With the set of expressed attitudes towards statement j
( j ∈ {1,M}) by respondent i (i ∈ {1,N}) from the sample of outsiders (i ∈ θ , i.e.
xi j), we defined the benchmark for statement j for period t by:
ma jor jt =
1
n jt
N
∑
i=1
xit1{(3− xit)(3− xit)> 0}, if i ∈ θ , with (9.1)
n jt =
N
∑
i=1
1{(3− xit)(3− xit)> 0}. (9.2)
The caveat of this approach is that xit in equation 9.1 is included for ma jor jt
purposes calculations only if the row mean xit and xit lie on the same side of the
numeric line separated at the point of three. For example, if row mean xit (reported
in9.2) is less than 3, then only xit < 3 are included. Formally, the insiders’ disagree-
ment (∆i jt ) with the major report on statement j for time t is specified by equation
9.3:
∆i jt =
{
0, if (3− xi jt)(3−ma jor jt)≥ 0
| xi jt −ma jor jt |, if (3− xi jt)(3−ma jor jt)< 0
, i ∈ φ . (9.3)
Next, we summed up ∆i jt for all statements within each of the five blocks. An
example of the results is provided in Figure 9.1, which shows a breakdown of pos-
sible patterns in the data. While the representation in Figure 9.1 is quite artificial,
it helps to estimate a simplified distribution of the opinions in the sample. The X-
axis is a log-scaled disagreement ∆i of insiders with the major report over the set
of rules-related statements, and the Y-axis is log-scaled disagreement on growth-
related statements. While 17 % of the insiders agreed with the major report on
rules and on growth, 37 % of the insiders considered only rules in the major re-
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Fig. 9.1: The log-scaled disagreement of insiders with benchmark on rules and
growth set of statements.
port to be in line with their views and expectations, 12 % of the insiders had the
opposite view, and 34 % disagreed with both statements.
9.6.2 Introduction of the Rossi et al.’s (2001) model and a
performance comparison with the basic model
Following the notions of Rossi et al. (2001), the vector of the latent responses
(i.e. true attitude towards statement j) of respondent i (i ∈ {1,N}) to question j
( j ∈ {1,M}), – y′i = [yi1, ...,yiM], defined by equation 9.4, is normally distributed
and discredited by a set of cut-offs [c0, ...,ck], with k – an array of discrete choices
from 1 to k (in our survey design k=5).
xi, j = k, if ck−1 ≤ yi j ≤ ck. (9.4)
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The cut-off values lie on the parabola a+bk+ ek2 with a = 0.5 and b = 1. The
coefficient e is a parameter to allow skewness and non-linear distribution of cut-
offs with a prior e= 0. The underlying latent continuous variable is a sum of means
for question j (µ j), respondent specific parameters τi and σi and the standardized
latent variable (zi j), which can be formalised as:
yi = µ+ τiι+σizi, with zi ∼ N(0,Σ). (9.5)
Model 9.5 incorporates the respondent-specific location τi and scale shift σi, es-
timated via the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm (for the detailed description
of the model implementation, see Rossi et al. (2012)). While Rossi et al. (2001)
focused on zi j as an indicator of true ”customer satisfaction”, they emphasized the
possibility of considering τi as a respondent-specific location shift towards either
the low or the high end of the scale. In essence, this means that if a specific respon-
dent tends always to select five, we could adjust for this tendency. To proceed, we
estimated the respondent-specific tendency for each block, where τi represents the
tendency of each respondent to answer in a certain direction over a set of statements
with mean µ .
Table 9.2: The comparison of model performance based on 20K draws with raw
summary statistics over the set of questions for each block
The scale in the table reflects the degree of average support - µ parameter for a sample established
view (major report) on a scale from 1 to 5. IO stands for industry outsiders; II - industry insiders.
Simulations
All questions Block Sample
IO II Total Total IO II Total
Agreement with Rules major opinion 3.96 3.78 3.78 3.85 3.78 3.7 3.72
average std. dev. [.16] [.08] [.06] [.07] [.98] [1.02] [1.01]
Agreement with Compl major opinion 3.8 3.79 3.75 3.36 3.32 3.35 3.34
average std. dev. [.16] [.08] [.06] [.06] [.94] [.98] [.97]
Agreement with Comp b major opinion 3.77 3.75 3.71 3.59 3.55 3.53 3.53
average std. dev. [.16] [.08] [.06] [.06] [.90] [.92] [.92]
Agreement with Comp o major opinion 3.43 3.51 3.45 3.72 3.68 3.6 3.62
average std. dev. [.15] [.07] [.06] [.06] [.90] [.99] [.97]
Agreement with Growth major opinion 3.52 3.54 3.49 3.52 3.34 3.5 3.46
average std. dev. [.15] [.07] [.06] [.06] [.90] [1.01] [.99]
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We estimated the respondent-specific location shift over the questions related
to subject-related blocks of questions. The estimated location shift τi represents
the location-specific shift for each respondent over the set of questions with ques-
tion mean µ . In order to illustrate the model performance with a prior default, we
present the estimation of the model parameters conditional on the block of ques-
tions described previously in comparison with the sample means.
Table 9.2 presents the summary statistics of the µ parameter over the block of
questions related to the effect of the Basel III regulation. For instance, the first
line of Table 9.2 should be interpreted as follows: The agreement with the major
report on Rules is measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. Based on raw sample
means, the agreement with the Rules major is 3.78 for industry outsiders (IO in
column 5) and 3.7 for industry insiders (II in column 6). In contrast, the means of
the estimated µ are 3.96 for outsiders (IO in column 1) and 3.78 for insiders (II
in column 2). The higher estimated means of µ may reflect different location shift
patterns of the subsample groups. In other words, some respondents consistently
”underrated” the statements. That fact leads to a negative respondent-specific shift
τ and higher estimated means µ .
Table 9.3: Summary Statistics
The table reports the summary statistics for ∆ calculated according to Equation 9.3 and aggre-
gated to level of blocks by summing up. Parameter τ represent the respondent-specific location
shift around parameter described in Table 9.2.
Variable name Abriviation N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
∆ estimated over Rules block ∆ Rules 416 1.95 2.72 0 0 2.63 16.53
∆ estimated over Compliance block ∆ Compl 416 2.59 2.85 0 0 4.2 14
∆ estimated over Competition banks block ∆ Comp b 416 1.64 2.19 0 0 2.4 17
∆ estimated over Competition others block ∆ Comp o 416 1.94 2.32 0 0 3.18 10.73
∆ estimated over Growth block ∆ Growth 416 2.71 2.61 0 0 4.32 12.45
τ estimated over Rules block τ Rules 416 −.01 .58 −1.33 −.45 .38 1.49
τ estimated over Compliance block τ Compl 416 −.01 .45 −1.04 −.35 .28 1.69
τ estimated over Competition banks block τ Comp b 416 −.01 .34 −.99 −.24 .20 1.26
τ estimated over Competition others block τ Comp o 416 −.01 .44 −1.02 −.34 .29 1.34
τ estimated over Growth block τ Growth 416 −.01 .43 −1.29 −.32 .25 1.16
τ estimated over all questions τ all 416 −.09 .31 −.84 −.29 .09 .94
144 9 Essay D
The procedure outlined above helps us to estimate the effect of self-disclosure
on the expressed opinions over the subject-related blocks of questions. The self-
disclosure reflects professional self-esteem, measured by the degree of self-reported
knowledge in subjects related to the effect of upcoming regulations. Respondents
were asked to rank their expertise from a very poor to a very good level of exper-
tise. In order to show the relationship between self-esteem and regulation approval,
we relate the opinion of each respondent to the predominant opinions in the sam-
ple summarized earlier. The support of the major opinion is measured in two ways:
the basic straightforward analysis - ∆ BlockX ; and the Rossi et al.’s (2001) model
with scale usage heterogeneity - τ BlockX . The summary statistics of the given
variables are presented in Table 9.3.
Further, we tested the relation of the designed variables and the professional
self-esteem level via ordinary least squares estimations. Given the anonymous re-
sponses, both τ and ∆ might be a function of unknown population characteristics.
In order to address this concern in the best possible way, we assumed that τ and ∆
were determined by a common set of omitted variables. Hence, we estimated first
how much of τ variance may be attributed to direct disagreement with the common
view ∆ ; then, we utilized the unexplained residual error term to assess the effect of
self-esteem. Section 9.6 presents the results of these estimations and discusses the
policy implications of our findings.
9.7 Results and discussions
The point of interest of this study is the variation of answer patterns across different
respondent groups given the level of the respondents’ self-disclosure. The baseline
results are presented in Table 9.4. Overall, the respondents with high self-disclosed
proficiency in banking regulations and operations demonstrate less agreement with
the major opinion. On average, they considered regulations and instructions to be
sufficiently clear and that regulatory and supervisory authorities are successful in
communicating how the regulations will be introduced. They also tended to agree
more with the delegation of regulatory initiatives to Brussels.
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Table 9.4: Baseline results
The table reports the relation between self-esteem and respondents’ specific location shift τ over
a block of statements related to regulations, and this relationship’s effect on compliance, compe-
tition within banks and with non-regulated entities, and bank’s growth prospects.
The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Competition
Rules Compliance within banks with shadow banks Growth
Panel A: Dependent variable - τ estimated over Block X
(A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (A.5)
∆ estimated over Block X −.06∗∗∗ −.05∗∗∗ −.03∗∗∗ −.03∗∗∗ .13∗∗∗
(.005) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.01)
Constant .76∗∗∗ .79∗∗∗ .73∗∗∗ .73∗∗∗
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
R2 .27 .36 .18 .11 .45
Adjusted R2 .27 .36 .18 .11 .45
Residual Std. Error .27 .18 .16 .21 .52
F Statistic 152.28∗∗∗ 231.90∗∗∗ 92.18∗∗∗ 53.11∗∗∗ 344.78∗∗∗
df (df = 1; 414) (df = 1; 414) (df = 1; 414) (df = 1; 414) (df = 1; 415)
Panel B: Dependent variable - residuals τ estimated in Panel A
(B.1) (B.2) (B.3) (B.4) (B.5)
Self-esteem −.04∗∗ −.02∗∗ −.03∗∗∗ −.03∗∗ −.22∗
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.11)
Self-esteem:Experience .01∗∗∗ .004∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .01∗∗∗ .01∗
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004)
Constant .98∗∗
(.39)
R2 .02 .01 .03 .02 .04
Adjusted R2 .01 .01 .03 .01 .04
Residual Std. Error .27 .18 .15 .21 .22
F Statistic 3.49∗∗ 2.62∗ 7.47∗∗∗ 3.58∗∗ 9.05∗∗∗
df (df = 2; 414) (df = 2; 414) (df = 2; 414) (df = 2; 414) (df = 2; 413)
Observations 416 416 416 416 416
The outcome of the following analyses suggests that the more the respondent
assessed him or herself as professionally knowledgeable, the more positive the
respondent was towards regulatory changes. Such respondents predict less dam-
age to the banking industry caused by regulations. Interestingly, more experi-
enced respondents were marginally less optimistic towards regulatory changes.
The straightforward estimation of disagreement measured by ∆ yields the same
results. The disagreement with the major opinion increased with higher levels of
self-esteem (see Table 9.5).
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Table 9.5: Supplementary results
The table reports the relation between self-esteem and the straightforward estimation of disagree-
ment measured by ∆ over a block of statements related to regulations, and this relationship’s ef-
fect on compliance, competition within banks and with non-regulated entities, and bank’s growth
prospects.
The significance levels are at ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Competition
Rules Compliance within banks with shadow banks Growth
Panel C: Dependent variable - ∆ estimated over Block X
(C.1) (C.2) (C.3) (C.4) (C.5)
Self-esteem .41∗∗∗ .76∗∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .76∗∗∗ .86∗∗∗
(.14) (.15) (.11) (.12) (.14)
Self-esteem:Experience .03 −.01 .01 −.05∗ −.02
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03)
R2 .35 .46 .37 .42 .53
Adjusted R2 .35 .45 .36 .42 .53
Residual Std. Error (df = 414) 2.70 2.85 2.18 2.30 2.58
F Statistic (df = 2; 414) 112.10∗∗∗ 172.97∗∗∗ 120.24∗∗∗ 151.77∗∗∗ 234.67∗∗∗
Observations 416 416 416 416 416
While the effect of the level of confidence on regulation acceptance is extremely
difficult to study given the data scarcity and the number of methodological issues,
the potential policy implications are quite straightforward. The enhanced literacy
about regulatory intentions, together with improved communication about policy
implications, may improve the readiness of market participants more closely to
comply and adhere to regulations, thereby benefiting overall financial stability.
9.8 Conclusions
The process of banking regulatory change is a long path from the initial regulatory
initiative or proposal to the ratification and implementation. The baseline of three
decades of bank regulation, since the deregulation in the 1980s, is the setting up
of limits, that is, setting parameters for banking activities. One of the longest last-
ing limits is the Basel I Capital Adequacy Regulation, which limited equity and
subordinated debt with respect to risk-weighted assets.
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Typically, the enforcement of the latest regulation (based on the introduction
of the Basel II accord and the transition towards the Basel III accord) is subject
to gradual implementation in order to smooth the industry compliance shock. The
window between the issue of the first draft of a new regulation and full enforcement
is open for manipulation by the industry. The more resilient and empowered the
representatives of the banking industry are, the longer that window has to be open,
and the more amendments have to be made between the first draft and the ratified
version. One of the most efficient methods of delaying the requirement adoption
is to abuse the scrutiny of regulation enforcement. The underlying conflict about
an anticipation of regulatory effects introduces frictions to the ratification of the
restrictive measurement in the case when there are high social costs of imposing
the planned requirements.
It is well established in the literature that banks act strategically in response
to anticipated regulatory action. This essay adds to the literature by analyzing
one channel through which the strategic actions are determined, namely, profes-
sional self-esteem. In particular, in our sample professionals with higher levels of
self-esteem also seemed less worried about their abilities to manage regulatory
change. This finding supports the recent regulatory efforts to improve communica-
tion strategies and facilitate the understanding of the regulatory framework. Unfor-
tunately, as of 2018 most of the efforts address employees of the European central
banks and are optional for European banks. The relatively scarce literature and the
current analysis suggest that an improvement in the direction of the facilitation of
literacy in the banking regulation may facilitate the support of regulatory initiatives
by banking industry.
As outlined in the literature review, even when regulations are properly designed
and accepted, supervision still needs to be efficient. Although our study has not di-
rectly focused on supervision, it is notable that respondents with high professional
self-esteem also seemed less worried about having a supranational supervisor. The
extent to which this supervisor is more difficult to manipulate (i.e., strategic ac-
tions are less useful) could be an interesting avenue for further research. Moreover,
if managers with high professional self-esteem are better equipped to manage in
an environment with persistent change and supranational supervision, perhaps pro-
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fessional self-esteem should be taken into consideration when outlining the char-
acteristics that determine pay. If, as indicated by our study, managers with high
professional self-esteem are better equipped to manage processes of change, they
should perhaps also be better paid - so long as this is a desirable trait.
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A Summary statistics by statement
Appendix A presents the statements relating to each category of questions as well
as the summary statistics per statement. Table A1 describes the attitude towards the
regulation-related statements. Effect of compliance on banking activity is presented
in Table A2. Table A3 summarizes the industry insiders and outsiders on the effect
of regulatory amendments on the banking competition. The expectation regarding
the future role of shadow banking in light of the Basel III introduction is provided
by Table A4. Table A5 presents the statistics on the industry insiders and outsiders
beliefs about the growth restrictions imposed by the Basel III adoption.
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Table A1: Notations and Major Report Values: Statements Related to Regulatory Efficiency
The table presents notations of the statements included to the Rules variable. The first part of descriptive statistics - Panel A, presents the mean
of the major opinion within industry outsiders. Stars in Panel A stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers for previous against
subsequent year. The second part of descriptive statistics - Panel B, presents similar statistics for industry insiders. Stars in Panel B stand for
the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers of industry insiders and outsiders. Agreement rate (Agrm) in percentage reports the portion of the
respondents expressing similar view (neutral or strict opinion). Expr % (i.e. observed ratio of opinion offer) presents the portion of respondents
expressed their opinion regarding certain statement (all respondents of corresponding type net of those chosen ’non-informative’ options scaled
by total). The third part of descriptive statistics - Panel C, provides the descriptive of Disagreement - dargm βit , between industry insiders and
dominated view of industry outsiders (mean) with at least one non zero dargm βit in the set of expressions. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Industry outsiders Bankers Disagreement
Statement Var Year Mean Agrm Expr Mean Agrm Expr Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y x agrm expr x agrm expr ∆ σ min max
The rules are clear exp 7.1
16Y 1.43 73.7 70.4 1.72 71.9 65.3 1.07 1.37 0 3.57
17Y 1.87 75 69 1.66 62.3 65.6 1.26 1.2 0 3.13
18Y 1.6 74.1 67.5 1.69 67 70.5 1.26 1.32 0 3.4
Regulators are sufficiently clear in their
regulations and instructions exp 7.2
16Y 1.53 71.4 77.8 1.66 79.4 64.3 .76 1.25 0 3.47
17Y 1.56 90 69 1.64 74.6 76.3 1.1 1.3 0 3.44
18Y 1.68 76 62.5 1.71 78.7 69 .77 1.17 0 3.32
There is no uncertainty about how the
regulators will follow up the application of
the regulations and instructions
exp 7.3
16Y 1.56 88.9 66.7 1.54 86.3 74.5 .62 1.21 0 3.44
17Y 1.78 100 79.3 1.59 84.7 77.4 .63 1.09 0 3.22
18Y 1.58 82.8 72.5 1.65 89.5 81.4 .48 1.06 0 3.42
There is sufficient proportionality in the rules
between large and small banks exp 7.4
16Y 1.68 95.7 85.2 1.45 83.6 62.2 .5 0.97 0 2.32
17Y 1.65 87 79.3 1.5 88.1 63.4 .44 1.01 0 3.35
18Y 1.63 93.1 72.5 1.49 91 77.5 .4 0.98 0 3.37
The regulatory changes in recent years are
very detailed in how banks should operate exp 7.6
16Y 4.63 90.5 77.8 4.56 87.7 74.5 .49 1.01 0 3.26
17Y 4.57 95.5 75.9 4.36 94.9 84.9 .23 0.72 0 2.43
18Y 4.63 90 75 4.55 90.4 72.9 .34 0.82 0 2.3
The fact that the regulations are
initiated/decided in Basel/EU, rather than
locally, is not important.
exp 9.4
16Y 1.59 81 77.8 1.53 82.9 71.4 .72 1.24 0 3.41
17Y 1.61 81.8 75.9 1.55 82.1 72 .83 1.35 0 3.39
18Y 1.39 84.8 82.5 1.42 76 77.5 1.09 1.39 0 3.61
Rules [N=149] rules 11.21 7.31 4.55 54.74
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Table A2: Notations and Major Report Values: Statements Related to Banking Compliance and Effect of being Legitimate
The table presents notations of the statements included to the Compliance variable. The first part of descriptive statistics - Panel A, presents the
mean of the major opinion within industry outsiders. Stars in Panel A stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers for previous against
subsequent year. The second part of descriptive statistics - Panel B, presents similar statistics for industry insiders. Stars in Panel B stand for
the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers of industry insiders and outsiders. Agreement rate (Agrm) in percentage reports the portion of the
respondents expressing similar view (neutral or strict opinion). Expr % (i.e. observed ratio of opinion offer) presents the portion of respondents
expressed their opinion regarding certain statement (all respondents of corresponding type net of those chosen ’non-informative’ options scaled
by total). The third part of descriptive statistics - Panel C, provides the descriptive of Disagreement - dargm βit , between industry insiders and
dominated view of industry outsiders (mean) with at least one non zero dargm βit in the set of expressions. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Industry outsiders Bankers Disagreement
Statement Var Year Mean Agrm Expr Mean Agrm Expr Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y x agrm expr x agrm expr ∆ σ min max
The ↑ risk of sanctions (↑e 5M) VS banks
and/or its boards/CEO have made banks ↑
cautious in their decision making
exp 7.5
16Y 4.33 66.7 66.7 4.23 62 51 .84 1.27 0 3.33
17Y 4.19 94.1 58.6 4.31 66.7 51.6 .66 1.07 0 3.19
18Y 4.36 82.4 42.5 4.38 58.4 59.7 .97 1.28 0 3.36
The processes that are essential under the
regulations are easy to identify and document exp 15.1
16Y 4.5 46.2 48.1 4.25 80 55.1 1.2 1.41 0 3.5
17Y 4 60 34.5 4.28 56.1 61.3 1 1.16 0 3
18Y 4.2 62.5 60 4.16 54.9 70.5 1.17 1.25 0 3.2
Regulatory changes are positive because it
makes banks develop clearer and more
systematic processes
exp 15.5
16Y 4.46 76.5 63 4.37 85 61.2 .4 0.98 0 3.46
17Y 4.12 92.9 48.3 4.25 85.2 65.6 .34 0.79 0 2.12
18Y 4.35 77.3 55 4.32 71.3 67.4 .77 1.23 0 3.35
Banks are becoming more and more
centralized exp 18.2
16Y 4.42 75 59.3 4.29 76.3 60.2 .66 1.24 0 3.42
17Y 4.11 60 51.7 4.33∗ 80.3 65.6 .52 1.04 0 3.11
18Y 4.3 69 72.5 4.23 74.7 67.4 .68 1.18 0 3.3
The scope of action given by the boards to the
bank management has diminished as a result
of regulatory changes
exp 18.3
16Y 4.17 92.3 48.1 4.3 79.7 60.2 .45 0.92 0 3.17
17Y 4.31 81.2 55.2 4.31 78.7 65.6 .55 1.02 0 3.31
18Y 4.28 69.2 65 4.26 82.4 65.9 .44 0.97 0 3.28
Bank organizations will become increasingly
hierarchical exp 18.4
16Y 4.25 80 55.6 4.21 71.7 61.2 .65 1.06 0 3.25
17Y 4.1 66.7 51.7 4.25 71.4 60.2 .6 0.96 0 2.1
18Y 4.4 62.5 60 4.33 74 59.7 .64 1.17 0 3.4
Compliance [N=249] compl 11.15 7.38 4 39.66
154
9
E
ssay
D
Table A3: Notations and Major Report Values: Statements Related to Competition within Banking Industry
The table presents notations of the statements included to the Competition banks variable. The first part of descriptive statistics - Panel A,
presents the mean of the major opinion within industry outsiders. Stars in Panel A stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers for
previous against subsequent year. The second part of descriptive statistics - Panel B, presents similar statistics for industry insiders. Stars in
Panel B stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers of industry insiders and outsiders. Agreement rate (Agrm) in percentage reports
the portion of the respondents expressing similar view (neutral or strict opinion). Expr % (i.e. observed ratio of opinion offer) presents the
portion of respondents expressed their opinion regarding certain statement (all respondents of corresponding type net of those chosen ’non-
informative’ options scaled by total). The third part of descriptive statistics - Panel C, provides the descriptive of Disagreement - dargm βit ,
between industry insiders and dominated view of industry outsiders (mean) with at least one non zero dargm βit in the set of expressions.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Industry outsiders Bankers Disagreement
Statement Var Year Mean Agrm Expr Mean Agrm Expr Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y x agrm expr x agrm expr ∆ σ min max
The entry barriers for new banks in Sweden
have increased due to the increased regulation exp 9.2
16Y 4.73 91.7 88.9 4.75 98.6 73.5 .06 0.41 0 2.73
17Y 4.67 87.5 82.8 4.59 94.1 73.1 .17 0.7 0 3.67
18Y 4.67 93.8 80 4.6 93.9 76.7 .24 0.8 0 3.67
The increased regulation is positive for the
banks competitiveness exp 9.3
16Y 1.71 73.7 70.4 1.67 76.8 57.1 .48 1.06 0 3.29
17Y 1.83 85.7 48.3 1.67 82.1 60.2 .28 0.81 0 3.17
18Y 1.58 88.9 67.5 1.59 72.6 65.1 .64 1.18 0 3.42
Banks’ products and the way they provide
them will be more equal between banks as a
result of the regulation
exp 9.6
16Y 4.21 87.5 59.3 4.38 90.6 65.3 .32 0.84 0 3.21
17Y 4.27 78.9 65.5 4.35 86.4 71 .31 0.83 0 3.27
18Y 4.39 81.8 55 4.29 91.4 72.1 .23 0.71 0 2.39
Synergies through shared services / processes
/ systems between banks will increase in the
future
exp 9.7
16Y 4.12 100 59.3 4.48 73.8 42.9 .38 0.91 0 3.12
17Y 4.31 80 69 4.26 82.5 61.3 .32 0.84 0 3.31
18Y 4.3 80 62.5 4.3 88.5 67.4 .17 0.65 0 3.3
The changes in the liquidity rules imply
increased competition for consumers and
corporate customers’ money
exp 9.8
16Y 4.09 78.6 51.9 4.29 68.9 45.9 .36 0.84 0 3.09
17Y 4.22 64.3 48.3 4.29 70.5 47.3 .49 1.05 0 3.22
18Y 4.19 72.7 55 4.25 80 50.4 .39 0.94 0 3.19
In the last 0-2 years, it has become more
difficult to recruit managers to the banks exp 18.5
16Y 4.33 90 37 1.75∗∗ 51.6 31.6 .67 1.21 0 3.33
17Y 4.11 75 41.4 4.29 58.3 38.7 .6 1.1 0 3.11
18Y 4.18 64.7 42.5 4.42 47.3 42.6 .56 1.03 0 3.18
Competition banks [N=214] comp b 10 5.72 4.59 29.71
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Table A4: Notations and Major Report Values: Statements Related to Competition from Non-banking Installments
The table presents notations of the statements included to the Competition others variable. The first part of descriptive statistics - Panel A,
presents the mean of the major opinion within industry outsiders. Stars in Panel A stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers for
previous against subsequent year. The second part of descriptive statistics - Panel B, presents similar statistics for industry insiders. Stars in
Panel B stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers of industry insiders and outsiders. Agreement rate (Agrm) in percentage reports
the portion of the respondents expressing similar view (neutral or strict opinion). Expr % (i.e. observed ratio of opinion offer) presents the
portion of respondents expressed their opinion regarding certain statement (all respondents of corresponding type net of those chosen ’non-
informative’ options scaled by total). The third part of descriptive statistics - Panel C, provides the descriptive of Disagreement - dargm βit ,
between industry insiders and dominated view of industry outsiders (mean) with at least one non zero dargm βit in the set of expressions.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Industry outsiders Bankers Disagreement
Statement Var Year Mean Agrm Expr Mean Agrm Expr Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y x agrm expr x agrm expr ∆ σ min max
The banking industry will get increased
competition from other players within 0-2
years
exp 12.1
16Y 4.38 100 88.9 4.52 89.6 68.4 .42 1 0 3.38
17Y 4.5 90.9 75.9 4.57 91.9 79.6 .3 0.86 0 3.5
18Y 4.77∗∗ 97.2 90 4.67 95.2 96.1 .23 0.77 0 2.77
Shadow banks or other players are easier to
develop specific customized solutions than
the banks
exp 12.2
16Y 4.44 94.7 70.4 4.43 83.1 66.3 .68 1.21 0 3.44
17Y 4.43 82.4 58.6 4.42 82.6 74.2 .6 1.14 0 3.43
18Y 4.42 94.3 87.5 4.49 81.1 82.2 .77 1.28 0 3.42
Competition makes it more difficult to
differentiate the Banks products against other
peoples offers
exp 12.3
16Y 4.18 78.6 51.9 4.36 75 57.1 .81 1.23 0 3.18
17Y 4.14 58.3 41.4 4.19 77.8 58.1 .53 1.03 0 3.14
18Y 4.31 81.2 80 4.36 80.4 71.3 .62 1.1 0 3.31
Asset managers (or similar players) will
receive a smaller share of the value in
customer offer within 0-2 years
exp 12.4
16Y 4.4 71.4 51.9 4.43 66.7 45.9 .93 1.34 0 3.4
17Y 4.29 63.6 37.9 1.71 49 52.7 1.15 1.33 0 3.29
18Y 4.23 61.9 52.5 4.23 54.4 61.2 1.24 1.29 0 3.23
The ”non-regulated” actors will be more
regulated within 0-2 years. exp 12.6
16Y 4.47 90.5 77.8 4.26 86.9 62.2 .5 1.08 0 3.47
17Y 4.4 90.9 75.9 4.38 85.9 76.3 .5 1.08 0 3.4
18Y 4.43 93.8 80 4.4 88.7 75.2 .4 0.96 0 3.43
The banks have unique and hard-plagued
processes that give rise to a competitive edge exp 15.2
16Y 1.62 53.3 55.6 1.63 77.6 50 .64 1.14 0 3.38
17Y 1.5 85.7 24.1 1.68 66.7 61.3 .94 1.3 0 3.5
18Y 1.82 78.6 70 1.71 82.1 65.1 .52 1.05 0 3.18
Competition others [N=214] comp o 10 5.72 4.59 29.71
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Table A5: Notations and Major Report Values: Statements Related to Growth and Development Constraints in Result of Regulatory Changes
The table presents notations of the statements included to the Growth variable. The first part of descriptive statistics - Panel A, presents the
mean of the major opinion within industry outsiders. Stars in Panel A stand for the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers for previous against
subsequent year. The second part of descriptive statistics - Panel B, presents similar statistics for industry insiders. Stars in Panel B stand for
the Kruskal-Wallis H test between answers of industry insiders and outsiders. Agreement rate (Agrm) in percentage reports the portion of the
respondents expressing similar view (neutral or strict opinion). Expr % (i.e. observed ratio of opinion offer) presents the portion of respondents
expressed their opinion regarding certain statement (all respondents of corresponding type net of those chosen ’non-informative’ options scaled
by total). The third part of descriptive statistics - Panel C, provides the descriptive of Disagreement - dargm βit , between industry insiders and
dominated view of industry outsiders (mean) with at least one non zero dargm βit in the set of expressions. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Industry outsiders Bankers Disagreement
Statement Var Year Mean Agrm Expr Mean Agrm Expr Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Y x agrm expr x agrm expr ∆ σ min max
The changes in the capital adequacy rules
imply restrictions on what products the bank
offers
exp 9.1
16Y 4.38 92.9 51.9 4.35 78.7 48 .43 1.01 0 3.38
17Y 4.55 78.6 48.3 4.43 71.2 55.9 .68 1.19 0 3.55
18Y 4.27 81.5 67.5 4.26∗ 61 63.6 .77 1.2 0 3.27
The process of preparation for upcoming
unresolved decisions implies restrictions on
the business development of banks
exp 9.5
16Y 4.06 94.1 63 4.54∗ 83.9 63.3 .4 0.93 0 3.06
17Y 4.11 94.7 65.5 4.48∗∗ 90.9 71 .21 0.64 0 2.11
18Y 4.26 76 62.5 4.32 88.9 76.7 .24 0.73 0 3.26
Changes in the regulation reallocate all banks’
development resources to ensure regulatory
compliance =⇒ R&D spendings ↓
exp 12.5
16Y 4.25 84.2 70.4 4.3 82 62.2 .43 0.95 0 3.25
17Y 4.27 64.7 58.6 4.42∗ 82.1 72 .5 1 0 3.27
18Y 4.35 56.7 75 4.29∗∗ 85.1 72.9 .34 0.89 0 3.35
Your bank is fast at adjusting its business
model based on digitization exp 12.7
16Y 1.5 66.7 55.6 4.37∗∗ 60.3 59.2 1.62 1.48 0 3.5
17Y 1.71 53.8 44.8 4.29∗ 63 58.1 1.49 1.33 0 3.29
18Y 1.93 63.6 55 4.33∗∗∗ 65.9 63.6 1.23 1.25 0 3.07
Banks need to be bigger (get more volume) in
order for their processes to be optimal (win
economies of scale)
exp 15.4
16Y 4.25 57.1 51.9 4.41 61.7 61.2 .93 1.25 0 3.25
17Y 4.25 57.1 24.1 4.41 68.8 68.8 .88 1.27 0 3.25
18Y 1.75 50 60 4.42 61.9 75.2 1.51 1.38 0 3.25
In the past 0-2 years, it has become ↑ difficult
for managers recruited outside the banking
industry to adapt to regulatory requirements
at banks.
exp 18.6
16Y 4.36 87.5 59.3 4.39 93.9 50 .13 0.59 0 3.36
17Y 4.5 100 55.2 4.5 95.1 65.6 .13 0.55 0 2.5
18Y 4.41 91.7 60 4.49 90 62 .21 0.75 0 3.41
Growth [N=284] growth 10.44 6.53 4.25 36.51
